No Federal Jurisdiction Over Spoiled Food Case

Wouldn’t it be great to be incarcerated in the state prison system? I imagine that it would lend a great deal of structure to my day, and I could file my lawsuits for free. Perhaps some court would write about me in an opinion. Instead of identifying me by name, the court would simply start the opinion with “Plaintiff is incarcerated at Ironwood State Prison . . . .” Alas, Walter Brown, Jr. was so lucky, as shown in Brown v. Summerset, No. C 09-04764, 2010 WL 3154538 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010).

Brown filed a products action based on the peanut products recall in 2009. Apparently, Summerset, the menu coordinator for the state prison system, also tried to punish Brown by providing him with “spoiled beef and textured vegetable protein tacos.” (This and other tidbits are available in the Complaint, which is Document 1 in the case easily found on PACER.) Although the complaint describes the injuries suffered, I’ll spare you most of the details, only to say that Plaintiff complained of an intestinal ailment that he described as “watery.”

Brown must have spent much of his time in prison studying law, as he stated claims for negligence, strict liability, warranty, and even intentional infliction of emotional distress. Brown did an excellent job pleading facts to get past Iqbal and Twombly. He alleged that the “Plaintiffs believed they would succumb to their sickness” and that the Peanut Corporation of America knowingly distributed tainted food. He also alleged damages of at least $35 million, ensuring that he would meet the amount in controversy requirement.

But woe to Brown, that in all of his legal study, the seminal case of Strawbridge v. Curtiss eluded him, and his suit was doomed from the start when he sued Ms. Summerset, a fellow California citizen, thereby destroying complete diversity among the parties. Judge Armstrong went the extra mile, even addressing whether federal question jurisdiction was available. Indeed it was not. Brown’s claim, being dismissed, may be re-filed in California state court, where it will be much harder for me to find and read his complaint on the internet. Good luck, Mr. Brown. May your next meal of beef and textured vegetable protein tacos be more appetizing.

Class Action Settlement Approved in Lawnmower Fraud Case

I’ll never forget that first–and last–time I purchased a store-brand jar of salsa, thinking there was no way it was any different that the $0.30-higher-priced name-brand jar. Then with my first dip, I bit into a twig. From that point forward, I was ready to pay that extra $0.30 because I then understood that was simply the cost of the name-brand company’s employing a twig picker. I became one of those perhaps gullible consumers who believes that when you pay more for a product, you’re getting a better product. Well, such is apparently not always the case.

Last week, a federal judge in Wisconsin gave final approval to a $65 million settlement in multidistrict litigation brought by consumers who accused 10 companies of conspiring to overstate the horsepower of lawn mower engines. According to an article in The Washington Post, the case began in 2003 when an employee of one of the manufacturers walked in to a Minnesota law firm, claiming that he was privy to some interesting information. Specifically, the manufacturers were selling lawnmowers with advertised horsepower of 4.5, 5, 5.5, and 6.75, but all had the exact same engine. Suit was thereafter filed in May 2009.

According to the complaint, these companies took mowers with identical engines, put different labels on them, and sold them at significantly different prices. Perhaps even more alarming, the suit alleges that several of the companies had created a “Power Labeling Task Force,” which was used to plan and organize the conspiracy. This group allegedly met at various locations and even kept minutes that were distributed when the task force adjourned.

To date, about 340,000 claims have been made. Under the terms of the settlement, class members will receive $35 for every eligible walk-behind mower they own, and $75 for every ride-on mower. The lawnmower companies have also agreed to extend warranties by one year and to change the way they test and report horsepower.

And so it seems that my cost-more, get-more theory may be misguided.

Bounce Houses — Possible Toxic Entertainment for Children

What you see captured above is Main Street Friday in our own downtown Greenville, South Carolina. You will notice what some people call a “Bounce House” or “Bouncy Castle” featured in the photo. While all Greenville parents are happy to have a form of entertainment for their children as they enjoy the show, what they do not know is that they may be allowing their children to jump in a toxic structure.

Last week, The New York Times reported that California Attorney General Jerry Brown filed a lawsuit against entities that manufacture, distribute, or supply bounce houses used at events such as Main Street Friday or children’s birthday parties. He claims that the houses contain more than the allowable limit of lead and pose health risks to children. The Center for Environmental Health began an investigation into the vinyl used in the construction of bounce houses — the component that gives them the bounce. The results of their investigation revealed lead levels in the vinyl varying from 5,000 parts per million to 29,000 parts per million. The federal limit for lead levels is 90 to 300 parts per million, significantly lower than the vinyl tested in these houses.

Attorney General Brown reported that his intention for this lawsuit is to cause manufacturers to stop using lead-containing vinyl and/or ensure that all bounce houses have adequate warnings regarding possible lead exposure. While that actual health effects on children by jumping in a bounce house for several hours is unknown, Dr. Megan Schwarzman, a family physician at Berkeley Center for Green Chemistry, told the Times that “there was no safe level of lead exposure for children.” It will be interesting to see how this litigation progresses and whether similar lawsuits will arise around the country. While parents will be glad to be warned about the possible toxicity of bounce houses, I am sure that children will not be pleased!

Friday Links

We don’t usually cite to the Word Spy here on Friday Links, but how could we not bring your attention to the phrase “iPod Oblivion,” defined as “Obliviousness to one’s surroundings caused by listening to an iPod or similar device.”

The Rainmaker Blog asks, “Should Attorneys Tweet?” We here, we merry few, say yes.

Amanda Ray at the North Carolina Appellate Blog has this post, entitled “COA: Expert Witness Costs May Only Be Awarded If the Expert Was Under Subpoena (But Language in Scheduling Order Could Waive This Requirement.” Long title, but it fits. She’s describing the North Carolina Court of Appeals’ new opinion in Jarrell v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority.

Earlier this month, Morihiko Nakahara, the Music Director of the South Carolina Philharmonic, spoke to the South Carolina Women Lawyers Association. The Association’s blog, The Briefcase, has a nice write-up of the event here.

The ContractsProf Blog has another post about, well, Paris Hilton. Uh, what happened to teaching Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon? Well, I guess it’s okay. Both cases involve pretentious socialites, so there you go.

FDA Issues Warning on Frozen Mice

Abnormal Use does not want to be accused of failure to warn, so here’s your warning: you might not want to read this post right after lunch. The FDA has issued a warning on the use of frozen mice sold for reptile food. (You may recall that we mentioned this very briefly in a previous Friday Links post, but you must have thought we were kidding.). Now, before you use your mouse to click directly out of Abnormal Use for the day, you might want to keep reading.

The contaminated mice, sold by Biggers and Callaham LLC, doing business as MiceDirect, may be contaminated with salmonella, a nasty little bacteria that can cause some very unpleasant symptoms. The FDA is warning those with compromised immune systems not only to avoid handling the rodents themselves, but also to avoid handling any reptiles who may have already consumed contaminated rodents. Some people have already reported symptoms.

So, if anyone in your family likes to cuddle with snakes, you might want to stop that practice. We think that might be a good idea generally, but even more so now.

Lou Gehrig May Not Have Had Lou Gehrig’s Disease, New Report Suggests


Big news: Lou Gehrig may not have actually suffered from Lou Gehrig’s disease, known less commonly as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. That new speculation is reported upon in this recent report by The New York Times, which notes that soon to be published medical literature finds that the conditions of those previously thought to have suffered from the disease “might have been catalyzed by injuries only now becoming understood: concussions and other brain trauma.”

What does this mean? The article goes on to say:

The finding could prompt a redirection in the study of motor degeneration in athletes and military veterans being given diagnoses of A.L.S. at rates considerably higher than normal, said several experts in A.L.S. who had seen early versions of the paper. Patients with significant histories of brain trauma could be considered for different types of treatment in the future, perhaps leading toward new pathways for a cure.

More significantly, [according to two doctors interviewed in the piece], the finding solidifies a long-suspected connection between A.L.S.-like motor disease and head trauma experienced in collision sports and combat.

According to statistics cited in the article, 30,000 Americans have been diagnosed with Lou Gehrig’s disease. The study, authored by Boston University Associate Professor of Neurology and Pathology Ann McKee and several co-authors, will appear in the September issue of the Journal of Neuropathology and Experimental Neurology.

Products Liability: Celebrity Edition

In a post reminiscent of Us Weekly‘s “Stars: They’re Just Like Us” section, which offers photographs of celebrities doing inane things that “everyday people do,” (beautiful, famous people have to pump their own gas, too!), we’ll take a quick look at some of the many recent instances where celebrities have made headlines for products liability-themed events.

Right here in South Carolina in 2008, celebrities DJ AM and Blink 182’s Travis Barker were among six people aboard a Learjet that crashed during takeoff in Columbia. The four others on board were killed. Both Barker and DJ AM subsequently filed suit against the airline and the maker of the tires used on the aircraft, alleging that both were defective. One year later, in a very celebrity-like turn of events, DJ AM died from a drug overdose, whereupon his mother took over his $20 million lawsuit and amended it to include a wrongful death claim. She alleged that the crash ultimately led to DJ AM’s drug overdose and death. Both of those suits reportedly settled for undisclosed amounts.

In 2007, actor Dennis Quaid and his wife took their newborn twins for treatment of a staph infection at Cedars-Sinai Hospital in Los Angeles, where they were administered 1,000 times the prescribed dose of blood-thinning drug heparin. The twins eventually recovered, and Quaid subsequently filed suit against Baxter Healthcare Corporation, maker of the drug, alleging that the company did not sufficiently differentiate its packaging. Quaid’s children were supposed to receive a 10-unit dose of a diluted version of heparin, but instead mistakenly received 10,000 units of the undiluted drug. The lawsuit set forth that the bottles shared similar labels and a common shape. The couple’s suit was not about money, they said, but was an attempt to ensure no other parents endured the same experience.

Finally, as we previously reported here, Israel-based Teva Pharmaceutical Industries recently announced it would stop production of its widely used sedative propofol, after two headline-grabbing events issued blows to both its image and its financial well being. One of those events that garnered the most attention of the press was the death of Michael Jackson. The drug became infamous after the superstar died from an overdose of the sedative, in combination with other sedatives, which were administered by Jackson’s personal physician. As previously reported, although no product liability suit has yet arisen, Jackson’s devoted fans followed the Teva announcement closely in fanpages devoted to the star.

In the products liability arena, celebrities are, it seems, just like us. Except, perhaps, for accidental drug overdoses administered by a live-in, personal physician.

Failure to Survey Medical Literature may be Negligence Per Se

One issue in a recent decision by the District Court of New Hampshire was whether a generic manufacturer’s failure to comply with Food an Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulations constitutes a per se violation of its duty of care under New Hampshire law. Bartlett v. Mutual Pharm. Co., No. 08-CV-358-JL, 2010 WL 2765358 (D.N.H. Jul. 12, 2010). Judge Joseph N. Laplante answered in the negative, holding that the jury could consider the violation as evidence of a breach but it was not a per se breach of duty.

In Bartlett, Karen Bartlett sought medical treatment for right shoulder pain. Her physician prescribed a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory (“NSAID”) drug called Clinoril. Bartlett’s pharmacist filled per prescription with Sulindac, the generic version of Clinoril, manufactured by Mutual Pharmaceutical Company (“Mutual”). Two weeks after taking Sulindac, Bartlett was diagnosed with Stevens-Johnson Syndrome (“SJS”) progressing to toxic epidemal necrolysis (“TEN”), a serious and potentially fatal condition characterized by necrosis of the skin and mucous membranes.

As a result, Bartlett filed suit against Mutual asserting state law claims for strict products liability – failure to warn, strict products liability – defective design, fraud, and negligence. During discovery, it was found that the year prior to Bartlett’s physician prescribing Clinoril to her, an international medical journal found a link between NSAIDs and the conditions that Bartlett suffered from. It found 89 reported cases of SJS/TEN over a 17 year period in patients taking Clinoril, more than any other NSAID on the market. Also during discovery, Mutual admitted not being aware of the study and not monitoring medical literature for information on Sulindac’s safety risks. According to Mutual, the manufacturer of the brand named drug was responsible for monitoring safety risks.

On cross-motions for summary judgement, Bartlett argued that she was entitled to summary judgement on her negligence claim based on Mutual’s failure to survey medical literature for adverse events associated with Sulindac. Bartlett based this argument on the FDA requirement that generic manufacturers “develop written procedures for the surveillance . . . of post-marketing adverse drug experiences to the FDA.” 21 C.F.R. Section 314.80(b).

The Court interpreted this regulation to require generic manufacturers to develop procedures for surveying medical literature for information and studies on safety risks. Therefore, the question became whether Mutual’s admitted violation of this safety regulation versus violation of a statute could be a per se violation of its duty of care. The Court found that courts were split over whether plaintiffs could seek to enforce a FDA violation through a negligence per se action even thought the FDCA does not provide for a private right of action. Judge Laplante found no clear answer in New Hampshire but held that the New Hampshire Supreme Court would likely not treat the violation as negligence per se. Therefore, the court denied Bartlett’s motion for summary judgment and ruled that the jury could consider the violation as evidence of breach.

Drug manufacturers, generic and named-brand, must be aware of these FDA regulations governing surveillance of medical literature. Compliance with these regulations will be especially relevant in states that consider violations as negligence per se and not merely evidence of breach for the jury to consider.

Friday Links

Finally, the occasionally salacious, always funny eavesdropping website Overheard in New York provides link fodder for a legal blog. See here for a recent courtroom exchange which a contributor to that site overheard and reported.

Meredith R. Miller of the ContractsProf Blog asks in this post if a website’s privacy policy constitutes a binding contract.

We’re a bit surprised that Lawyerist has to ask, “Do Lawyers Need Smartphones?” It’s 2010. Everyone needs a smartphone. Lawyers (arguably) are a subset of people, and thus, they need smartphones. Why would they not?

A Kansas driver has a vanity plate that says “So Sue Me.” (Hat Tip: Overlawyered). One of our contributors – we won’t say who – has a vanity plate that says “LACHES.”

Speaking of Overlawyered, that site’s Ted Frank is going on a speaking tour to various states, but not South Carolina. We hope he’ll make it our way soon.

We always knew that Facebook would be the end of all things good and just. In this post, the Technology and Marketing Law Blog reports the following: “The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently concluded that a Facebook ‘friendship’ between a Temple University disciplinary board member and a witness may have procedurally undermined a disciplinary hearing.”

Texas Products Liability Case Intertwined with Common Law Marriage Issue

When does a products liability action become inextricably intertwined with family law? Apparently, when the case is brought in Texas. In Crenshaw v. Kennedy Wire Rope & Sling Co., — S.W.3d —, 2010 WL 2601662 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2010, no pet. h.), the court of appeals was confronted with issues relating to the alleged defectiveness of a wire rope sling as well as the elements of common law marriage in Texas.

That wrongful death case centered around the death of a floorhand who was killed while “moving two casing bails with the use of a braided wire rope sling.” The Defendants were Newco Manufacturing Company, the maker of a component hook, and Kennedy Wire Rope & Sling Company, the manufacturer of the integrated sling itself. Although the action was initially brought by the floorhand’s parents (who later settled), the appeal centered around the claims of the intervenor-common law wife of the floorhand, against whom a take nothing judgment was entered because the jury found that they had never been married. Thus, the jury never reached any of the liability issues in the case. However, the two defendants cross-appealed, contending the trial court erred in refusing to grant their motions for directed verdict, both on the issue of common law marriage as well as the underlying products liability claims.

After a lengthy analysis, the court ultimately concluded that the trial court’s jury instruction on common law marriage was flawed. Accordingly, it turned to the products liability issues.

In its appeal, Newco argued that “the evidence conclusively established that its component hook did not fail, and that it was not in any way involved in the design of the integrated wire rope sling.” Agreeing, the court of appeals rejected the common law wife’s reliance on the testimony of a Newco manager and the Plaintiff’s petroleum engineering expert. Although the common law wife had argued that the Newco manager had essentially admitted the hook was defective, the court noted that the manager’s testimony indicated only that the manager believed that the “whole assembled product” was dangerous, and only then under certain conditions, when there was slack in the line. As for the testimony of the retained expert, the court noted that he had conceded that the Newco hook had in no way broken or failed and that his belief was that slack in the line caused the accident, not the hook. Accordingly, the court of appeals found that Newco was entitled to summary judgment on the stated liability grounds.

Kennedy Wire was not so lucky. In rejecting its cross appeal, the court found that “reasonable minds could differ” on the application of Texas’s five risk-utility factors (which, as the court noted, “are used to determine whether the defective design of a product rendered it unreasonably dangerous”). In so doing, the court explained:

The evidence established that the particular design of the braided wire rope sling with a Newco hook was chosen by Kennedy. Before recommending the “improved” sling product to H & P, Kennedy made the decision to use braided wire rope, rather than single wire rope, and then chose the Newco number 3 choker hook for assembly with the braided rope, knowing it did not have a safety latch. Ryles testified that not only does Newco sell a similar hook with a safety latch, although only for use with single wire rope, but a competitor, Crosby, also sells a hook with a safety latch that can be used with braided wire rope. In addition, Ryles testified that the sling should have incorporated a hook with a safety latch in order for the whole product to be as safe as possible for lifting overhead loads-in case slack got in the line. McClay testified that the hook without a safety latch was “inappropriate for that particular job;” specifically, McClay stated that, although the hook itself was not defective and did not fail, the sling design incorporating a hook without a safety latch allowed the load to come unhooked when slack got in the line, causing the accident. In addition, there is evidence that Kennedy had the ability to make the integrated sling product safer for lifting overhead loads without impairing its usefulness or significantly increasing costs. Further, the testimony of Hubler and Garland Kennedy shows that Kennedy was well aware of H & P’s prior problems with chain slings that broke or failed and its need for a safer sling for use on it rigs, and yet recommended a sling that incorporated a hook without a safety latch. Hubler testified he would have liked to know about the option of using a hook with a safety latch, and that the additional cost would not have been an issue. Kennedy testified that incorporating a choker hook with a safety latch was feasible and would not have reduced the sling’s utility.

Accordingly, the court of appeals remanded that portion of the case back to the trial court.