In honor of the Tea Party’s victory/destruction of the country as we know it, we here at Abnormal Use take this opportunity to write about tea. Not just any tea, mind you, but extremely, piping hot tea. Tea so hot, that if you removed the lid and poured it on your body, it would burn you just as if it were brewed in the fires of Hephaestus himself. A tea so destructive and ominous that it has earned the street name of “2012.” Notice that if you remove the “0” from 2012, you find yourself with 212, which is the Fahrenheit temperature at which water boils, so obviously, the imminent collapse of humanity has much to do with boiling hot tea.

Unfortunately, this is 2010, a time in which poor 76-year-old Plaintiff Rachel Moltner simply cannot subsidize her own negligence with the profits of the mega-corporation Starbucks. In yet another hot beverage case, we see a purportedly evil-beverage serving corporation forcing consumers to burn themselves and then legally smiting the innocent consumer via summary judgment, surely while the CEO lights his cigar with $100 bills and guffaws mercilessly.

On Tuesday of this week, the Second Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment to Starbucks against Moltner in Moltner v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. 09-4943-cv, 2010 WL 4291299 (2d Cir. Nov. 2, 2010) [PDF]. After several months of ordering a weekly regular sized hot tea, Ms. Moltner upgraded to the “Venti,” a 20-oz behemoth of a beverage. The tea was double-cupped and sleeved, the purpose of which, was, of course, to protect the consumer from burning her hand on the very hot elixir. Moltner was handed the beverage, lid in place. She then ambled over to a table to pour some sugar into her tea. As she removed the lid, she poured some tea into her shoe, causing her burns necessitating skin grafts, as well as some secondary injuries related to her hospital stay, including bed sores, a fractured sacrum, and some herniated discs. (As an aside, Ms. Moltner’s “coffee name” was Plaintiff Oldy McOlderton.)

Per the district court, however, at Moltner v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. 08 Civ 9257, 2009 WL 3573190 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2009), plaintiff’s counsel tried to spin this double cupping: “Plaintiff alleges that the double cup constitutes a dangerous defect . . . .” While a double cup may be inadvisable or ineffective in other walks of life, here, in fact, it was no defect. Furthermore, expert suppositions about grip positioning or finger size were likewise dismissed. (We’d like to see the CV of the tea cup grip positioning expert.). Plaintiff also tried to make some hay with an apparent directive from Starbucks to its employees that they not double cup because it changes the cup’s center of gravity. Seriously. I have never thought about ensuring that my beverages have a low center of gravity. Unfortunately for her, Ms. Moltner’s quest for not more than $3 million dollars ended in a sweet and frothy summary judgment. Pour some sugar in that.

Lest you think me heartless, I do empathize with Ms. Moltner. I don’t wish injury upon anyone, but spilling a hot beverage on yourself is not grounds for a cause of action. It wasn’t in 1992, and it isn’t 18 years later. It’s just carelessness or bad luck or the whims and caprices of the fates. Please just accept some responsibility and be careful when you double cup.

You can read the rest of the summary judgment order yourself. I will note that valuable resources of the federal judiciary were occupied hearing the motions and writing the 41 page order in this case. Moreover, there was a fair amount of discovery taken in this case, with the plaintiff deposed not once but twice. Perhaps the airline’s attorney could not believe what he heard the first time. There was also some talk of Luna amending her complaint to add sasquatch fur as a second foreign object, and the airline was forced to conduct discovery on the existence of Bigfoot.

I now fear that someday I may be writing on discovery relating to sasquatch. After all, if Luna had alleged that she had sasquatch fur in her food (and had retained the fur), wouldn’t that be a cognizable claim? My hope is that the sasquatch case is filed in South Carolina, and I get to be a part of that discovery.

This past Tuesday, Orin Kerr of The Volokh Conspiracy remarked upon the case of United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926), a notable Fourth Amendment case in which future U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan II – then an Assistant U.S. Attorney – argued before a Second Circuit panel which included the famed Justice Learned Hand, who ultimately authored the opinion in that case. Kerr noted playfully: “Counsel for the defendant, a Mr. Leo Klugherz, is slightly less known.” Perhaps so.

But that prompted our diligent researchers here at Abnormal Use to do a bit of cybersleuthing and investigation into the past of Mr. Klugherz. Who was this unsung participant in this case who once stood in a room with a future U.S. Supreme Court Justice and one of the most famous jurists never to serve on that Court? What’s his story, and what became of him?

All we know from the Kirschenblatt opinion is that he was a criminal defense lawyer who represented those accused of doing those things that were illegal during Prohibition.

Klugherz is certainly not remembered on the Internet. A simple Google search of “Leo Klugherz” reveals very little, and in fact, the most prominent result is Kerr’s post.

So we dug deeper, and we learned a bit more about this “slightly less known” attorney.

Leo Henry Klugherz attended law school at New York University and was admitted to practice law in 1904. According to this 1919 law directory, for at least part of his career, Klugherz practiced out of New York’s Liberty Tower at 55 Liberty Street. A Westlaw search of his name reveals that he was counsel of record in nearly 80 reported opinions from 1918 to 1941 (the first of those being People v. Smorack, 119 N.E. 1065 (N.Y. 1918) (per curiam)). He was described as a “splendid lawyer and delightful companion” in Norman Levy’s 1958 book, My Double Life: Adventures in Law and Letters. He would live another fifteen years after the Kirschenblatt case.

His two paragraph obituary, published in The New York Times on October 19, 1941 (and only available through The New York Times subscription paywall archive), noted:

Leo H. Klugherz, a member of the New York bar for thirty-five years who had specialized in criminal law, died yesterday at his home, 1937 Eighty-first Street, Brooklyn, after a day’s illness of heart disease, at the age of 58.

Mr. Klugherz leaves a widow, the former Stella Schoenfeld, a daughter, Marjorie, two sons, Richard and Daniel, and a sister, Mrs. Blanche Rosen.

His son, Daniel, apparently became a documentary film-maker.

Klugherz seems to have had quite the legal career. The same year Kirschenblatt was released, Klugherz squared off against Harlan in another appeal, that being Horowitz v. United States, 11 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1926) (per curiam). However, the facts of that case may be lost to history, as the Westlaw entry is simply an affirmance without an accompanying opinion.

Of further interest, Klugherz was no stranger to Learned Hand.

Aside from Kirschentblatt and its companion case, United States v. Kirsch, 16 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1926), Klugherz appeared before Learned Hand in the following reported cases:

• United States v. Adamowicz, 82 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1936)
• United States v. Busch, 64 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1933)
• Grossberg v. Mulligan, 48 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1931)
• United States v. Auerbach, 47 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1931)
• United States v. Grossberg, 47 F.2d 597 (2d Cir 1931)
• Maqueo v. Hecht, 32 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1929)
• Picker v. United States, 28 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1928)
• Rouda v. United States, 10 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1926)

Most were per curiam opinions or affirmances without opinion (and it’s unclear whether he participated in oral argument, if any, in the cases), but the Rouda case resulted in a full opinion authored by Learned Hand who once again addressed Prohibition era facts.

It gets better: Klugherz also appeared before Justice Augustus Hand, Learned’s first cousin, on at least two occasions, those being:

• Guterman v. Moore, 46 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1931) (per curiam)
• United States v. Rosenstein, 34 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1929) (Manton, J.)

According to Westlaw, on at least three occasions, the U.S. Supreme Court denied his petitions for cert.

The full transcript of a 1921 assault case defended by Klugherz is available at the Lloyd Sealy Library’s “Trial Transcripts of the County of New York 1883-1927” collection at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Alas, that transcript is on microfiche and not online in any form.

Klugherz never lived to see Harlan become an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, a position to which he was appointed in 1955. However, in that court room in the 1920s, Klugherz surely knew that Harlan, his opponent, was the grandson of a U.S. Supreme Court justice.

Though he is not remembered today, it certainly seems that he had a long and storied career.

In a case against pharmaceutical giant Merck that ended with a mistrial in September 2009 when jurors became hopelessly deadlocked, the jury for the second go-round recently awarded the plaintiff $8 million, which was reportedly $3 million more than her attorneys had asked for.

The case was one of several bellwether cases being tried in federal court in Manhattan involving Merck’s osteoporosis drug Fosamax. The company is reportedly facing more than 1,000 cases in state and federal courts in which plaintiffs allege the drug is defectively designed in that it can cause a jaw-destroying condition known as osteonecrosis. According to The Wall Street Journal, of the so-called bellwether cases, one was thrown out last year, a jury recently found in favor of Merck in a second, and a fourth is set to be tried in November.

United States District Judge John Kleenan oversees the federal Fosamax cases. He has set a hearing for September in which Merck will present post-trial motions to overturn the recent verdict. In this regard, it appears as though the plaintiff’s $8 million verdict may be in jeopardy.

Paul F. Strain, counsel for Merck, reportedly has said in a post-trial statement that he believes the jury’s verdict was a result of “plaintiff’s counsel’s inflammatory and prejudicial remarks.” And it appears as though Judge Keenan agrees. Although Merck unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial, arguing that plaintiff’s counsel improperly used his closing statement to encourage the jury to punish Merck with its verdict, Judge Keenan, 80, reportedly told lawyers of the closing outside of the jury’s presence: “I have never heard a more outrageous summation in my life than the one I heard yesterday.” Encouraging words for Merck officials, who recently issued a statement indicating the company’s intent to challenge the jury’s verdict.

Not only are these tasty treats two of my favorite indulgences, but they are the subjects of two pending products liability actions.

On May 13, 2010, New York resident Mirko Carrea (“Carrea“) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Carrea, on behalf of himself and a nationwide class of consumers, alleged that Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream labels are misleading and could deceive a reasonable consumer into believing that their products are healthier than they truly are. Carrea v. Dreyer’s Ice Cream, No. 3:10-1044, amended complaint filed (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2010). The Federal Drug Administration provided that a product with more than 13 grams of total fat or 4 grams of saturated fat cannot claim to be trans-fat-free. Carrea takes issue with the fact that nothing on the Dreyer’s Drumstick ice cream cone directs a consumer to the nutritional information, even though it contains 19 grams of fat and 10 grams of saturated fat. Carrea also takes issue with the fact that the label uses the work “original” and the ingredients when this product was first made differs from the ingredients used today. Carrea seeks restitution of funds gained through this alleged “false advertising” and an injunction to stop marketing in this manner.

Another interesting suit was filed on May 3, 2010 by Agnes Mercado (“Mercado”), a New York women, who asserted that she ate two to three bags of popcorn a day for about 16 years and, as a result, developed severe lung disease that may require a lung transplant. Mercado v. ConAgra Foods Inc., et al., No. 11069/10, complaint filed (N.Y. Supreme Ct., Queens County May 3, 2010). Mercado filed suit against ConAgra and Givaudan Flavors Corp., manufacturers of the butter flavoring diacetyl added to the popcorn. She alleges that the diacetyl causes “serious debilitating” respiratory illnesses. Mercado’s complaint alleges negligence, defective design, failure to warn and breach of warranty. She is seeking $100 million in compensatory damages and punitive damages.

Two thoughts – ice cream is not “healthy” in any form and 2 to 3 bags of popcorn a day for 16 years, she must be acquaintances with the Plaintiff we wrote about in our A Can of Tuna a Day post. Both of these action will be interesting to follow to see how at least two courts address claims by Plaintiffs seeking damages for what likely are open and obvious risks?

I’ve never driven a forklift, and I’ve also never been fortunate enough to have been injured at work. It would be nice to collect from the worker’s compensation carrier and then have the luxury of filing suit against some third-party. Tashee Parker was employed by Home Depot at one of its distribution centers. Mr. Parker was hurt when the forklift he was driving collided with a pallet jack, injuring his foot. The Supreme Court in Orange County, New York, in Parker v. Raymond Corp., No. 2005/7189, 2010 WL 1999529 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 17, 2010), recently terminated Mr. Parker’s case against the forklift manufacturer via summary judgment.

Parker alleged that the forklift had a design defect. What he didn’t know at the outset was that the forklift was “first developed by Raymond in the 1940s.” Also, the design and manufacture of the forklift are “subject to certain design and safety standards . . . which . . . have been incorporated into Federal regulations. . . . The subject forklift meets or exceeds all such requirements and standards.” If you are a plaintiff, it is not a good sign when the court points out that the equipment that you claim has a design defect has been around for more than 60 years and exceeds the necessary regulations. The forklift probably doesn’t have a design defect. Most likely. Someone probably would have found it before you, Mr. Johnny-come-lately plaintiff.

It comes as no surprise to most of us that plaintiffs regularly make fantastical arguments. Usually, these fantastical arguments succeed in defeating summary judgment, allowing the plaintiff to settle his lawsuit for more than it is worth. The New York Supreme Court did not buy what the plaintiff was selling. Plaintiff argued that the forklift should have been made with a “foot guard” to “facilitate the operator’s ability to safely remain within the confines of the compartment,” even though Plaintiff admitted at deposition that he was trained to remain in the operator’s compartment, and, had he done so, he would not have been injured. Moreover, the Plaintiff had his expert introduce a sham affidavit to defeat summary judgment, even though at the expert’s deposition “he was unable to recall any basis to conclude that the design of Defendant Raymond’s forklift violated any ANSI standard.” Summary judgment granted.

While no new groundbreaking law was announced in Parker, it’s always fun to read an opinion that rebuts ridiculosity at every point. More than likely, it would have been cheaper to pay Parker than to conduct discovery, get an expert, depose the other expert, and move for summary judgment. But Raymond decided to pay more and give Parker what he deserved. Raymond Corporation, we here at Abnormal Use salute you.

In the summer of 1997, Walter Adams, a maintenance man, climbed into a personnel lift (a device which a basket into which a person enters and presses a button, which causes the basket to rise or lower depending upon the operator’s preference). After he had taken the basket to a height of approximately twelve feet, the lift tipped to one side and Adams fell from the basket. Adams later brought suit against Genie Industries, Inc., the designer, manufacturer, and seller of the lift at issue. Following a trial, a jury found that the lift had been defectively designed. Yesterday, nearly thirteen years after the accident at issue, the New York Court of Appeals, that state’s highest court, affirmed that verdict in Adams v. Genie Industries, Inc., No. 67, 2010 WL 1849325 (N.Y. May 11, 2010) [PDF].

The Plaintiff’s principal theory was that the lift at issue did not have interlocking outriggers. The device actually came with outriggers, but sometime between the purchase of the lift in 1986 and the accident in 1997, Plaintiff’s employer lost them. That didn’t affect Plaintiff’s employer’s use of the equipment, though, and the lift remained in service despite a warning on the equipment advising that “[a]ll outriggers must be installed before using.” Plaintiff theorized that the lift was unsafe because the outriggers at issue did not feature an interlocking mechanism, i.e. a device that would prevent the lift from being operated without the outriggers installed and in use.

The evidence clearly showed that the use of outriggers would have made the product safer. Expert testimony explained that outriggers would have expanded the product’s “footprint,” making it more stable by distributing its weight over a wider area. Indeed, Genie’s own label warned against using the product without outriggers. It is thus reasonable to conclude that an interlock, making use without outriggers impossible, would have increased the safety of the product.

Plaintiff also offered evidence from which a jury could find that, in 1986 when the product was sold, it was technologically possible, at minimal cost, to design the product with interlocked outriggers. A qualified expert so testified, and illustrated his point with a model that he had created of Genie’s machine, to which he had added a half dozen switches, of a kind available in the late 1980s for $20 to $25 each.

The court acknowledged Genie’s point that liability could not attach “merely on a showing that a safer product was theoretically possible at the time the machine was made.” However, the Court cited to testimony that a former Genie employee had specifically envisioned and discussed the possibility of interlocked outriggers in 1985, a year before the sale of the device at issue, and that he recalled thatGenie had obtained a competitor’s lift featuring interlocked outriggers in 1985, as well. Further, a Genie official had apparently secured company permission in 1985 to present the idea of interlocked outriggers before a safety panel in 1985 to an industry safety committee.

The court sustained Genie’s point of error that the trial court had erred in submitting to the jury the issue of its alleged negligence from 1986 to 1997 in failing to retrofit or recall the lift at issue. However, the court essentially punted on this issue, finding that the error was harmless.

In so doing, the Court remarked:

Our decisions make clear that, in general, the duty of the seller of a product who discovers, after the sale, risks that were not known beforehand is (sic) a duty to warn. In this case, there can be no successful claim that Genie breached any duty to warn, either pre-sale or post-sale. Supreme Court held, on a pretrial motion, that the warning contained in Genie’s product label was adequate, and that holding is not challenged here. We have never imposed a post-sale duty to recall or retrofit a product, and the facts of this case provide no justification for creating one. Thus the jury should not have been permitted to find that Genie was negligent in failing to recall or retrofit its product after the 1986 sale.

The trial court’s error in submitting this theory to the jury, however, had no impact on the outcome of the case. Plaintiff’s post-sale negligence claim, as presented at trial, was no more than a duplicate of his design defect and negligent design claims. Plaintiff presented no evidence of any facts that came to Genie’s attention after the sale that might have triggered a new duty; plaintiff merely asserted that Genie should have recalled or retrofitted the personnel lift for the same reasons that it should not have sold it in the first place-principally, because the outriggers were not interlocked. Genie points to no evidence admitted on the post-sale negligence claim that would have been inadmissible on the other claims, and identifies no way in which the court’s error in submitting one claim might have tainted the jury’s verdict on the others.

Id. (citations omitted).

It appears that there were a number of liability issues which were either not subject to the appeal or not discussed in meaningful detail by the Court. However, aside from a few brief statements, the court did not spend much time addressing the Plaintiff’s employer’s use of the lift in contravention of the warning and its admitted loss of the outriggers at issue. Further, there was no discussion of whether the accident at issue would have occurred had the originally included outriggers been present and installed on the lift at issue at the time of the accident. Had the Plaintiff, or his employer, used the product as intended or as contemplated by the warning on the face of the equipment, the accident may well have not occurred.

Certainly, between a lift with no outriggers of any kind, and a lift with interlocked outriggers, the latter may be safer than the former. But Genie did not sell a lift sans outriggers in 1986; it sold one with them, albeit non-interlocked. But in losing the outriggers, Plaintiff’s employer made the device less safe, yet continued to use it, presumably for some time. What of that? Should Genie be responsible for a Plaintiff’s employer’s modification of the device? Should it be responsible for the device being made less safe by such an alteration? If the device is made less safe by a third party, is it that less-safe device the standard that shall be judged, or the device as it was sold?