Lawyer Advertising Rules Update

Late last month, the South Carolina Supreme Court amended its Rules of Professional Conduct to address several lingering issues related to lawyer advertising. The amended Rules are meant to be consistent with the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  You can read them here. The amendments delete the previous ban on testimonials, eliminate a mandatory solicitation filing requirement and fee, and add requirements for electronic solicitations.

Specifically, advertisements for legal services can now include testimonials IF the ad specifically identifies that the statement is a testimonial, discloses whether or not it was paid for by the lawyer or law firm, and if it was made by an actual client.  Most importantly,  the ad must “clearly and conspicuously” state that the any result achieved in one case “does not necessarily indicate similar results” in another.   Sounds like a really long commercial.  Right?

For a full summary of the new rules, check out blogger Greg Forman’s recent post on the subject here.  He does a great job of laying it out for us.

In the meantime, here is a brief update on what is happening in other states on similar issues:

Florida –  On May 27, 2011, the Florida Bar proposed new rules for attorney advertising which would also allow for the use of some testimonials. See here.

Virginia – Virginia State Bar’s Standing Committee on Legal Ethics has issued proposed amendments to their Rules of Professional Conduct and seeks comments by September 14, 2011.  That’s next week! For a summary of those changes, click here.

Michigan – On July 19, 2011, the Michigan Supreme Court rescinded its previous order that amended that state’s Rules of Professional Conduct and proffered these new amendments. They also provide for a comment period which ends November 1, 2011.

Here’s the deal: the rules have not changed THAT much.  Things have just been clarified a little and updated to include web advertisements and electronic communication.  The same rules of thumb still hold true.  If a statement is a lie, or even stretching the truth, you probably shouldn’t put it in an advertisement pushing your legal services.  You also shouldn’t make any promises or guarantees.  Oh, and keep it classy.  Like this.

 

Vice Squad: On Assignment in the Gulf

Dateline: 12:36 pm, CST, Saturday, September 3, 2011, Pensacola, Florida

Vice Squad here, on location from Florida’s panhandle. I’m on assignment this weekend with a bachelor party for an old friend, conducting field research into the depraved and licentious behavior of young American men bound for holy matrimony. This has required me to go undercover, to blend in with my subjects, to become one of them. Do I do this willingly? Of course not. I do it all in the interests of academic integrity and for the benefit of you, my dear reader. Mostly.

To be certain, I am exposing myself to a certain amount of danger in submitting this field report. As I write, I am sitting outside under the swirling clouds of Tropical Depression Lee. It is gently spitting rain and generally punishing this part of the world with a force equivalent to the cooing of a newborn baby. This weather event, touted as causing a current state of emergency, has prompted local residents to look to the sky and casually proclaim, “Meh.”

The greater danger comes from the circumstances surrounding the preparation of this very post. I’m among five of my closest friends. For a bachelor party. At a beachfront Florida town. On Labor Day weekend. On the first college football Saturday of the season. I’m sure you can imagine how popular I am right now, as I sit here preparing this post. I would love to share with you the things that are being said about me. But I can’t, not unless they’re heavily edited, and even then, I don’t think they’d make grammatical sense. So trust me, I’m enduring a significant amount of personal ridicule to file this field report.

Oh, look. The first round of kickoffs just happened.

The trip so far has been filled with observations about the products we depend on in our daily lives. I’ve highlighted five of those observations for your consideration.

1. Google Maps. We’re staying at my buddy Matt’s house in Pensacola. I’ve never previously been to this city, and frankly, had no idea how to get here or how much time it would take. These problems were quickly solved courtesy of the Google machine. Almost instantaneously, we had alternate routes available and estimated times of arrival. For the most direct route, 7.7 hours from Abnormal Use headquarters in Greenville, South Carolina. No sooner had we gotten this information from Google, something funny happened. We turned on Google. In the blink of an eye, the information provided by Google became an enemy. It was questioning our manhood. “Google says it will take almost 8 hours. That’s [redacted]. I bet we can get there in six and a half. Probably six.” The entire car agreed without hesitation. Literally one minute earlier, none of us had any idea where we were going. One minute later, after Google had shown us the way, we had unanimously voted that Google didn’t know what it was talking about. In fact, we saw Google as challenging us. The machine was daring us to beat its time. Challenge accepted, Google. We left Greenville at 5:45 pm.

We pulled into my pal’s Pensacola driveway at 12:30 am–6.7 hours after departure. Unfortunately, Pensacola is a time zone behind Greenville. It was 1:30 back home. We had been on the road for exactly 7.7 hours. Touche, Google.

2. Chick-fil-A. We decided to stop for dinner on the far side of Atlanta, and we decided there was no better place to recharge our batteries than the Original Chick-fil-A location. The original restaurant is in the Atlanta suburb of Hapeville, which backs up to the far side of the Atlanta airport. If you’ve never been here, you need to go. It’s everything you love about Chick-Fil-A, multiplied by everything you love about Waffle House. There’s table service, a full menu of side items like sweet potato souffle and mac and cheese, and it’s open 24 hours. This raises two important points. First, when I say “full menu,” I mean full menu. Specifically, they serve beef. At a Chick-fil-A. Riddle me that. The second point is even more staggering: it’s open 24 hours. Everyone knows that Chick-fil-A is closed on Sundays. And we have found ourselves on more than a few Sunday mornings wishing that our Creator would make a special exception just one time so we could get a chicken biscuit. Our prayers have gone wholly unanswered. This blew our minds, so we asked our resident Chick-fil-A expert and waitress Tammy how this works. Apparently, the original is open until 4 am on Sunday mornings (almost certainly a prime business time) and then closes until Monday morning. However, Tammy has assured us that she is putting a proposal together to see that the original will also close promptly at midnight. We’re fine with this and we support her efforts. After all, if not everyone can get Chick-fil-A on Sunday, then no one shall get Chick-fil-A on Sunday.

3. Automatic Vehicle Collision Detectors. We took my car to Florida. My car does not have an automatic vehicle collision detector, but I had the next worst thing: my buddy Nick. Somewhere on a quiet stretch of I-65, Nick saw a car on my rear quarter (the only other car around for miles, mind you) start to merge into me. Rather than inform me in a clear, cohesive manner that we were about to be involved in a mass fatality situation, Nick releases an incomprehensible cry that can only be described as the mating call of a yeti. It had been dead quiet in my car before, making his cry that much more alarming. I nearly wrecked from the shock value alone. The merging car moved back in its lane before anything more serious happened. Nick collected himself and explained that the car, at its closest point, was a mere inch away from us. Reports from other parts of the vehicle indicated that while we had a close call, it was nowhere near as close as Nick’s freaking out suggested. Certainly, if we were in danger, a collision detector would be useful, and the risk makes me wish I had the capability in my vehicle. But the fact of the matter is that even if I had a collision detector, Nick’s caterwauling would have drowned it out. Maybe a better feature would have been a cone of silence around his seat. This would have been useful for most of the trip.

4. Cigars. I love a good cigar, especially when I’m driving. There are certain risks involved, though, that are not for the untrained aficianado. First, you’ve got to be careful of where you ash. Hot ash in the lap is not pleasant, not as bad as a boiling hot cup of coffee, sure, but still, not good. Second, you’ve got to be careful about checking your blind spot with a stogie in your mouth, unless you just really like a trail of hot ash streaked across your window. Finally, in particular regard to stick shifts, if you’re pushing into third or fifth while holding your cigar, you’re likely to end up with ash in your cd player. Not that I know first hand about any of these problems . . . .  Moving right along.

5. Matt’s TV. Let me begin by saying that I am grateful for Matt opening up his home to us. However, Matt’s TV is a problem. To be fair, it is a large, flat screen manufactured by a reputable company (which shall remain nameless). And it’s designed for 1080p HD picture quality. Unfortunately, Matt is in a service area that can’t deliver that picture quality, so everything you watch ends up looking like a Tim Burton movie–animated computer graphics. The limited amount of football I’ve been able to watch while writing this post looks like Madden ’12. I say all this for 2 reasons. First, technology is great if there’s the ability to use it. There’s no point in having a Porsche if all the roads are dirt. Don’t get me wrong: this isn’t Matt’s fault. He was relocated to Pensacola from an area that had the ability to deliver high picture quality. But second: now that you’ve moved, Matt, you’ve got to get a TV that doesn’t make everything look like it was made by Pixar.

As an epilogue, I understand that Matt is working on getting a new TV. His flat screen is mounted on the wall with an assembly that is rated to support 30 pounds. Matt’s TV weighs 90. This problem may take care of itself in the very near future.  In related news, I predict my next post will consist of live-blogging a TV falling off a wall.  I’ll be sure to write it with a view toward the post becoming admissible evidence, either in regard to Matt’s insurance claim or his wife’s murder trial.

This is the report from the field. Vice Squad out.

A rose by any other name would smell . . . like a lawsuit.


According to a recent story at UPI.com, a Florida man is suing Winn-Dixie for $15,000 because he pricked his finger on a rose thorn, which was allegedly negligently, recklessly, and unforgivably left attached – to a rose!  In the suit, Plaintiff Charles Imwalle of Lake Mary, Florida claims that he suffered pain, disfigurement, medical bills and lost wages as a result of his encounter with the most delicate of flowers.  The suit also names Passion Growers, L.L.C. as the offending gardeners who ignorantly and negligently left the rose in its natural (though beautiful) state of unreasonable dangerousness.

Disfigurement?  Lost wages?  What was this guy, a hand model?

According to the UPI story, Mr. Disfigured’s lawyer declined to comment to the media.  But, thank goodness, we know from the pleadings what Mr. Disfigured’s lawyer thinks should have been done: there should have been antibacterial solution in the buckets in which the flowers were kept.  So, obviously, they’re claiming that the Plaintiff’s finger became infected.  Which begs the question: How long did this guy actually go without washing his hands?

Each week, we seem to be able to find a new ridiculous lawsuit brought by someone with less common sense than the last person.  And yet, this one might take the cake.  At least until next week.

Jurisdiction of Federal Court Determined by Distributor Liability Analysis

For defendants in products liability actions, the issue of distributor liability is a maddening, state-by-state patchwork of different rules and laws.  The same conduct by one distributor of a product across many states may make it liable for any injuries caused by the product in one state, yet immune from liability in another.  Not only can the role of the distributor be crucial from a liability perspective, but it often has jurisdictional implications as well.  This was the case in Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. and Saracare Corp., 5:11-CV-144/RS-CJK, 2011 WL 2473318 (N.D. Fla. June 22, 2011). The issue was the plaintiff’s motion to remand, i.e. whether the Northern District of Florida had jurisdiction to hear the case at all based on diversity of citizenship.  The plaintiff had sued Medtronic, Inc. and Saracare Corporation on products liability theories, including strict liability, after the death of her decedent allegedly caused by a defective insulin pump.

For diversity purposes, the plaintiff was considered to be a citizen of Florida; Medtronic was a citizen of Minnesota; and SaraCare a citizen of Florida.  No diversity, right?  For all of you with recent memories of law school (which are, alas, distant memories for us), you will understand that the correct answer is always, “Well, it depends!” (For all of you readers who do have recent recollections of law school, be forewarned:  This is also always the right answer in “real life” legal situations, as well). Whatever the case, the jurisdictional question hinged on whether or not SaraCare was a “sham defendant,” in which case the Court would not consider its citizenship for diversity purposes (meaning that there would be diversity after all).  And, since SaraCare was alleged to be a distributor of the insulin pump, the Court’s jurisdictional analysis focused on the potential liability of SaraCare as a distributor. As the Court summarized:

Generally, strict liability extends to those in the “distributive chain” including “retailers, wholesalers, an d distributors.” Strict liability is applicable to distributors of medical products. Strict liability, however, does not generally apply to doctors or hospitals that use a defective medical device incidental to their services.  Similarly, strict liability does not apply to pharmacists who simply dispense prescription drugs and play no role in their preparation.
In this case, SaraCare performed two functions:  first, it confirmed that the letter of necessity met the guidelines of the decedent’s insurance company for reimbursement, and second, it took the order for the pump and routed it to a Medtronic distributor.
The Court determined that SaraCare’s actions were more akin to a traditional distributor than a pharmacist and held that “because Plaintiff claims the pump malfunctioned, the traditional medical device line of strict liability cases governs.”  As such, the strict liability claims could be maintained against SaraCare, and it was determined not to be a sham defendant.  With SaraCare remaining in the case, no complete diversity existed, and the case was remanded to state court.

Another Tomato Farm Takes on FDA, Claims $11 Million in Damages

We recently reported here that a South Carolina family-owned tomato farm had sued the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in South Carolina federal court in Beaufort, alleging that the agency was negligent in its issuing of a 2008 nationwide tomato recall.  Seaside Farm, Inc. v. United States, C.A. No. 9:11-cv-1199-CWH (D.S.C. May 2011).  The FDA issued that recall over fears that tomatoes were the source of salmonella contamination, though, ultimately, the outbreak was traced to a source other than tomatoes.  Well, another tomato farm has since joined in filing suit.

Law360.com reports that Williams Farms Produce Sales, Inc., which grows more than 500 acres of tomatoes in South Carolina and Florida every year, filed suit alleging that it lost $11 million as a result of the recall that later proved to be unnecessary.  The latest suit, which was filed less than one month after the Seaside Farm’s complaint, was filed in federal court in Charleston.  Williams Farms Produce Sales, Inc. v. United States, C.A. No. 2:2011-cv-1399 (D.S.C. June 2011).  Lexology.com reports hat the latest complaint includes causes of action of negligence, defamation, slander of title, product disparagement, unconstitutional taking, and violation of unfair trade practices law, for which the tomato grower seeks actual damages in excess of $11 million, special damages, compensatory damages, treble damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.

These two lawsuits could be the firsts of many, and they certainly demonstrate that the amount of potential damages alleged against the FDA could be staggering.  MiamiHerald.com and FloridaFarmers.org have reported that Florida farmers estimated they lost $60 million as a result of the recall, and that national numbers could be $140 million or more.  They also report that previous attempts in 2008 to acquire voluntary compensation from the government to offset the losses failed, and as such, litigation was almost certain to follow.

Dear expert witnesses: Please perform testing prior to drafting your report. Thanks. Sincerely, The Plaintiffs.

To be a good expert witness, a person should be extremely knowledgeable about the subject upon which he or she is opining.  The expert should preferably have a nice balance of practical and academic experience in his or her field, be good looking, well spoken, and able to articulate complex theories into easy to understand, layman’s terms. Oh, and one more thing.  The expert should probably wait until after he or she conducts testing on the product at issue in a case to draft his or her expert report.

In Cannioto v. Louisville Ladder, No. 8:09-CV-1892-T-30TBM, 2011 WL 2014260 (M.D. Fla. May 20, 2011), the plaintiff Robert Cannioto was allegedly injured when the 24-foot ladder he was standing on performing roofing work failed, causing him to plummet 16 to 18 feet to the ground.  The ladder was manufactured by LL. Cannioto and Home Depot, and Mr. Cannioto and his wife Bonnie Cannioto sued these two companies on theories of (1) strict liability against Louisville Ladder; (2) negligence of Louisville Ladder; (3) strict liability against Home Depot; (4) negligence of Home Depot; and (5) loss of consortium against Louisville Ladder.  The defendants filed a motion to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Charles Benedict, and for summary judgment.

The plaintiffs hired Dr. Bendedict to render an opinion for them about the design and condition of the ladder at issue in the case.  Obviously, the plaintiffs wanted him to say there was something wrong with the ladder.  So, he did, writing a report in which he opined that the ladder was defectively designed.

Unfortunately, Dr. Benedict couldn’t quite get his tests, conducted after he wrote the report, to match his “findings” that the ladder was defectively designed:

In an attempt to prove his theory that the ladder failed as a result of the effect of torsional forces on a defectively designed foot, Benedict had one of his engineers set up a 24–foot extension ladder . . . in a manner similar to the one used by Plaintiff. He then had the engineer stand on the tenth rung of the fly or extended section of the ladder and violently jerk the left rail for almost 10 minutes in an effort to get the ladder to fail. The engineer also set the ladder on uneven ground and placed large weights near one of the feet in an effort to get the rail to fracture. Benedict’s assistants were unable to get the ladder rail to bend or break during the tests.

Don’t you hate when that happens?  So, the expert changed his theory from design defect to manufacturing defect.  In the middle of his deposition.  Without conducting any testing at all on the theory.

During his deposition, Benedict offered a new theory, one about a manufacturing defect rather than a design defect, as to why the subject ladder failed. He testified that the rungs were not properly or adequately attached to the rail and that the rung pulled out. This theory was not in Benedict’s expert report and Benedict admitted that he had not performed any testing to support this theory.
Not surprisingly, defense counsel argued at the hearing that Dr. Benedict should be excluded from testifying about the manufacturing defect because that particular theory had not been included in his expert report as required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B), FRCP.  Once the expert was excluded by the court, the plaintiffs could not support their theory of the case, and the defendants were granted summary judgment.

Hall v. Sunjoy Industries and Kmart: How NOT to litigate a products liability case

Growing up, we here at Abnormal Use were told more than once that one can learn more from failures than successes. If that’s the case, the perpetrators of one recent Florida lawsuit may have learned a great deal recently. See Hall v. Sunjoy Indus. Group Inc., No. 8:09-cv-2032-T-30MAP, 2011 WL 589830 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2011).

The facts are simple. Plaintiff Dorothy Hall sat on a patio chair displayed in the garden center at her local Kmart. The chair collapsed, causing her to allegedly suffer “various injuries, including a painful back condition.” Hall and her husband sued Kmart as the retailer, and Sunjoy as the alleged manufacturer on theories of strict liability for a manufacturing defect, negligence for failing to inspect and test the chair, and negligent failure to warn. They also sued Kmart on a fourth count, res ipsa loquitur for displaying the chair. Both defendants filed summary judgment motions on all counts, as well as a motion to dismiss based on the plaintiffs’ dishonesty during their depositions. The plaintiffs also filed a motion to establish a rebuttable presumption of negligence based on the fact that the chair was not preserved.

Here are the lessons that we can take from this case:

Lesson #1: Make Sure You Sue the Correct Manufacturer. This may be obvious advice, but these plaintiffs could have used it before facing the court on this issue. Apparently, Sunjoy was not the chair manufacturer. In fact, the record was undisputed as to that fact. In order to avoid Sunjoy’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss Sunjoy without prejudice. The court wasn’t buying their trick and remarked:

When the parties have expended considerable resources to fully develop a case, a court may infer that a plaintiff seeks a voluntary dismissal solely to avoid a pending motion for summary judgment.

In those cases, it is appropriate to do as this court did: deny the motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice and grant the summary judgment motion.

Lesson #2: Hire the Necessary Experts. The plaintiffs’ first count against both defendants was a strict liability claim for a manufacturing defect. Step one in building such a case is to establish that there is, in fact, a defect. Expert testimony is necessary on this issue if the defect is latent, i.e., not obvious, as in this case. In fact, the plaintiffs needed to establish, through expert testimony, that the chair malfunctioned when it collapsed. While this may appear to be an easy question because the chair in fact collapsed, the court explained that “While the chair may have broken after Plaintiff sat on it, this does not automatically mean the chair ‘malfunctioned.'” The plaintiffs also sacrificed their design defect claim by failing to hire an expert who could provide expert testimony about whether or not testing or an inspection could have revealed a design defect. Finally, the plaintiffs’ negligent failure to warn claim failed because of a lack of expert testimony. “A claim that a warning is necessary and that the failure to warn rendered a product unreasonably dangerous and defective requires a warnings expert,” the court noted.

Lesson #3: Vet Your Clients Properly. The plaintiffs also filed a claim of res ipsa against Kmart. The court granted summary judgment on this claim for two reasons: First, the plaintiffs could not prove that the chair was in the store’s exclusive control because it was in the garden department where people, like Ms. Hall, could sit in it. Second, the court held that the plaintiffs had not presented “any evidence that the reason for the chair’s collapse was some act of the Defendants as opposed to Ms. Hall’s excessive weight” of over 350 lbs.

Even more on this point. The court’s opinion in this case included several footnotes alluding to the fact that both Mr. and Mrs. Hall appear to have perjured themselves, in either their depositions or in affidavits, or both. Not only is that a problem for them, but it could be a problem for their lawyers. It appears that the court did not find the legal theories any more admirable than the Plaintiffs, as evidenced by the reference to the Rule 11 motion which was filed by Sunjoy, based on the fact that Sunjoy was not the manufacturer of the chair.

Lesson #4: Keep the Evidence. The plaintiffs also filed a motion asking the court to grant them a rebuttable presumption of negligence based on the fact that Kmart didn’t preserve the chair at issue in the case even after a preservation letter was sent. Apparently, Kmart kept it initially, but discarded it after seven months, thinking the case was “old.” Because the court found no evidence of bad faith by Kmart, it denied the plaintiffs’ motion. Still, this is one of the cardinal rules of defending a products case: keep track of the evidence, or it may lead to a presumption of negligence later.

Hot Coffee: Take Two (In Florida)

We here at Abnormal Use garnered a bit of buzz with our recent comments on Susan Saladoff’s Hot Coffee documentary and the Stella Liebeck litigation. Some of our critics have interpreted our remarks as an attempt to re-litigate that infamous McDonald’s case. Those critics scolded us and purported that “it’s over.” They advised us to simply “move on” and write on other topics. Perhaps those critics were right. Certainly, the details of a 1994 lawsuit must be irrelevant in today’s legal landscape. However, someone forgot to tell Florida’s Cynthia Gamrot.
According to the local ABC news affiliate, Ms. Gamrot recently ordered a cup of coffee at a Chick-Fil-A drive-thru in St. Petersburg, Florida. She allegedly spilled coffee in her lap and sustained second- and third-degree burns after the cup’s lid “popped off.” The coffee was served at a temperature somewhere between 170 and 200 degrees which was reportedly in accordance with Chick-Fil-A corporate policy. As a result, she sued the owner of the St. Petersburg Chick-Fil-A. (The report did not specify the jurisdiction in which the case was filed). Sound familiar?
In response to Ms. Gamrot’s lawsuit, Tampa’s ABC Action News tested the serving temperature of 33 cups of coffee from 10 national restaurant chains – a task reminiscent of law clerk Danny Jarrett’s work in the Liebeck case. The station’s study indicated that the majority of the coffee was served between 150 and 180 degrees. It should be noted, however, that the coffee served in the 150-degree temperature range came primarily from Arby’s and Wendy’s – two restaurants that do not serve breakfast and are not historically known for their coffee. Starbucks, Dunkin Donuts, Krispy Kreme, and McDonalds all tested in the 168 to 180 degree range.
Back in 1994, Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Charles Baxter opined during the Liebeck trial that the optimal temperature to serve coffee was between 155 and 160 degrees. Defense expert Dr. Turner Osler indicated that coffee served at a temperature as low as 130 degrees could result in burns similar to those sustained by Ms. Liebeck. Further, Reed Morgan, Ms. Liebeck’s counsel, theorized that any coffee served over 140 degrees was “unreasonably dangerous.” If this testimony from the Liebeck trial is true, why do top fast food chains continue to serve an allegedly “dangerous product?” Either restaurants have a diabolical agenda to harm their patrons or they have recognized that people enjoy their coffee piping hot.
The ABC affiliate’s study demonstrates that the Liebeck case did little, if anything, to alter the manner in which fast food restaurants serve coffee. Further, it reveals that the conduct of McDonald’s in the early 1990s conformed to industry standards – both then and now. Critics of the restaurant chain – and those who attempt to use the Liebeck case to advance the agenda of the Plaintiffs’ bar – simply fail to acknowledge the fact that coffee, by its very nature, is meant to be served hot. No one wants to consume a lukewarm cup of sub-140 degree coffee. Restaurants recognize this fact, as do consumers of coffee. Why can’t the trial bar? If Mr. Morgan honestly believes that any coffee served at a temperature greater than 140 degrees is “unreasonably dangerous,” then he essentially argues that coffee should be taken off of restaurant menus. Starbucks did not become a morning staple because of its iced coffee selections.
In no way are we here at Abnormal Use intending to trivialize the injuries of coffee burn victims.
No one is disputing the severity of Ms. Liebeck or Ms. Gamrot’s burns. We do, however, question the need for attributing liability for those burns to the producer or seller of the coffee. There is no evidence that either Ms. Liebeck or Ms. Gamrot expressed any concerns with their fast food-produced coffee prior to their accidents. In fact, we imagine they probably enjoyed the hot product, which is why they ordered it in the first place. They might have even complained had they been served coffee cooler than the industry standard temperature. Simply put, hot coffee does not become “unreasonably dangerous” until it is negligently spilled by the consumer.

It’s Cheese and a Lawsuit Against The Mouse

The Mouse takes great umbrage that someone would complain of the cheese he graciously bestows upon us. The Mouse takes great pride in his cheese. But as you can see here, here, here, and here, multiple news outlets and blogs have picked up the story of a recent lawsuit filed against Disney for the ancient tort of injury by Nacho. Unfortunately, this case features a real injury. Four-year-old Isaiah Harris became hurt when he found himself about to fall (from an unsteady chair, of course), grabbed a tray of food for balance, and suffered an encounter with a “paper cup of scalding nacho cheese.” Of course, like all hot food and beverage proceedings, this lawsuit conjures up the spirit of Stella Liebeck, her hot coffee lawsuit, and its progeny that have been well chronicled. So in light of all of that, what is the real significance of this lawsuit?

First, it’s amazing to see the public reaction to these lawsuits. Scroll down through the comments to the news stories and blogs to see thoughts from those who have absolutely no sympathy for the child and blame everything on the parents. The commenting public now automatically equates a hot food lawsuit with frivolity, which, lawyers who followed the Liebeck case know is not always the case. Ms. Liebeck probably did very well for herself, settling her case on appeal after receiving a substantial jury verdict. Nevertheless, some part of the public thinks that hot food lawsuits are frivolous and remain unafraid to air their personal grievances. Whether this is attributable to a vague conception of a litigation tax on products, or some other archaic conception of pure contributory negligence, would be a fairly boring subject for a sociology paper.

Second, not that the lawyer would need this, but it is interesting that the public can issue spot in such cases. Scroll through the comments and see the number of people that remark upon the picture of Isaiah, the probability that a paper cup of cheese would land precisely on his mouth (where it looks like he tried to drink the cheese), and posit their own version of the facts. Website comments now double as free jury research. My own personal issue-spot: Why didn’t anyone handling this paper cup of cheese notice the purported temperature?

Third, and getting to the legal matters at hand, it’s not clear to me what the reasonable expectation of the consumer would be in a case involving nacho cheese. It’s not at all clear to me that the subject nacho topping was actually cheese. Does a consumer have a reasonable expectation that his or her nacho topping is actually cheese? It would be perfectly appropriate for the plaintiff’s parents to argue that they assumed that the topping was an unnaturally viscous liquid-at-room-temperature cheese-like substance. If it was cheese, then we will likely need to look for a cheese expert from the American Cheese Society and perhaps attend the Sonoma Valley Opportunities and Challenges Cheese Conference for further education on a consumer’s reasonable expectation of cheese temperature. There is no doubt that this lawsuit will appear on the conference agenda as the public fallout from injury by cheese is a serious topic to consider.

Fourth, while we often call out plaintiffs’ lawyers on the blog, the plaintiff’s attorney in this case, one Sean Cahill, seems to be a legitimate defense lawyer, who belongs to several defense-oriented organizations, at least according to his website. Perhaps Mr. Cahill is simply trying to beef up his cheese liability practice. Who knows? We’ll see if The Mouse pays something on this suit. Anyway, next time you go to Disney World, test the nachos.

Florida Court: Members of Decertified Tobacco Class Action May Use Factual Findings in Individual Cases

Cigarettes and asbestos are two products that refuse to phase out of products liability cases. And, in the case of cigarette smoking, that long litigation history recently came back to haunt R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company in an appeals court in Florida in the case of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Martin, 2010 WL 5074839 (Fla. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2010).

A little background. In 1994, a class action was filed against cigarette companies, including R.J. Reynolds, seeking damages for smoking-related illnesses and deaths. The class was eventually decertified by the Florida Supreme Court in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006). The case didn’t die there, though; as the Court in Martin stated, the Florida Supreme Court “allowed certain jury findings from the class action to have res judicata effect in any subsequent lawsuits by individual class members seeking damages from the defendants.”

The Engle trial was divided into three phases. During Phase I, the jury was asked to consider “common issues relating exclusively to the defendants’ conduct and the general health effects of smoking” and entitlement to punitive damages. Phase II dealt with whether the three class representatives received compensatory damages and the amount of class punitive damages they would receive, if the jury found entitlement to punitive damages during Phase I. Phase III would deal with liability to and compensatory damages for the remaining class members.

During Phase I, the jury found evidence to prove several claims against the tobacco defendants, and it also concluded that there was sufficient evidence for an award of punitive damages. Following Phase II, the jury awarded $12.7 million to the class representatives, and $145 billion in punitive damages to the class. (Note: yes, we said billion, with a “b.”) The defendants appealed before Phase III began.

The Martin case was the first to consider the appeal of the preclusive effect of the Phase I findings as to individual class members. At the trial phase of Martin, the jury awarded Plaintiff $5 million in compensatory damages (later reduced to $3.3 million based on apportionment of fault) and $25 million in punitive damages. On appeal, the Court framed the issues as follows:

RJR primarily contends that the trial court gave the findings approved in Engle overly broad preclusive effect and thus relieved the plaintiff .
. . of her burden to prove legal causation on her negligence and strict
liability claims. RJR also asserts [Plaintiff] failed to prove the reliance
element of her fraudulent concealment claim, and that the punitive damage award
is excessive and unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s use of the Phase I findings from Engle, stating that during Phase I of Engle, “the jury considered and determined specific matters related to the defendants’ conduct” and that, in trying to minimize the preclusive effect of the Engle decision, “[R.J. Reynolds] urges an application of the supreme court’s decision that would essentially nullify it.” The Martin court also declined to follow an Eleventh Circuit decision in Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2008), stating that “we find it unnecessary to distinguish between [issue preclusion and claim preclusion] or to define what the supreme court meant by ‘res judicata.'”

The decision goes on to discuss several related issues, but the damage was done primarily by this holding, which is just dangerous. As mentioned earlier, tobacco and asbestos are two products with long histories in the courts. True, Engle specifically discussed, considered, and ruled that class members who were purported members of the decertified class action could use the findings later as they brought individual suits and it is possible that the issue will stay relatively contained and limited to those cases. However, the Engle and Martin decisions also crack the door just enough to give plaintiffs the idea that they can reach back years, if not decades, to discover findings against defendants that may benefit them if their own court allows them to use the findings for their own advantages.

Unfortunately, there is also a huge potential incentive to trial courts to use these prior findings as well. Here in South Carolina, and probably across the nation, court systems are struggling to keep pace with long dockets and reduced budgets, and it would be very easy for a court to cut corners, save time, and rely on prior findings against a defendant who routinely comes before it. Strangely, this approach could backfire–in jurisdictions where past holdings rule, plaintiffs will race to file their claims there, creating just the problem the courts sought to avoid.