Friday Links

  • It’s Friday, so as per usual, we bring you legal themed comic book issues. We’re a bit troubled by the revelation in Action Comics #900, issued late last month, in which Superman appears to renounce his American citizenship. How can a comic book superhero so closely associated with the United States of America do such a thing? We’re puzzled. We’re crestfallen. The only other person we can think of offhand who attempted to renounce his American citizenship was Lee Harvey Oswald. That’s not good company. What is Supes thinking? How does this affect the citizenship of Clark Kent? What does Lois think about this decision? Friend of the blog Ryan Steans offers his analysis here, while our pals at The Law and the Multiverse blog analyze the legal issues here.
  • Like many, we’re fans of the late, great novelist David Foster Wallace who, sadly, took his own life two years ago. Just a few weeks ago, Wallace’s last, unfinished novel, The Pale King, saw publication. We’re thankful that one of our readers writes in to report of a products liability lawsuit reference in Wallace’s mostly complete tome:

    Your readers may be interested in an amusing products liability case which appears in the recently published posthumous novel The Pale King by David Foster Wallace. On pp 200-207, a case is described in which a man’s arm is trapped in the doors of a subway train he is trying to catch, the fatal injuries that result, and the subsequent wrongful death litigation. That litigation is described as incredibly complex and such issues are raised as –

    1. “The manufacturer’s specifications for the doors’ pneumatic systems did not adequately explain how the doors could close with such force that a healthy adult male could not withdraw his arm” resulting in the manufacturer’s claim that the deceased “failed to take reasonable action to extricate his arm,” and the ensuing difficulties in refuting this claim.

    2. And, of course, the ever important question of whom to sue, and the conflict arising when the plaintiff realizes “that our legal team’s major criterion for arguing for different companies’, agencies’, and municipal entities’ different liability designations involved those different possible respondents’ cash resources and their respective insurance carriers’ record of settlement in similar cases—that is, that the entire process was about numbers and money rather than anything like justice, responsibility, and the prevention of further wrongful, public, and totally undignified and pointless death.”

    Interesting.

  • Eric Turkewitz of the New York Personal Injury Law Blog predicts that the iPhone GS data controversy will lead to a flurry of subpoenas. He notes that the data would be handy in wreck cases and other contexts, as well. We wonder how receptive Apple would be to subpoenas from all over the country seeking such data. Will they be as resistant to such discovery as Facebook and other such sites? We shall see.
  • By no means is Abnormal Use a career site; we’re not here to help you find jobs. But friend of the blog Monica Handa offers these helpful tips for those seeking legal jobs in these trying and troubling economic times. As the hiring contact for her firm, Monica has seen her fair share of deficient resumes, so perhaps she knows a thing or two about the perils of job seeking and issues relating to such quests. An aside: We might add that when applying for a job at our firm, mentioning your adoration of Abnormal Use is a plus. It’s probably best that they don’t let us bloggers play any role in that process. Oh, well.

Abnormal Interviews: Law Professor Jennifer Wriggins

Today, Abnormal Use continues its series, “Abnormal Interviews,” in which this site will conduct interviews with law professors, practitioners, and other commentators in the field. For the latest installment, we turn to University of Maine School of Law professor Jennifer B. Wriggins, who teaches Torts, Insurance Law, and Family Law. Last year, her book, The Measure of Injury: Race, Gender, and Tort Law, was published by the NYU Press. The interview is as follows:

1. What do you think is the most significant recent development in torts and products liability litigation?

I think that the continuing lack of conceptual clarity about comparative fault is very significant and interesting. What I mean is this: While contributory negligence has been on the wane for decades now there remains, I think, lots of vagueness about how its replacement, comparative fault (comparative negligence), is supposed to work. Statutes and jury instructions are often not at all clear about how the defendant’s action is supposed to be compared to the plaintiff’s action, even when they are engaging in the same activity, like driving. This is particularly the case with multi-party litigation. There is, relatedly, rather little clarity about how to quantify (and thus compare) actions by many different parties that are very different in nature. Yet, comparative fault is widely accepted and generally seen as an important improvement over contributory negligence. There is a huge disconnect, I think, with the everyday way that people think about causation and fault, and the fascinating and unwieldy system we have now with comparative fault and comparative responsibility.

2. What rule or concept in modern torts or products liability jurisprudence do you believe is the most outdated, and why?

One rule that strikes me as possibly outdated is the rule that juries are not allowed to learn about liability insurance policies. Even when a case involves an auto accident, and auto insurance is mandatory in a state (as it is in almost all states), so that jurors who are car-owners (probably most jurors) know that there is likely to be insurance, jurors are not supposed to know about insurance. I understand that it is important for the liability and damages issues not to be affected by the presence or absence of insurance, but I think it is very likely that jurors think about insurance anyway. I would want to think about this more before advocating it, but perhaps we should just give jurors the insurance information and tell them it should be kept separate from the liability and damages determinations. If they are hypothesizing about insurance and taking it into account anyway, then giving them accurate information should not hurt the process. I can see both sides of this, but I think we are probably deluding ourselves if we pretend jurors don’t know and aren’t thinking about the existence of liability insurance.

3. You have written much on the role of race and gender in litigation. In your view, how do these concepts affect tort cases specifically, and what would you advise civil litigators to keep in mind on that front?

One place where race and gender can come into play is damages. In my book, The Measure of Injury: Race, Gender and Tort Law (NYU Press 2010), my co-author Martha Chamallas and I talk about how in cases where an individual lacks an earnings history (for example a child) and suffers an injury that will affect future earnings, experts and courts still use race-based and gender-based earnings tables to project earnings into the future. Many experts and lawyers, I think, simply assume that these categories have to be used and don’t think of them as problematic at all. We argue that this use of tables is deeply problematic and potentially unconstitutional because using the tables in court is in effect a race-based or gender-based classification. Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York issued a ruling in October 2008 that agreed with this position. We also talk about how caps on non-economic damages can affect claims of women, members of racial minorities, and minority women, who may have serious injuries but small lost earnings, making their claims perhaps too small to be worth bringing. Research has suggested this is happening in California and Texas, for example.

BONUS QUESTION: What do you think is the most interesting depiction of the interaction of law and medicine in popular culture, and why?

One of the most insightful depictions of the interaction of law and medicine in popular culture is a book, Damages, by Barry Werth (1998). He deals in a very nuanced way with the interaction of insurance, doctors, patients, and lawyers in a heart-breaking Connecticut infant cerebral palsy case. It’s also a great read.

BIOGRAPHY: Professor Jennifer B. Wriggins, the Sumner T. Bernstein Professor of Law at the University of Maine School of Law, teaches Torts, Insurance Law, and Family Law. Upon receiving her J.D., Professor Wriggins served as Clerk to Hon. Edward T. Gignoux, U.S. District Judge in Portland, Maine. She was a Visiting Professor at Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law in Spring 2005.

Revisiting The Unreasonably Dangerous Undergarment

Generally, when a matter originating from South Carolina reaches a level of national discussion, we don’t find the news coverage to be entirely favorable. Much of that criticism is undeserved. We must confess, though, that our fair state is not immune to litigious ridiculousness. Indeed, suits brought by unreasonable Plaintiffs still percolate through our court system.

Today, dear readers, we revisit the case of the dangerously defective bra.

Take for example, the very recent Bennett v. Hanesbrands, Inc., No. 2-11-0613, 2011 WL 1459213 (D.S.C. Apr. 15, 2011). At the time of our initial post, the complaint was made in state court. However, the defendants removed the case, as defendants often do, and the plaintiff’s attorney filed a motion to remand, arguing that the purported permanent discoloration of his client’s skin was worth less than $75,000. Presumably, the Plaintiff sought to avoid federal court due to the mandatory scheduling order, expert deadlines, and other work that must go into the litigation of a case in federal court. Judge Norton, after analyzing the complaint, decided that the facts alleged in the complaint could in fact support diversity jurisdiction, because the Plaintiff capped the value of only one cause of action, rather than on all her causes of action alleged. Accordingly, he denied the Plaintiff’s motion for remand, and the case stay with the feds.

Judge Norton did not recite the facts set forth in the state court complaint, a copy of which is available on PACER as well as here [PDF]. However, our faithful readers will recognize that we previously blogged about this suit, prior to its removal, in which Ms. Bennett pleaded that “the defendants knew or should have known that the bra was an inherently dangerous product.”

Obviously, the counsel for the plaintiff knew or should have known that if a defendant spots a chance to remove a lawsuit, it likely will. Hanesbrand and Wal-mart did so in March, and it seems that recoverable damages on the face of the complaint were in excess of $75,000.

Judge Norton ended his opinion with an invitation to the plaintiff: “should plaintiff wish to voluntarily dismiss her case without prejudice, the court would be pleased to entertain such a motion.” We’ll see what happens. Perhaps the defendants will be happy to litigate in federal court and force the plaintiff to expend some resources on discovery and expert reports. I’m certain that permanent skin discoloration would support some significant expert work. Now that this is a federal case, it will be easier to track, but the lesson to be learned here, is, to make sure to plead that in no event are recoverable damages in the entire matter more than $75,000, lest you find yourself in federal court.

Abnormal Interviews: Adam Avery of the Avery Brewery, Brewer of Collaboration Not Litigation Ale

Today, Abnormal Use continues its series, “Abnormal Interviews,” in which this site will conduct interviews with law professors, practitioners and makers of legal themed popular culture. For the latest installment, we turn to Adam Avery, President and Brewmaster of the Avery Brewing Company. Why the president of a brewing company? The answer is two-fold. First, we here at Abnormal Use love to experiment (in moderation of course) with the greatest craft beers our country has to offer. Second, Avery produces a Belgian-style ale known as Collaboration Not Litigation. Once we heard the delightful name of that brew, we simply had to talk to its maker. Avery was kind enough to submit to a brief interview about the ale and the source of its name.

[ON THE ORIGIN OF THE NAME]

AVERY: I believe 2000, 2001, I met Vinnie Cilurzo from Russian River Brewing Company, and we became really good friends. . . . [W]e both had a beer called Salvation. We had mutual friends and, you know, so we were destined to meet and we hit it off. I asked, “Are you going to have a problem with [the beers with the same name]?” . . . I do remember him saying at some time we need to figure out – we should do something together about this. . . . So, the years went by, we became really close friends, and I visited him a bunch of times. When I got out there – I believe it was like 2004 – I showed up at his brew pub and pounded a bunch of beers. We started talking about this idea and his wife, Natalie, came up with the idea to call it Collaboration Not Litigation because he does a lot of “-tion” beers. He has Consecration, Damnation . . .He just has this theme going.

[ON THE BREWING OF THE ALE]

AVERY: We sat down and we blended both of our beers together out of the bottles and came up with the percentage that we thought was really good. So we said as soon as we have time we’re going to do this. We’re going to do a batch of beer and we’ll blend them and we’ll sell it. Well, these collaborations started to become more and more popular. Somebody called me from a brew magazine, and I told him the story. It goes to press. So I see it in this magazine, and I called Vinnie and say, “Hey, we’re kind of f***** here. We actually have to do this beer now, right?” So, he came here to the brewery in 2006 or 2007. He brewed a batch of his beer with us and then we brewed ours. We blended them at the right rate and then boom. I thought it was going to be a one and done. We sold a lot. People were excited about it, so we do a small batch once a year. We brew it typically in January. . . . It’s a fun beer. It’s more about like it just shows the craft industry is really about sticking together and about the rising tide floats all boats, that sort of thing.

[THOUGHTS ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION]

FARR: Would you consider this a good example of alternative dispute resolution?

AVERY: I think it’s the perfect. It’s one that’s unreasonable, though, obviously. There’s still people – and I understand why people have to have trademarks. . . . If we weren’t friends, I’m sure that we would both be like, “Hey, we’ve got to settle this and figure out who’s got the name and who doesn’t.” There are a lot of names out there of beers in the industry that are shared. I don’t know if they’ve come to the same kind of friendship that I have with Vinnie, or if it’s just that we’re a little more laissez faire about trademark and trademark infringement and that sort of thing.

[PUBLIC REACTION TO THE ALE]

FARR: So what has been the public’s reaction to the beer itself and to the name of the beer?

AVERY: It’s been all positive. People really appreciate the fact that we could have sued each other but instead we kept this – our single beers both called Salvation and then we decided to do this blend. Vinnie and I would both think that the blend itself is a better beer than the other two by themselves. It’s just more complexity. There’s a weird kind of combination that goes on. There’s aromas and flavors that are new, that come together between the two beers being brought together. These flavors don’t exist in either of the two beers, but somehow when they come together they create the new nuances. It’s an excellent beer. Do people like it? If you go on Rate Beer and Beer Advocate, these rating sites, it’s rated very, very high and people enjoy it. What craft is to most people is a bunch of home brewers like myself who turn their hobby into a profession, who are not strictly businessmen. They’re actually about passion for making beer and hopefully passion for everybody else’s business as we try to grab more of the market share because we’re fighting over scraps. We’re at 5 percent nationally, so we’ve got a long way to go. If we do that together, it’s going to be a lot easier. This beer is kind of an epitome of that philosophy and thought that I think that most craft brewers have.

[REACTION FROM THE LEGAL COMMUNITY]

AVERY: I get a lot of calls. I get a lot of emails from litigators. They’re like, “We’ve got to pick up ten cases of this for our company party.” I direct them to wherever they are in the country. Hopefully, there’s a retailer near them that’s got some beers. So, yeah, I get comments all the time about it. I’ve never had one say, “You guys are crazy, you should be fighting. ” All the attorneys are like, “This is unbelievable, I can’t believe you guys actually did this. “
[BEER – THE WORLD’S PROBLEM SOLVING AGENT?]
FARR: In your experience, how can beer be a catalyst to solving problems?

AVERY: I think Homer Simpson said it best: “Beer, the cause of all the world’s problems and the solution.” I mean beer is that thing that almost everybody loves. Most people that say they don’t like beer, they think of beer as Bud, Miller, Coors. They think of something that’s fairly flavorless and just carbonated. So, once we get everybody on board with how much flavor can come out of a craft beer, especially something like Collaboration Not Litigation. Everybody drinks a beer together and it just seems like an easy way to – it definitely helps to solve problems.

BIOGRAPHY: Adam Avery is the President and Brewmaster of the Avery Brewing Company. Located in Boulder, Colorado, the Avery Brewing Company has a line-up of more than twenty uniquely named beers which blend “Old World tradition and expertise with ingenuity, creativity and boldness.” You can follow the company on Twitter here.

South Carolina Seeks Billions in Suit for Alleged Deceptive Marketing of Drug

A Spartanburg, South Carolina judge is set to decide how much money Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., a Johnson & Johnson subsidiary, should pay the state for what the jury found to be deceptive marketing by the company of its antipsychotic drug Risperdal. Last month, a jury agreed with attorneys for the State of South Carolina that the drug manufacturer had violated the state’s Unfair Trade Practices Act by sending misleading letters to approximately 7,200 South Carolina doctors downplaying the links between Risperdal and diabetes. South Carolina law provides for potential penalties of $5,000 for each offense, and since attorneys for the state argued that every single prescription, sample box or “Dear Doctor” letter written since the 1990s may constitute a violation of the law, the number could reach into the billions of dollars.

South Carolina’s suit is the fourth case of its kind to go to court. We previously reported here on a similar case tried in Louisiana. In that case, the jury awarded a $257.7 million verdict against the drugmaker. The jury found that the company had sent 7,604 “Dear Doctor” letters and made a total of 27,542 sales calls in which its sales representatives claimed Risperdal was safer than competing antipsychotic drugs such as Eli Lilly’s Zyprexa and AstraZeneca’s Seroquel. The Louisiana jury assessed penalties of $7,250 for each violation. Of the other two cases, the Pennsylvania case was dismissed in June, and another case in West Virginia was dropped in December.

As reported by TheState.com, Janssen has appealed the Louisiana verdict, although representatives have reportedly not yet decided whether they will do the same with this latest South Carolina jury verdict. That likely will depend on the dollar number reached by the Spartanburg County judge. We’ll continue to follow this case and report on Judge Couch’s ruling.

Friday Links

  • We recently realized that most newly minted lawyers are now too young to remember watching “L.A. Law” when it originally aired back in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This is sad news. How is it that a practicing lawyer can be unaware of the fictional exploits of the McKenzie Brackman firm? Was it that long ago in the past when the show left the airwaves in 1994? Was it that many years ago that the Rosalind Shays character perished by falling down an elevator shaft? So, what can we do but commemorate this program by sharing with you the cover of Mad Magazine #274, published way back in 1987? (An aside: One of the writer contributors of this blog actually bought this issue off the newsstand back in ’87, but we’re not going to tell you which one of us it was so as to protect the innocent.).
  • You know, we here at Abnormal Use are usually unsympathetic to folks trying to get out of jury duty, but we think this may be the best excuse we’ve ever heard.
  • Eric Goldman of the Technology & Marketing Law Blog directs us to a new federal case from Nevada in which the court found that the republication of a newspaper article in its entirety was fair use under the particular circumstances of the case. We hope that new jurisprudence doesn’t apply to Abnormal Use posts in their entirety. Eek.
  • Check out Just Enrichment, a new legal blog. Interesting stuff. (Hat tip: Volokh).
  • Ruthann Robson of the Constitutional Law Prof Blog alerts us to an interesting footnote about music criticism from a 1989 dissent by Justice Marshall. That still doesn’t top the Fifth Circuit Talking Heads opinion, though. But then again, what possibly could?
  • This new Georgia suit might be the most interesting suit you read about this week.

Hydrogen Cars: The Fight Over the Price Tag of Development

Recently, The Washington Post published an online article about the future of the hydrogen car and the effect that the current budget fight will have on this technology. According to the article, President Obama’s administration has continued to cut funding for research and development of cars powered by hydrogen, putting its weight behind electric cars instead. Former President George W. Bush was apparently much more hopeful about the future of hydrogen power and provided more funding to the research. In a related article, the South African weekly newspaper Mail & Guardian discussed the challenges of re-fueling hydrogen powered cars, and how private sector scientists and engineers are working on that problem, too.
The relationship between private and public funding and development of particular technologies is one to watch; it’s interesting to see how one affects the other. For instance, is it an accident that NASA started to think about getting out of the space business, just on the heels of Virgin Galactic’s appearance on the scene? If there is money to be made in the marketplace on hydrogen cars, venture capital and similar sources of private funding will make sure that the federal government’s belt-tightening won’t completely stall development. I, for one, can’t wait for the first Ford Hindenburg to roll off the assembly line.
What does all of this have to do with products liability? Nothing yet, because there isn’t yet a hydrogen car on the market. But my reference to the Hindenburg may not be far off – part of the problem with hydrogen as a fuel source is a perception problem. When the first hydrogen car malfunctions – and as a brand new product, rest assured that there will be bugs to work out – the media and the plaintiffs’ attorneys will use that perception to stir up fear about the technology.
In fact, fear plays a huge role in trying products cases in general – stirring up thoughts of all of those latent defects in our food, cars, and nearly everything else we run across in our lives for the jury to sweat about and decide where best to assign blame for the consequences. So many, in fact, that we here at Abnormal Use can find something in the world of products liability to write about every business day. Thankfully, products liability law has developed in a way that (mostly) takes this fear mongering out of the equation. Well, at least in theory. We’ll see how it all plays out once hydrogen cars hit the roads.

Recent Complaints Allege that "Your Baby Can Read" Products Do Not, in Fact, Teach Your Baby to Read

A class-action lawsuit has been filed in California against the makers of “Your Baby Can Read” products. The complaint was filed on behalf of a class of consumers who purchased the infant and toddler educational programs based on the company’s claims regarding the effectiveness of its products. Television and radio advertisements for the products in question allegedly made false and misleading claims, including claims that the early language development system could teach a three-month-old baby to read by nine months of age, could enable a five-year old to read at a junior high school level, and could teach infants with Down syndrome how to read.

According to the complaint, such claims made by the company simply are not supported by scientific evidence. Criticism of the company’s products and allegedly misleading advertisements, it seems, has grown in recent weeks. TODAY.com reports that the Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood, a national watchdog group that previously successfully campaigned to change the way that the “Baby Einstein” program marketed its products, has filed a separate complaint with the Federal Trade Commission alleging that makers of “Your Baby Can Read” have engaged in deceptive marketing practices to convince parents to buy its products. It has requested that the FTC stop the company from continuing its allegedly deceptive marketing practices, and that it offer full refunds to “all those parents who have been duped.”

The problem with the educational products seems to be two-fold. First, doctors and scientists who have tested the products have reportedly found that infants using the products are not reading, but rather are memorizing the shapes of the letters presented. There is no evidence, the class-action plaintiffs allege, that this memorization process increases a child’s ability to read or comprehend. Second, a representative for the Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood points out that the program is actually harmful to children, as it encourages them to sit in front of television screens and computer monitors, getting them “hooked on screens” too early in life. In fact, the group notes that if parents follow the “Your Baby Can Read” instructions, after nine months, babies would have spent more than a full week of 24 hour days in front of a screen.

It remains to be seen what effect these two recent complaints will have on the maker of the infant educational products and on its approach to advertising. It seems that the old-fashioned approach to teaching your children to read – by reading aloud to them – triumphs.

Manufacturer’s Duty to Warn Does Not Include Duty to Train Airline Pilots

In Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 2011 WL 1466393 (Ct. App. Minn. April 19, 2011) [PDF], the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered how far a manufacturer’s duty to warn extends in the context of piloting an aircraft. In so doing, the court found that any such duty does not extend so far as to require the manufacturer to provide pilot training.

The facts were these: In 2001, Gary Prokop received his pilot’s license, training mostly on an aircraft manufactured by Cessna and logging most of his hours in that plane, as well. He had a visual-flight-rules certification, which meant that he was not permitted to fly when weather conditions might require the use of instruments. He subsequently completed all of the training he needed to take the test to be instrument-certified, but he had not yet taken the test.
In 2002, Prokop bought a new plane, a Cirrus SR22. He was provided a Pilot’s Operating Handbook and FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual for that aircraft. Also included in the purchase price of the plane was two days of “transition training.” Not to be confused with classes on how to actually fly a plane, this “transition training” was designed simply to show a pilot how the new aircraft differed from the plane the purchasing pilot had previously flown. In this case, the transition training was supposed to have included training on the autopilot system of the Cirrus plane, a feature Prokop’s original Cessna lacked. In addition to this two days of transition training, Prokop purchased and attended an additional day and a half of training.
Following these training sessions, the instructor was supposed to grade the pilot on specific maneuvers on an evaluation sheet, leaving blank those maneuvers which had not been performed by the pilot. Following his training, Prokop received “S” for “satisfactory” on all maneuvers except one that involved the use of autopilot in switching between flying visually and flying with the use of instruments. That part of the evaluation form remained blank.
On January 18, 2003, after being cleared to fly, Prokop and a friend, Jamed Kosak, took off from Grand Rapids, Michigan on their way to St. Cloud for their sons’ hockey game. A few minutes later, the plane struck the ground and both men were killed in the accident. The trustees for the decedents’ next of kin sued Cirrus; the trustee for Kosak’s next of kin also sued Prokop’s estate. The Kosak complaint alleged that “Cirrus undertook a duty to provide Prokop with flight training, that Cirrus breached an implied warranty of merchantability by omitting a flight lesson [concerning switching from visual to instrument flying using autopilot], and that Prokop was negligent in piloting the aircraft.” The Prokop complaint alleged that Cirrus was negligent in the “designing, testing, manufacturing, sale, distribution, maintenance, warnings, pilot training, and instructions given regarding the aircraft.”
Much of the ensuing trial focused on the “transition training” – what specifically was taught by the instructor, whether or not that one training session in question was actually performed or not, and whether or not the crash would have happened if the training had been performed properly or differently. Following the trial, the jury awarded both trustees damages.
On appeal, however, the appellate court focused not on the adequacy of the transition training, but whether or not the manufacturer, Cirrus, owed a duty to train Prokop at all. The issue, as framed by the appeals court, was, “Does an airplane manufacturer’s duty to warn by providing adequate instructions for the safe use of its aircraft include a duty to provide pilot training?”
The appellate court concluded that it does not, for two reasons. The first focused on the purpose of the transition training, and whether or not it had anything to do with the manufacturer’s duty to warn:

Respondents assert that Cirrus offered transition training as a means of satisfying its duty to warn by providing adequate instructions for safe use. But the record indicates that the purpose of transition training was to assist Prokop to be proficient in the use of an unfamiliar aircraft. Although proficiency training undoubtedly promoted the safe use of the SR22, we find no support in the law for respondents’ proposition that Currus’s duty to warn included an obligation to train Prokop to proficiently pilot the SR22–which is the crux of respondents’ claims.

Second, the court focused on the fact that at the time he purchased the aircraft, Cirrus provided Prokop with two sets of written instructions: the Pilot’s Operating Handbook and FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual for the Cirrus Design SR22.

Therefore, the court held, “any liability based on appellant’s failure to provide adequate transition training cannot be sustained under a product-liability theory.”

This is the right decision for a few reasons. First, the transition training was not mandatory, nor was it a prerequisite for buying the plane from Cirrus in the first place. If Prokop had never availed himself of the training offered, then the adequacy of the training would never have been put under the microscope. Secondly, there was never any allegation that the training Prokop did receive was performed negligently. And, finally, the liability waves from a finding that Cirrus did owe a duty to train Prokop could have turned into tidal waves, leading to de facto requirements that chainsaw manufacturers provide training to every person who buys their product from a Home Depot, car manufacturers give driving lessons, ad infinitum. But for now, the floodgates remain closed on this issue, thanks to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.

Abnormal Interviews: Ted Frank of the Center for Class Action Fairness

Today, Abnormal Use continues its series, “Abnormal Interviews,” in which this site will conduct interviews with law professors, practitioners, and other commentators in the field. For the latest installment, we turn to the founder of the Center for Class Action Fairness and an Adjunct Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, Ted Frank. We have cited Mr. Frank often in connection with our work on the Stella Liebeck McDonald’s hot coffee case. He was kind enough to give us his thoughts on that famous case as well as his other projects. The interview is as follows:

1) What do you think is the most significant recent development in torts and product liability litigation?

It goes beyond tort and product-liability litigation to some extent, but the erosion of the preemption doctrine is of some concern. It’s ironic that, even as we see the federal government assert its authority over local affairs in legislation such as PPACA and cases like United States v. Arizona, we’re simultaneously seeing this administration insist that state court juries should exercise dominion over interstate commerce already fully regulated by the federal government. This seems precisely backwards.

2) The Wall Street Journal has a characterized you as a “leading tort reform advocate.” In your view, why is tort reform needed in our system, generally, and in product liability litigation, specifically?

I view tort reform as a means to an end, rather than an end in and of itself. I consider myself a consumer advocate, and it just so happens that the pendulum of the legal system has swung so far in favor of lawyers that consumers are being hurt, and tort reform is needed to restore balance. If ever the pendulum swings too far the other way, you’ll see me switch sides on these debates. As it is, if anyone asks me, I tell them I oppose collateral source reform, which just punishes individuals with the foresight to purchase insurance.

There are so many places where reform is needed. The judiciary and the bar aren’t doing enough to punish or deter fraudulent cases. We have very sensible rules that courts don’t second guess the good faith decisions of lawyers or prosecutors, or the exercise of business judgment by executives, but those rules are thrown out the window when it comes to second guessing the design decisions of engineers or the judgment calls of physicians, though there is every reason to believe that courts are even less likely to get those questions right, especially in hindsight. And uncapped noneconomic or punitive damages introduces an element of complete randomness into the system. Even when the system is considered to be “working,” the majority of the expense of the system goes to paying the administrative costs of the attorneys rather than to the putative victims: we wouldn’t tolerate that level of overhead in any other sector of the public or private economy. All of these features distort incentives, deter innovation, result in unjust punishment of the innocent, and hurt the economy and consumers in the long run.

3) Recently, we here at Abnormal Use have written several pieces regarding the Stella Liebeck hot coffee case in which we have cited some of the articles you have written on the subject. Why have you taken an interest in that litigation, and why is it important to dispel some of the “urban legends” that have arisen?

For twenty years I’ve had an interest in urban legends (I was friends with the Snopeses before there was a snopes.com), and several of them stem from the legal arena. One of my favorites involves the Baby Ruth bar: it’s a famous trivia answer that the candy bar was named after Grover Cleveland’s daughter, rather than the baseball player Babe Ruth. Snopes and I did some research in the 1990s, and concluded that the “Grover Cleveland’s daughter” story was almost certainly invented for purposes of trademark litigation against Babe Ruth, who had a competing candy bar.

The Stella Liebeck case was exactly the sort of thing that turns into an urban legend, and there are certainly a lot of inaccuracies that crept into the story as it went viral. The Liebeck case got politicized, however: it was an outrageous result and picked up as a poster child for tort reform, and, fascinatingly, the trial lawyer lobby, instead of reasonably saying “Look: the justice system is never going to be 100 percent correct, there have been a dozen hot coffee cases before this one where the courts got it right and threw it out, and you can’t make public policy based on a single anecdote just because the judge made a mistake here” decided to engage in a misinformation campaign to argue that the Liebeck case was both correct and an aspirational result for our tort system – and a disturbing number of law professors joined that cause. If you Google for the case, the vast majority of results are trial-lawyer sites filled with misstatements of the facts and laws. It’s gotten to the point that, in the majority of tort reform debates I participate in, it’s the trial lawyer who is the first to introduce the subject. I’ve been following the case and rebutting the misinformation on both sides since it first made the news, and it just so happens that the majority of misinformation is coming from the plaintiffs’ lawyer side these days. One of these days, I’ll lock myself in a room for a couple of weeks and write a law review article on the subject so there can be a one stop place for truthful information and arguments about the case.

I have a popular talk I give to law schools where I talk about the hot coffee case and a couple of other lawsuits against McDonald’s called “The Law of McDonald’s” and use that as the framework to talk about the two visions of tort law: personal responsibility versus deep pocket compensation of victims, and why I prefer the personal responsibility route.

4) As the founder of the Center for Class Action Fairness, you have sought to protect the interest of consumers in class action settlements. In your opinion, what needs to be done in order to balance the interest of consumers in class action settlements with the need for tort reform?

Assuming that the Supreme Court doesn’t do anything crazy in the Wal-Mart case, the law is, for the most part, in the right place, and it’s just a question of judges exercising their responsibility to apply it correctly – which is hard to do when the settling parties are making an ex parte presentation to the court, and good-faith objectors don’t have the financial incentive to hire a lawyer to make sure the court gets it right. That’s why I do the pro bono representation that I do: someone’s got to do it.

There are certainly some legislative tweaks possible to resolve some ambiguities in the law that class action lawyers have used to benefit themselves at the expense of consumers. I don’t think it’s a tort reform thing; it should be a bipartisan good government thing. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, as a group, should be supporting what I do, because class action lawyers like Milberg and like Kabateck Brown Kellner make them all look bad when they negotiate settlements that don’t do anything for the class but pay the lawyers millions.

BONUS QUESTION: What do you think is the most interesting depiction of products liability and/or class actions in popular culture, and why?

I have a toy figurine of Lionel Hutz on my bookshelf, but his only class action was the consumer fraud case against the makers of the film The Neverending Story. Larry Ribstein’s scholarship on why Hollywood so consistently gets these issues wrong explains why I find this question tough, but I enjoyed the first half of John Grisham’s The King of Torts for its depiction of a corrupt class action settlement that never would have survived Amchem scrutiny. I’m told I should read Gregg Easterbrook’s The Here and Now, which might well supplant Grisham if I ever get around to it. There’s also Michael Clayton, which takes me back to my days as a law-firm associate setting car bombs for adverse witnesses; it amuses me no end in the scene where the lawyer complains that the case had 85,000 documents and 100 motions. The problem with Grisham is that his books repeatedly have a critical plot point where somebody bribes a state court judge to decide a federal removal motion some way, and it just ruins the book for me when the author gets a federal jurisdiction question so wrong. They really should teach 28 USC § 1446 at the Iowa MFA program.

BIOGRAPHY: Ted Frank is an attorney licensed in Illinois, the District of Columbia, and California and a graduate of the the University of Chicago Law School. He served as the first director of the American Enterprise Institute Legal Center for the Public Interest and was an attorney for the McCain-Palin 2008 campaign. He is currently an Adjunct Fellow at the Manhattan Institute and runs the Center for Class Action Fairness, which he founded in 2009. He is a contributor to fellow legal blogs PointOfLaw and Overlawyered. You can follow him on Twitter here.