Not too long ago, we reported on the decision of an Oklahoma federal court to toss a $951,000 jury verdict against Hillerich and Bradsby, the manufacturer of Louisville Slugger baseball bats. As you may recall, the jury had awarded a 15-year old boy and his parents nearly $1 million after he was struck in the face by a line drive, causing severe facial injuries. In reaching its decision, the jury determined that the aluminum bat was defective and unreasonably dangerous because it could hit a ball faster than its wooden counterparts – a condition for which Louisville Slugger failed to warn. Moreover, it determined that the boy did not assume the risk of injury when electing to play baseball. The court held, however, that there was “no basis for a reasonable jury to find that the bat had ‘dangerous characteristics.’”

In an unpublished decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant Hellerich’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. In a well-written opinion, the Court examined the plaintiff’s theory that the bat was unreasonably dangerous because it hit a ball “too fast.” In order to recover on such a theory, logically the plaintiff would need to show the the speed of a ball off of an “ordinary” bat versus the speed of the ball off of the bat at issue. Because the plaintiff produced no objective evidence of either component, the Court held that the district court judge did not err in correcting the jury’s verdict on defective design. The opinion can be found at Yeaman v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., No. 12-6254 (10th. Cir. June 30. 2014).

While this case involves a much different set of facts and rests on a different theory of recovery, it is an interesting contrast to the recent flying hot dog opinion in which the court held that the risk of being hit by a flying dog was not inherent to baseball and, thus, a baseball team could not be shielded from liability. The risks of being injured by a ball struck by a bat are clearly inherent to the game. This Louisville Slugger case, on the other hand, attempted to establish that the bat was somehow unreasonably dangerous beyond those inherent risks. An interesting theory, to be sure. While the jury may have bought it, the court saw otherwise.

Jury instructions served as the basis for appeal in Kokins v. Teleflex, Inc., 621 F.3d 1290 (10th Cir. 2010) (PDF). This suit arose out of an accident involving a city park ranger, who was thrown from a boat after the boat’s steering cable snapped and sustained a permanent injury to her ankle. She sued the manufacturer of the steering cable, alleging that it was defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous. During discovery, the parties determined and agreed that the reason the cable snapped was because water had somehow entered the core of the cable and caused it to rust. The parties could not agree on how the water got there. The plaintiff alleged that the cable was defectively designed and that a simple fix to the design could have prevented the water from entering into the cable’s core. Teleflex, however, provided evidence at trial that the cable was improperly installed, and had not undergone routine maintenance.

The case arises out of a plane crash that occurred shortly after takeoff on January 21, 2005. Id. at *1. The crash resulted in the deaths of the pilot and all four passengers. Id. The Plaintiffs in this consolidated action were the heirs of the four deceased passengers. Id. The plane’s engines were manufactured by Honeywell’s predecessor-in-interest in 1979. Honeywell repaired the plane’s left engine in 2003 and subsequently declared that the engine was airworthy. Id. The Plaintiffs brought suit against Honeywell for wrongful death on three theories: (1) negligent repair of the left engine; (2) strict product liability; and (3) breach of implied warranty. Id.

The majority of the opinion dealt with each parties’ respective motions to exclude expert testimony. However, the most intriguing portion of the opinion was the court’s analysis of Honeywell’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiffs’ strict liability and implied warranty claims. Honeywell argued that since it had only repaired the engine in 2003, Kansas law would not support a claim for strict product liability or breach of an implied warranty when there was not an accompanying sale of the product. Id. at *8.

The court began by recognizing the fact that the Plaintiffs had conceded that their claims for strict liability and breach of warranty were not based on an alleged defect in the engine when it was originally manufactured and sold in 1979. Id. The court then provided a brief summary of Kansas law with respect to strict liability and implied warranty claims. Specifically, the court stated that Kansas, with respect to strict liability claims, had adopted section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts. Id. at *9. As such, liability attaches to one who sells a defective product. The court also reiterated that Kansas courts have required a plaintiff to show that the good’s defect was present when it left the manufacturer’s control and that an implied warranty arises out of a contract for the sale of goods. Id.

In response, the Plaintiffs argued that Honeywell’s repair of the left engine in 2003 was of such magnitude to have constituted a remanufacturing of the engine. Id. Nevertheless, the court stressed the fact that there was no evidence that the repair in 2003 constituted a sale: “[t]here is no evidence, however, that the title to the engine did not remain with the owner during repair or that the engine was re-sold by the defendant at that time.” Id. Furthermore, the court relied on Kansas law for the proposition that the term “manufacturer” includes one that remanufactures a product before its sale to a consumer. Id. Finally, the court held that under Kansas law, which is now in line with the majority of jurisdictions, a claim for strict liability or breach of an implied warranty will not extend to repair situations where there is not a sale of the product. Id.

Thus, in light of this opinion, it appears that the bleeding will now stop with regards to strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims arising out of a repair of a product that has already been sold.