Press Your Luck: Two Injuries, Two Statute of Limitations Periods

Unless you are one of those fictional big tobacco executives portrayed in anti-tobacco television commercials, you know that tobacco has been linked to a number of diseases – cancer, emphysema, and heart disease, to name a few. Unfortunately for many tobacco users, these diseases are not exclusive and often do not coordinate among themselves as to when to manifest. As a result, tobacco users plaintiffs, when opting to litigate their usage, face a dilemma. Should they sue cigarette manufacturers upon the first onset of disease or wait for a potentially more dangerous side effect? Recently, the California Supreme Court weighed in with its solution.

In Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. S172303 (Cal. May 5, 2011), the plaintiff sued a number of cigarette manufacturers in California state court after being diagnosed with lung cancer in 2003. Previously, the plaintiff had been diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and periodontal disease in 1989 and 1991, respectively, but chose not to pursue a claim at those times. After the state case was removed to federal court, the judge dismissed the plaintiff’s claims on statute of limitations grounds. Undeterred, the plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which in turn guidance from the California Supreme Court as to the application of the statute of limitations when separate diseases arise at different times from the same alleged wrongdoing.

The defendant manufacturers argued that allowing the plaintiff to bring her claim under these circumstances would violate the standard that a statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suffers “appreciable and actual harm, however uncertain in amount.” The plaintiff argued against the application of that well-settled rule and contended that each of her three ailments was the basis of a distinct primary right. The California Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the plaintiff, holding that “two physical injuries . . . can, in some circumstances, be considered ‘qualitatively different’ . . .” for statute of limitations purposes.

On one hand, the Court’s holding is logical. Each of the plaintiff’s diseases is separate and distinct from the other. It would seem a bit ridiculous to require a plaintiff to sue for potential lung cancer when her only known damages are COPD or periodontal disease. Imagine the flood of litigation if the Court were to make such a requirement. On the other hand, this holding shakes the foundation of the law school paradigm “one tort, one claim for damages.” This is not a case where a plaintiff suffered property damage and later had a claim for personal injury arising out of the same event. Rather, the plaintiff has suffered personal injury – albeit three separate and distinct diseases – arising out of the same cigarette smoking.

While we here at Abnormal Use do not intend to make light of the seriousness of the damage caused by tobacco use, we must admit the Court’s holding conjures up images of a litigation-themed Press Your Luck. The opinion did not suggest that the plaintiff intentionally delayed pursuing litigation until she contracted lung cancer, but apparently tobacco users in California now have that option. Hopefully, they won’t land on any whammies while they wait.

Abnormal Interviews: Adam Avery of the Avery Brewery, Brewer of Collaboration Not Litigation Ale

Today, Abnormal Use continues its series, “Abnormal Interviews,” in which this site will conduct interviews with law professors, practitioners and makers of legal themed popular culture. For the latest installment, we turn to Adam Avery, President and Brewmaster of the Avery Brewing Company. Why the president of a brewing company? The answer is two-fold. First, we here at Abnormal Use love to experiment (in moderation of course) with the greatest craft beers our country has to offer. Second, Avery produces a Belgian-style ale known as Collaboration Not Litigation. Once we heard the delightful name of that brew, we simply had to talk to its maker. Avery was kind enough to submit to a brief interview about the ale and the source of its name.

[ON THE ORIGIN OF THE NAME]

AVERY: I believe 2000, 2001, I met Vinnie Cilurzo from Russian River Brewing Company, and we became really good friends. . . . [W]e both had a beer called Salvation. We had mutual friends and, you know, so we were destined to meet and we hit it off. I asked, “Are you going to have a problem with [the beers with the same name]?” . . . I do remember him saying at some time we need to figure out – we should do something together about this. . . . So, the years went by, we became really close friends, and I visited him a bunch of times. When I got out there – I believe it was like 2004 – I showed up at his brew pub and pounded a bunch of beers. We started talking about this idea and his wife, Natalie, came up with the idea to call it Collaboration Not Litigation because he does a lot of “-tion” beers. He has Consecration, Damnation . . .He just has this theme going.

[ON THE BREWING OF THE ALE]

AVERY: We sat down and we blended both of our beers together out of the bottles and came up with the percentage that we thought was really good. So we said as soon as we have time we’re going to do this. We’re going to do a batch of beer and we’ll blend them and we’ll sell it. Well, these collaborations started to become more and more popular. Somebody called me from a brew magazine, and I told him the story. It goes to press. So I see it in this magazine, and I called Vinnie and say, “Hey, we’re kind of f***** here. We actually have to do this beer now, right?” So, he came here to the brewery in 2006 or 2007. He brewed a batch of his beer with us and then we brewed ours. We blended them at the right rate and then boom. I thought it was going to be a one and done. We sold a lot. People were excited about it, so we do a small batch once a year. We brew it typically in January. . . . It’s a fun beer. It’s more about like it just shows the craft industry is really about sticking together and about the rising tide floats all boats, that sort of thing.

[THOUGHTS ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION]

FARR: Would you consider this a good example of alternative dispute resolution?

AVERY: I think it’s the perfect. It’s one that’s unreasonable, though, obviously. There’s still people – and I understand why people have to have trademarks. . . . If we weren’t friends, I’m sure that we would both be like, “Hey, we’ve got to settle this and figure out who’s got the name and who doesn’t.” There are a lot of names out there of beers in the industry that are shared. I don’t know if they’ve come to the same kind of friendship that I have with Vinnie, or if it’s just that we’re a little more laissez faire about trademark and trademark infringement and that sort of thing.

[PUBLIC REACTION TO THE ALE]

FARR: So what has been the public’s reaction to the beer itself and to the name of the beer?

AVERY: It’s been all positive. People really appreciate the fact that we could have sued each other but instead we kept this – our single beers both called Salvation and then we decided to do this blend. Vinnie and I would both think that the blend itself is a better beer than the other two by themselves. It’s just more complexity. There’s a weird kind of combination that goes on. There’s aromas and flavors that are new, that come together between the two beers being brought together. These flavors don’t exist in either of the two beers, but somehow when they come together they create the new nuances. It’s an excellent beer. Do people like it? If you go on Rate Beer and Beer Advocate, these rating sites, it’s rated very, very high and people enjoy it. What craft is to most people is a bunch of home brewers like myself who turn their hobby into a profession, who are not strictly businessmen. They’re actually about passion for making beer and hopefully passion for everybody else’s business as we try to grab more of the market share because we’re fighting over scraps. We’re at 5 percent nationally, so we’ve got a long way to go. If we do that together, it’s going to be a lot easier. This beer is kind of an epitome of that philosophy and thought that I think that most craft brewers have.

[REACTION FROM THE LEGAL COMMUNITY]

AVERY: I get a lot of calls. I get a lot of emails from litigators. They’re like, “We’ve got to pick up ten cases of this for our company party.” I direct them to wherever they are in the country. Hopefully, there’s a retailer near them that’s got some beers. So, yeah, I get comments all the time about it. I’ve never had one say, “You guys are crazy, you should be fighting. ” All the attorneys are like, “This is unbelievable, I can’t believe you guys actually did this. “
[BEER – THE WORLD’S PROBLEM SOLVING AGENT?]
FARR: In your experience, how can beer be a catalyst to solving problems?

AVERY: I think Homer Simpson said it best: “Beer, the cause of all the world’s problems and the solution.” I mean beer is that thing that almost everybody loves. Most people that say they don’t like beer, they think of beer as Bud, Miller, Coors. They think of something that’s fairly flavorless and just carbonated. So, once we get everybody on board with how much flavor can come out of a craft beer, especially something like Collaboration Not Litigation. Everybody drinks a beer together and it just seems like an easy way to – it definitely helps to solve problems.

BIOGRAPHY: Adam Avery is the President and Brewmaster of the Avery Brewing Company. Located in Boulder, Colorado, the Avery Brewing Company has a line-up of more than twenty uniquely named beers which blend “Old World tradition and expertise with ingenuity, creativity and boldness.” You can follow the company on Twitter here.

Abnormal Interviews: Ted Frank of the Center for Class Action Fairness

Today, Abnormal Use continues its series, “Abnormal Interviews,” in which this site will conduct interviews with law professors, practitioners, and other commentators in the field. For the latest installment, we turn to the founder of the Center for Class Action Fairness and an Adjunct Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, Ted Frank. We have cited Mr. Frank often in connection with our work on the Stella Liebeck McDonald’s hot coffee case. He was kind enough to give us his thoughts on that famous case as well as his other projects. The interview is as follows:

1) What do you think is the most significant recent development in torts and product liability litigation?

It goes beyond tort and product-liability litigation to some extent, but the erosion of the preemption doctrine is of some concern. It’s ironic that, even as we see the federal government assert its authority over local affairs in legislation such as PPACA and cases like United States v. Arizona, we’re simultaneously seeing this administration insist that state court juries should exercise dominion over interstate commerce already fully regulated by the federal government. This seems precisely backwards.

2) The Wall Street Journal has a characterized you as a “leading tort reform advocate.” In your view, why is tort reform needed in our system, generally, and in product liability litigation, specifically?

I view tort reform as a means to an end, rather than an end in and of itself. I consider myself a consumer advocate, and it just so happens that the pendulum of the legal system has swung so far in favor of lawyers that consumers are being hurt, and tort reform is needed to restore balance. If ever the pendulum swings too far the other way, you’ll see me switch sides on these debates. As it is, if anyone asks me, I tell them I oppose collateral source reform, which just punishes individuals with the foresight to purchase insurance.

There are so many places where reform is needed. The judiciary and the bar aren’t doing enough to punish or deter fraudulent cases. We have very sensible rules that courts don’t second guess the good faith decisions of lawyers or prosecutors, or the exercise of business judgment by executives, but those rules are thrown out the window when it comes to second guessing the design decisions of engineers or the judgment calls of physicians, though there is every reason to believe that courts are even less likely to get those questions right, especially in hindsight. And uncapped noneconomic or punitive damages introduces an element of complete randomness into the system. Even when the system is considered to be “working,” the majority of the expense of the system goes to paying the administrative costs of the attorneys rather than to the putative victims: we wouldn’t tolerate that level of overhead in any other sector of the public or private economy. All of these features distort incentives, deter innovation, result in unjust punishment of the innocent, and hurt the economy and consumers in the long run.

3) Recently, we here at Abnormal Use have written several pieces regarding the Stella Liebeck hot coffee case in which we have cited some of the articles you have written on the subject. Why have you taken an interest in that litigation, and why is it important to dispel some of the “urban legends” that have arisen?

For twenty years I’ve had an interest in urban legends (I was friends with the Snopeses before there was a snopes.com), and several of them stem from the legal arena. One of my favorites involves the Baby Ruth bar: it’s a famous trivia answer that the candy bar was named after Grover Cleveland’s daughter, rather than the baseball player Babe Ruth. Snopes and I did some research in the 1990s, and concluded that the “Grover Cleveland’s daughter” story was almost certainly invented for purposes of trademark litigation against Babe Ruth, who had a competing candy bar.

The Stella Liebeck case was exactly the sort of thing that turns into an urban legend, and there are certainly a lot of inaccuracies that crept into the story as it went viral. The Liebeck case got politicized, however: it was an outrageous result and picked up as a poster child for tort reform, and, fascinatingly, the trial lawyer lobby, instead of reasonably saying “Look: the justice system is never going to be 100 percent correct, there have been a dozen hot coffee cases before this one where the courts got it right and threw it out, and you can’t make public policy based on a single anecdote just because the judge made a mistake here” decided to engage in a misinformation campaign to argue that the Liebeck case was both correct and an aspirational result for our tort system – and a disturbing number of law professors joined that cause. If you Google for the case, the vast majority of results are trial-lawyer sites filled with misstatements of the facts and laws. It’s gotten to the point that, in the majority of tort reform debates I participate in, it’s the trial lawyer who is the first to introduce the subject. I’ve been following the case and rebutting the misinformation on both sides since it first made the news, and it just so happens that the majority of misinformation is coming from the plaintiffs’ lawyer side these days. One of these days, I’ll lock myself in a room for a couple of weeks and write a law review article on the subject so there can be a one stop place for truthful information and arguments about the case.

I have a popular talk I give to law schools where I talk about the hot coffee case and a couple of other lawsuits against McDonald’s called “The Law of McDonald’s” and use that as the framework to talk about the two visions of tort law: personal responsibility versus deep pocket compensation of victims, and why I prefer the personal responsibility route.

4) As the founder of the Center for Class Action Fairness, you have sought to protect the interest of consumers in class action settlements. In your opinion, what needs to be done in order to balance the interest of consumers in class action settlements with the need for tort reform?

Assuming that the Supreme Court doesn’t do anything crazy in the Wal-Mart case, the law is, for the most part, in the right place, and it’s just a question of judges exercising their responsibility to apply it correctly – which is hard to do when the settling parties are making an ex parte presentation to the court, and good-faith objectors don’t have the financial incentive to hire a lawyer to make sure the court gets it right. That’s why I do the pro bono representation that I do: someone’s got to do it.

There are certainly some legislative tweaks possible to resolve some ambiguities in the law that class action lawyers have used to benefit themselves at the expense of consumers. I don’t think it’s a tort reform thing; it should be a bipartisan good government thing. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, as a group, should be supporting what I do, because class action lawyers like Milberg and like Kabateck Brown Kellner make them all look bad when they negotiate settlements that don’t do anything for the class but pay the lawyers millions.

BONUS QUESTION: What do you think is the most interesting depiction of products liability and/or class actions in popular culture, and why?

I have a toy figurine of Lionel Hutz on my bookshelf, but his only class action was the consumer fraud case against the makers of the film The Neverending Story. Larry Ribstein’s scholarship on why Hollywood so consistently gets these issues wrong explains why I find this question tough, but I enjoyed the first half of John Grisham’s The King of Torts for its depiction of a corrupt class action settlement that never would have survived Amchem scrutiny. I’m told I should read Gregg Easterbrook’s The Here and Now, which might well supplant Grisham if I ever get around to it. There’s also Michael Clayton, which takes me back to my days as a law-firm associate setting car bombs for adverse witnesses; it amuses me no end in the scene where the lawyer complains that the case had 85,000 documents and 100 motions. The problem with Grisham is that his books repeatedly have a critical plot point where somebody bribes a state court judge to decide a federal removal motion some way, and it just ruins the book for me when the author gets a federal jurisdiction question so wrong. They really should teach 28 USC § 1446 at the Iowa MFA program.

BIOGRAPHY: Ted Frank is an attorney licensed in Illinois, the District of Columbia, and California and a graduate of the the University of Chicago Law School. He served as the first director of the American Enterprise Institute Legal Center for the Public Interest and was an attorney for the McCain-Palin 2008 campaign. He is currently an Adjunct Fellow at the Manhattan Institute and runs the Center for Class Action Fairness, which he founded in 2009. He is a contributor to fellow legal blogs PointOfLaw and Overlawyered. You can follow him on Twitter here.

Four Loko: PBJ or Goober Grape?

Manufacturers love to combine two independently successful products and pass the combination off to consumers as a new and original idea. After the surge in popularity of energy drinks and the advent of Red Bull-vodka cocktails, it came as no surprise that the alcoholic energy drink was born. Unfortunately, just like Smucker’s Goober Grape, the results were less than stellar.

Last November, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) warned four manufacturers of alcoholic energy drinks that the caffeine added to their product was an “unsafe food additive.” Citing concerns that caffeine may mask the effects of alcohol, the FDA instructed manufacturers to cease adding caffeine to their product or face the possibility of “further action” under federal law. The FDA made no mention of the after-market mixture of caffeine and alcohol. The FDA’s warning was only the beginning of the bad news for alcoholic energy drink manufacturers.

Recently, a New Jersey man sued Phusion Projects, the manufacturer of the popular Four Loko beverage, in state court, claiming that the product caused heart damage. The plaintiff, 22-year-old Michael Mustica, alleges that he developed a heart arrhythmia after drinking two-and-a-half cans of Four Loko over the course of one evening. Each 23.5 ounce can of Four Loko contains 12 percent alcohol, the equivalent of four beers, and 135 milligrams of caffeine, the equivalent of two cups of coffee. Ironically, the plaintiff claims to have fallen asleep prior to waking with a racing heart and difficulty breathing. Along with his claim of negligence, he also alleges that Phusion Projects failed to warn him of the potential danger of combining caffeine and alcohol. The report was silent as to whether these events took place before or after the November FDA warning.

We may want to withhold judgment until more facts surface. First, the plaintiff claims that his heart condition is the result of one night of Four Loko consumption. However, further investigation could reveal that the plaintiff – like many other 20-somethings – has a significant history of caffeine and/or alcohol consumption. A history of this nature can cause heart arrhythmia even without the consumption of Four Loko. Second, while the FDA’s warning about alcoholic energy drinks did not come until November 2010, concerns over energy drink consumption have been expressed since as early as 2008. Four Loko may have lacked a warning, but certainly, the plaintiff was likely aware of the potential health concerns from drinking 70.5 ounces of an energy drink in the span of one evening.

Furthermore, while we here at Abnormal Use have no medical evidence to refute the FDA study, it would seem illogical to hold Phusion Projects liable under these circumstances. At its essence, Four Loko is nothing more than a manufactured version of a cocktail served in every bar in America. If the combination of caffeine and alcohol is as dangerous as the FDA believes, then why hasn’t it – or some other government agency or official – issued a similar report concerning the safety of after-market mixing? We can only surmise that the FDA, just like the rest of us, likes its peanut butter and jelly sandwiches, but hates its Goober Grape.

Good News for Toyota (at last)

For many, the year 2009 will be remembered as the launching point for several successful careers. President Obama was inaugurated. Chesley Sullenberger became America’s hero. Taylor Swift released 2009’s top selling album leading to her 2010 Grammy. For the Toyota Motor Corporation, however, the year was not so kind.

For Toyota, 2009 marked the beginning of the largest vehicle recall in the company’s history. Initially, Toyota was forced to recall some 3.8 million vehicles upon the discovery that removable floor mats could cause accelerator pedals to stick in the depressed position. Toyota later broadened the recall after determining that the accelerator pedals could stick even without the aid of the mats. In total, over 6 million Toyota vehicles were recalled. As of February 2010, 2,262 incidents of unintended acceleration had been reported. That figure included 815 crashes, 341 injuries, and 19 deaths. Not surprisingly, Toyota became a popular defendant in a plethora of subsequent lawsuits. Reports estimated that these lawsuits could cost Toyota over $3 billion. Certainly, 2009 was a year Toyota would just as soon forget.

Recently, Toyota’s misfortunes took an unexpected turn when the first of these recall-related lawsuits went to trial. In Sitafalwalla v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.SA., Inc., No. 08-CV-3001 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), the plaintiff, Dr. Amir Sitafalwalla, sued Toyota in a New York federal court, claiming that a defect, in either the electronic throttle system or the floor mats of his 2005 Scion, caused his car to suddenly accelerate into a tree. After the plaintiff’s expert testified that the accident was caused by an unsecured driver floor mat, the defense moved to exclude any evidence related to the electronic system. Judge E. Thomas Boyle, the U.S. magistrate presiding, granted Toyota’s motion. With evidence of the electronic system excluded, counsel for Toyota argued that the accident was caused by the driver – not the floor mat. After deliberating for less than one hour, the jury agreed with Toyota.

Jury forewoman, Regina Desio, indicated that after weighing all of the evidence, the jury “came to the conclusion that there was not a defect with the automobile.” Toyota is touting the jury’s conclusion as precedent for the hundreds of other lawsuits yet to be decided. Toyota spokeswoman, Celeste Migliore said:

[The case] clearly demonstrates a plaintiff’s inability to identify, let alone prove the existence of, an alleged electronic defect in Toyota vehicles that could cause unintended acceleration.

While we here at Abnormal Use share Toyota’s enthusiasm with the jury’s decision, it may be premature to accurately forecast the outcome of the outstanding lawsuits. First, jury verdicts lack precedential value. Unfortunately, we have all experienced the enigma of the unpredictable jury. Second, we do not know how much the plaintiff’s own conduct may have influenced the jury’s decision. Certainly, a jury may treat a plaintiff driving at an excessive rate of speed on a neighborhood street differently than a plaintiff gently rolling away from a stop sign prior to the “unintended acceleration.” The plaintiff alleges that his car accelerated as he shifted from drive to park with his foot on the brake. We do not know how credible the jury found these allegations, only that it found Toyota was not liable. Finally, no evidence was actually presented to the jury regarding an alleged electronic defect. Because Judge Boyle disallowed the plaintiff’s evidence on the electronic system, at best, Toyota may cite the jury verdict as evidence that the floor mats were not defective.

Whether this decision is a foreshadowing of things to come or an outlier in a long series of jury verdicts, only time will tell. For the moment, however, we should let Toyota enjoy the good news. Its been awhile.

CPSC: Beware the Dangers of Walking on Water

We here at Abnormal Use work hard to maintain our “street-cred.” We tweet. We use Foursquare. We go to concerts, preferably before you have heard of the band that we are going to see. We watch foreign films that are later (and regrettably) adapted by Hollywood, and we snarl in disdain when anyone mentions the subsequent remakes. However, despite our great efforts to remain hip and relevant, one fad has eluded us, and it was the federal government, of all things, that alerted us to its existence. Yes, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) recently informed us of something called water walking. Who knew? Certainly not us!

According to this Fox News report, this new trend can be witnessed at amusement parks and carnivals. Water walking is a new recreational activity where individuals roll across the water while encapsulated in large, airtight, plastic balls. While this activity may be entertaining, it doesn’t quite rise to the level of “miraculous,” like that of a certain Biblical figure. Recently, the CPSC warned of the dangers associated with water walking, namely the potential for suffocation. Because the water balls are airtight, the CPSC advises that there is an inadequate air supply within the enclosed spheres required for the activity. In addition, the CPSC expressed concern over the lack of an emergency exit in the event an encapsulated individual becomes distressed. Two incidents of physical injury, both involving children, have already been reported.

It stands to reason that an airtight, plastic ball does not have a limitless supply of oxygen. The CPSC claims that suffocation can occur inside the balls in just a few minutes. In an interview with the Chicago Tribune, Charles Jones, who claims to have invented the water sphere, disagrees. According to Jones, each 6 1/2 foot water ball contains 90-minutes worth of oxygen. Without empirical evidence as to the oxygen supply, we cannot validate either claim. However, with only two reported incidents despite the numerous participants, it is difficult to envision a scenario where a water walker’s oxygen supply is actually depleted in a matter of minutes. But, hey, don’t ask us; we just heard about water walking the other day, so what do we know?

While the CPSC’s investigation into the safety of water walking continues, they have not resorted to a draconian ban of the water spheres. The CPSC report is a warning. It is merely a lesson that, despite how much fun walking on water may be, the oxygen supply inside your vehicle will eventually be exhausted. If you really want to walk on water without the fear of suffocation, we here at Abnormal Use recommend you start studying the anatomy of the basilisk (aka “Jesus Lizard”). In the meantime, enjoy your rides – albeit short ones – inside the water balls.

Abnormal Interviews: Larry D. Thompson, Author of "The Trial"

Tomorrow marks the release of Texas attorney Larry D. Thompson’s new novel, The Trial, a legal thriller which chronicles the plight of a small town attorney litigating against a fictional international pharmaceutical company. The book’s protagonist, Lucas Vaughn, is a former Houston-based trial lawyer who migrates to a small Texas town to escape the stress associated with his trial work. His plan appears to be working as his health improves and he is finally able to mend his troubled relationship with his teenage daughter, Samantha. Unfortunately, his new found peace is short-lived. After participating in a clinical trial for a drug manufactured by the fictional drug company Ceventa, Samantha contracts severe drug-induced hepatitis. With her life dwindling away, Vaughn takes the fight to the courtroom. During the litigation, he quickly learns that there are no limits to what Ceventa will do to protect its “revolutionary” new drug. You can see the novel’s “book trailer” (complete with dramatic music) here.

We here at Abnormal Use were fortunate enough to have the opportunity to interview Mr. Thompson about his new book and his inspiration for the tale.

Excerpts of that interview follow below:

[ON PORTRAYING HIMSELF IN THE NOVEL]

FARR: The Trial’s protagonist, Lucas Vaughn is a seasoned UT [University of Texas] law grad, Houston-based trial lawyer. Did you see a little bit of yourself in Lucas?

THOMPSON: Not really. There’s more of me in my first novel, So Help Me God. The protagonist in [So Help Me God] is Todd Duncan. He’s primarily a defense lawyer, so there’s more of me in him. [With Lucas Vaughn] I just wanted a character who had been around the courthouse some. I wanted to put him in a small town, so there’s really none of me. And of course, he was a plaintiff’s lawyer and I had been primarily defense. Although, like any defense lawyer, if a good plaintiff’s case comes along and it’s not against the client, then I’m happy to take the case.

[DEPICTING A LAWYER’S QUALITY OF LIFE]

FARR: Quality of life and the challenge of balancing a successful career with a good home life are serious issues in the legal community. What does the novel say about these issues – particularly in the context of Lucas and his relationship with his daughter, Samantha?

THOMPSON: Well, I think Lucas Vaughn thought he was being a good father. He was faced with having to raise a daughter by himself and I think he thought that “I provided a roof over her head and three meals a day and see her a few hours now and then,” then that’s what a father is supposed to do. He had the rude awakening when he moved her to San Marcos and discovered that his method of fathering really wasn’t all that good. He moved, and he changed his lifestyle. He didn’t change his method in fathering until Samantha flunked out of [Texas] A&M. It was his romantic interest, Sue Ellen, who finally said you need to change it [his parenting style], and he did. That gave him about a year’s worth of a good father/daughter relationship before she took the drug. My old deceased law partner said once that the “law is a jealous mistress.” And that is, in fact, true. No matter what you’re doing, you cannot let it consume you and you’ve got to find time for family. Actually, you’ve got to make time for family. If you don’t, then you end up with problems with your kids and problems with your spouse.

[DIFFICULTY OF REPRESENTING FAMILY]

FARR: In the novel, Lucas represents his daughter as she’s dying of liver failure against the clinical trial physician and Ceventa, the pharmaceutical company that manufactured the clinical drug. How difficult do you think it would be for a lawyer to actually represent a loved one under these circumstances?

THOMPSON: Hugely difficult. I mean, nearly impossible. I wouldn’t recommend it to anybody that they represent a family member. I have some personal experience in that. My brother was a successful lawyer in the eighties. He died way too young. He wrote crime non-fiction. He got sued for libel for a book called Blood and Money in Texas. The first lawsuit was a nothing lawsuit when he lived in Los Angeles. I said, “I’ll handle that for you, and we’ll dispose of it pretty quickly.” Then came two other more serious lawsuits. Suddenly, I’m representing my own brother with three lawsuits, two of which were with very strong plaintiff attorneys. So I had a few sleepless nights as we went through those. We won all three of them primarily because my brother had gotten all his facts right. But to have to represent your daughter when she’s dying is something really that no lawyer in his right mind ought to do.

[ON REALISTIC DEPICTIONS OF THE LEGAL PROCESS]

THOMPSON: I want to make sure that any lawyer that reads this book will think, “Okay, the guy that wrote it really knows something about trials and evidence and what goes on in a lawsuit. It’s not ‘made up.'” From that standpoint, I generally succeed. My first novel had a trial at the end. This one has a trial at the end. The one I’m starting now will end up with a trial. I want lawyers to read it and think, “Okay, this guy really does know something about trying lawsuits.”

[ON MAKING LITIGATION INTERESTING]

FARR: The Trial is about far more than just those proceedings in front of the jury, the trial itself. In the book, you go through the rigors of written discovery, depositions, and pretrial motions. What were the challenges of, not only including a large part of the litigation process in a 300 page novel, but also of making it interesting to the reader?

THOMPSON: That is a challenge. I think the only way it can be done is that you have to – you can’t have talking heads for too long a period of time in any book. The reader is going to get bored when that happens. I think you have to mix in (along with the discovery and the depositions) . . . some scenes that involve a little more conflict, a little more drama, something totally apart from the discovery process itself. I think that’s the only way you can really keep a reader’s attention if you’re talking about discovery and hearings at the courthouse and that kind of thing.

[ISSUES WITH THE LENGTH OF COMPLEX LITIGATION]

FARR: One of the ways you were able to kind of condense the process, I guess, was to have the trial expedited due to the circumstances surrounding Samantha’s health. I believe that Ceventa had 90 days to prepare for trial. In practice, a case of this magnitude can be in litigation for a couple of years before it ever goes to trial, if at all. Do you think that courts should do more to expedite the process – especially in situations like Samantha’s?

THOMPSON: Absolutely. I think that – having been a trial lawyer for a long time, I think we [trial lawyers] waste far too much time in discovery. I really think that we could cut out about three quarters of it and it would not affect the outcome. I’ve actually got a plaintiff bad faith case against a disability carrier that I’m going to go to trial in September, and I’ve elected not to depose anybody from the insurance company. . . . I’ve just decided I’ve got their claim file. I know where I want to go with it. I’ve just decided that I’ve tried enough lawsuits that I’ll cross-examine them at the courthouse for the first time. . . . Of course, the big problem is that you go up against a big insurance company or a big pharmaceutical company or even a big products manufacturer, and they want to wear down the plaintiff’s lawyer and the plaintiff if they can drag it out long enough. I’ve seen it and know it happens. I’ve done it myself. It may not be the best way to achieve justice, but sometimes the money they’re willing to throw at it can just cause one delay after another.

[ON THE DEPICTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES]

FARR: In the novel, Ceventa, the pharmaceutical company, takes some pretty drastic measures – bribery, kidnapping, and murder – to not only have their drug approved by the FDA, but also to protect their interests during the course of the trial itself. Obviously, The Trial is a fiction novel, but were you concerned in any way as a defense attorney about the message that this may convey to readers about large corporations and corporate interests?

THOMPSON: Not really. The reason is because I did do a lot of research. Now, short of murder and kidnapping, well, maybe not even that because where I got interested in this subject was I had a doctor who was on the periphery of the VIOXX litigation and that got me interested in it. There’s a whistle blower named David Graham, who still works for the FDA. He’s a medical doctor and he was interviewed when he blew the whistle on VIOXX and all the problems that it was causing with the heart. He was interviewed by CNN and a question was specifically asked to him, “Because you have come forward and taken this position against Merck [manufacturer of VIOXX], are you in fear for your life?” He [Graham] just said, “Well, I try not to think about that. I am going to do what I think is right.” So far nothing has happened. . . . I’m stretching it a little bit when I tie in kidnapping and murder. As far as bribery , there’s evidence that the FDA has – some people on the FDA have taken bribes. It’s not too big a leap to say that a drug company might commit something like that. But, obviously, that’s fiction.

[ON REPRESENTING THE PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY]

FARR: If you were standing in Audrey Metcalf’s shoes representing Ceventa, would you have handled the case any differently? Are there any things that you may have done that Audrey did not do during the course of the litigation?

THOMPSON: Good question. I don’t think anybody has posed that question to me. . . . What could she have done differently that might have impacted on the trial itself? I think things got out of her hands. I think she was doing a good job as a defense lawyer. She was throwing up obstacles. She had actually kept the clinical trial results out of evidence with a very innovative theory that the results didn’t make any difference because Samantha was participating in the trial itself. I think that she was on the right track until the results of the clinical trial, including the falsified data, came to light through Ryan Sinclair. I think that once that was done the die was probably cast. But I think if that had not come to light, then I think she was on track to win the case. I don’t think she ever – she, herself, did not know that there was fraud involved in the trial itself. So I really think she did a good job. It was her client who was the one that really torpedoed the case.

[ON WRITING A NOVEL WHILE WORKING AS AN ATTORNEY]

THOMPSON: . . . [J]ust a matter of desire and self discipline. If once you decide you want to write, if you’re still a full time lawyer, then you have to get up a little earlier in the morning and write a couple of hours in the morning and then go to the office. That’s assuming you’re not in trial. If you’re in trial or getting ready for trial, then you’ve got to set the book aside and you’ve got to focus on your trial. . . . I couldn’t do it when I was in your stage in life [young associate] and I was too busy with . . . trial and family and . . . all the other stuff that was part of the world then. That took up all my time and I couldn’t have possibly written a book then. But, when my youngest [child] graduated from college and I said okay, I think I’ll give it a try.

[ON WRITING FROM THE PLAINTIFF’S PERSPECTIVE]

THOMPSON: I think David versus Goliath always has an appeal. So if you’re going to write a David versus big old Goliath story, you want to make David the protagonist. So – actually, I’ll give credit to John Grisham who’s the master of this genre in that he usually has, at least in some of his early novels, . . . some little guy against a big establishment company industry figure or something of that sort. And they succeeded. So I decided, well, if it’s good enough for Grisham, then I think I will. Nobody’s done one on the pharmaceutical companies really, so if I’m going to do one on the pharmaceutical companies, I don’t want to make the drug companies the good guys. I want them to be the bad guys.

[DEFENSE AS THE GOOD GUYS?]

FARR: Do you think it’s possible to tell a story, at least a story that people would actually want to read, where the corporate defendant is the good guy?

THOMPSON: Yes. Actually, I’ll direct you back to my first novel, So Help Me God. It’s not really about a corporate defendant, but I decided that for my first novel I took on a noncontroversial subject. I took on the abortion controversy. I decided I wanted to write a novel that would tell both sides of that without taking sides. I wrote it and I submitted it to a bunch of publishers and agents and, not surprisingly, got rejected by everybody – every single one of them. . . In that I actually presented both sides as evenly as I could. I had two really good, different personalities – lawyers on each side. I wanted to show that the – that lawyers can be professional adversaries, but still not take it personally as we so often see in what we do. . . and that there could be a trial where both sides could have really good lawyers. Both sides could have really good cases to present. Then I thought of a way so that I could end the story without taking a side as far as pro-life or pro-choice, which I did. But that doesn’t quite answer your question about the corporation. Can a corporation be a good guy and a protagonist? I would think probably the best way a corporation could do that is if you made the antagonist the federal government. Most people do not personally align themselves with big corporations. I’ve represented too many in my time, and you have, too. I know you haven’t been practicing very long. Juries usually don’t like big corporations. That’s one of our problems when we defend them.

BIOGRAPHY: Larry D. Thompson is a graduate of the University of Texas School of Law and is a member of Houston’s Lorance & Thompson, PC. While he has tried numerous cases involving products liability, medical malpractice, insurance coverage, and health care throughout his career, in recent years, over seventy percent of his practice has been in the defense of physicians and health care providers.

The Regulation of Electronic Cigarettes

If you are a fan of Bravo’sReal Housewives of Beverly Hills” series, you will undoubtedly recall the episode featuring the appearance of psychic Allison DuBois at a dinner party hosted by Camille Grammer. DuBois was quite irksome, but surprisingly, not due to the cigarette she puffed at the dinner table. While DuBois’s cigarette caused little conflict at the party, the product has been at the forefront of some intense litigation and proposed legislation in recent months.

DuBois’s “cigarette” was an electronic cigarette or “e-cigarette.” As such, it was a battery-powered device that allows users to inhale vaporized nicotine, minus the tobacco, tar, and carbon monoxide. E-cigarette advertisements claim that the product is “the smarter and safer alternative to smoking” which looks, tastes, and feels like a real cigarette. If true, the e-cigarette could dramatically impact the nation’s health. Apparently, though, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has its doubts.

The emergence of the e-cigarette presented the FDA with a new opportunity to extend its regulatory reach. However, over a decade ago, the FDA lost its initial bid to regulate cigarettes and smokeless tobacco under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“the Act”) via the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 539 U.S. 120 (2000) (holding that Congress had not vested the FDA with the power to regulate cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products). Despite that loss, the FDA has made other attempts to regulate e-cigarettes, and we’ve created the handy list below to summarize those attempts:

  • In 2009, the FDA warned that e-cigarettes contain carcinogens and toxic chemicals such as diethyline glycol (an ingredient used in antifreeze). According to its statement, the FDA was concerned that e-cigarettes would increase nicotine addiction and tobacco use in young people. The FDA began detaining shipments of e-cigarettes at the border. Following the examination of the seized goods, it determined that the product meets the Act’s definition of a combination drug-device product and, accordingly, was subject to FDA regulation. E-cigarette distributors challenged the FDA’s jurisdiction.
  • In January 2010, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction to allow e-cigarette distributors to continue to import their products into the country. Judge Richard Leon agreed with the distributors that Brown prevented the FDA from regulating e-cigarettes. The FDA appealed the ruling, and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a stay on Judge Leon’s injunction. (For a more thorough examination of the Court’s decision, see our earlier discussion of that matter here.)
  • In September 2010, the FDA notified five e-cigarette distributors that it was taking enforcement actions against the companies for violations of the Act. The list of violations included “violations of good manufacturing practices, making unsubstantiated drug claims, and using the devices as delivery mechanisms for active pharmaceutical ingredients like rimonabant and tadalafil.” In addition, the FDA announced its decision to regulate e-cigarettes as combination drug-device products. As a consequence of regulation, e-cigarette manufacturers would be required to comply with the FDA’s drug-approval process.
  • On December 7, 2010, the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the district court decision and held that the FDA lacked the authority to regulate e-cigarettes under the Act as drugs or devices. In addition, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that the FDA may only regulate the marketing of e-cigarettes pursuant to the Tobacco Act.

While the FDA may have been unsuccessful in its legal battles thus far (the FDA is considering an appeal), several states are considering regulating, or in some instances banning, e-cigarettes. Recently, New York took the first steps to becoming the first state to ban e-cigarettes, passing a proposed bill through the Health Committee of the New York Assembly. The bill’s sponsor, Assemblywoman Linda Rosenthal, indicated she wanted to proscribe e-cigarettes until they undergo more investigation and regulation. Assembly Health Committee Chairman Richard Gottfried has urged e-cigarette manufacturers to prove to the FDA the legitimacy of their “smoking cessation” claims.

Rosenthal and Gottfried may have a point: e-cigarettes may pose some yet-to-be-determined health hazards. It is interesting that the FDA and state legislatures have become so adamant at this stage about banning a cigarette alternative. While we may not know the ill-effects, if any, of vaporized nicotine, we do know the risks associated with tar, tobacco, and carbon monoxide. There is always a risk that e-cigarettes can lead to hazards more significant than cancer and emphysema. However, it seems counter-intuitive to protect consumers by banning a product which may have risks in favor of one we know poses the threat of serious illness.

We can all relate to the fear of the unknown. On the one hand, we may discover in the future that the conservative approach of the FDA and the various state legislatures was proper. On the other hand, we may discover Allison DuBois knew what was safe all along. After all, she is a psychic.

Hot Coffee: Take Two (In Florida)

We here at Abnormal Use garnered a bit of buzz with our recent comments on Susan Saladoff’s Hot Coffee documentary and the Stella Liebeck litigation. Some of our critics have interpreted our remarks as an attempt to re-litigate that infamous McDonald’s case. Those critics scolded us and purported that “it’s over.” They advised us to simply “move on” and write on other topics. Perhaps those critics were right. Certainly, the details of a 1994 lawsuit must be irrelevant in today’s legal landscape. However, someone forgot to tell Florida’s Cynthia Gamrot.
According to the local ABC news affiliate, Ms. Gamrot recently ordered a cup of coffee at a Chick-Fil-A drive-thru in St. Petersburg, Florida. She allegedly spilled coffee in her lap and sustained second- and third-degree burns after the cup’s lid “popped off.” The coffee was served at a temperature somewhere between 170 and 200 degrees which was reportedly in accordance with Chick-Fil-A corporate policy. As a result, she sued the owner of the St. Petersburg Chick-Fil-A. (The report did not specify the jurisdiction in which the case was filed). Sound familiar?
In response to Ms. Gamrot’s lawsuit, Tampa’s ABC Action News tested the serving temperature of 33 cups of coffee from 10 national restaurant chains – a task reminiscent of law clerk Danny Jarrett’s work in the Liebeck case. The station’s study indicated that the majority of the coffee was served between 150 and 180 degrees. It should be noted, however, that the coffee served in the 150-degree temperature range came primarily from Arby’s and Wendy’s – two restaurants that do not serve breakfast and are not historically known for their coffee. Starbucks, Dunkin Donuts, Krispy Kreme, and McDonalds all tested in the 168 to 180 degree range.
Back in 1994, Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Charles Baxter opined during the Liebeck trial that the optimal temperature to serve coffee was between 155 and 160 degrees. Defense expert Dr. Turner Osler indicated that coffee served at a temperature as low as 130 degrees could result in burns similar to those sustained by Ms. Liebeck. Further, Reed Morgan, Ms. Liebeck’s counsel, theorized that any coffee served over 140 degrees was “unreasonably dangerous.” If this testimony from the Liebeck trial is true, why do top fast food chains continue to serve an allegedly “dangerous product?” Either restaurants have a diabolical agenda to harm their patrons or they have recognized that people enjoy their coffee piping hot.
The ABC affiliate’s study demonstrates that the Liebeck case did little, if anything, to alter the manner in which fast food restaurants serve coffee. Further, it reveals that the conduct of McDonald’s in the early 1990s conformed to industry standards – both then and now. Critics of the restaurant chain – and those who attempt to use the Liebeck case to advance the agenda of the Plaintiffs’ bar – simply fail to acknowledge the fact that coffee, by its very nature, is meant to be served hot. No one wants to consume a lukewarm cup of sub-140 degree coffee. Restaurants recognize this fact, as do consumers of coffee. Why can’t the trial bar? If Mr. Morgan honestly believes that any coffee served at a temperature greater than 140 degrees is “unreasonably dangerous,” then he essentially argues that coffee should be taken off of restaurant menus. Starbucks did not become a morning staple because of its iced coffee selections.
In no way are we here at Abnormal Use intending to trivialize the injuries of coffee burn victims.
No one is disputing the severity of Ms. Liebeck or Ms. Gamrot’s burns. We do, however, question the need for attributing liability for those burns to the producer or seller of the coffee. There is no evidence that either Ms. Liebeck or Ms. Gamrot expressed any concerns with their fast food-produced coffee prior to their accidents. In fact, we imagine they probably enjoyed the hot product, which is why they ordered it in the first place. They might have even complained had they been served coffee cooler than the industry standard temperature. Simply put, hot coffee does not become “unreasonably dangerous” until it is negligently spilled by the consumer.

The Abnormal Use Guide to Last Week’s SCOTUS Preemption Opinions

To many of non-lawyers, “preemption” is that nefarious word associated with a network’s decision to alter its television line-up with irksome breaking news. For defense attorneys, however, the term has a far more positive connotation. Preemption is a fan favorite because it can bar many types of claims. Needless to say, any time the United States Supreme Supreme Court issues a case involving preemption, we here at Abnormal Use pay close attention. Last week, the Supreme Court delivered two such rulings within a matter of days. It was a good week for express preemption, but for implied preemption, not so much. To assist you, our dear readers, in your review and analysis of this new jurisprudence, we’ve created this crib sheet.

In Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, No. 09-152, 2011 WL 588789 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2011), the Court held that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA) preempts all design defect claims against vaccine manufacturers arising out of injury or death caused by vaccine side effects. In reaching this result, Justice Scalia, writing for a six justice majority, navigated through the depths of the English language, bringing to mind those halcyon grammar school days of sentence diagramming. While we needed a copy of the Cambridge Grammar of English to fully appreciate the opinion, here is a simple, though not as grammatically pleasing, synopsis:

  • The Court examined whether 42 U.S.C. 300aa(b)(1) preempted all design defect claims against vaccine manufacturers. The statute reads as follows: “No vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with the administration of a vaccine after October 1, 1988, if the injury or death resulted from side effects that were unavoidable even though the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper directions and warnings.” The words of this statute would be parsed thoroughly in this jurisprudential inquiry.
  • The statute establishes unavoidability (given safe manufacture and adequate warning) with respect to the particular design as a complete defense.
  • The use of the term “unavoidable” in the statute does not incorporate comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. (Comment k exempts from strict liability “unavoidably unsafe products.”). According to Justice Scalia, there is no obvious intent to incorporate comment k because the statute uses the adjective “unavoidable” while the Restatement itself uses the adverb “unavoidably.”
  • The statute’s “even though” clause grammatically is a concessive subordinate clause. Justice Scalia argued that the dissent’s reading of this phrase incorrectly linked proper preparation and labeling with unavoidability – the job of a coordinating conjunction.
  • While seemingly admitting that the majority’s interpretation renders part of the statute superfluous, Justice Scalia contended that there is no rule indicating that a “passage which could have been more terse does not mean what it says.”
  • The lack of guidance from the federal regulations for design defects compared to the plethora of guidance for proper manufacturing and warning, specifically mentioned in the NCVIA, suggests that design defects were not a basis for liability.
  • While the Court has previously expressed doubt that Congress would preempt product liability claims without providing a federal substitute, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), Justice Scalia insisted that the Court has never suggested it would be skeptical of preemption unless the congressional substitute operated like the tort system.
  • Post-enactment legislative history is not a proper tool for statutory interpretation. (We all know how much Justice Scalia abhors any legislative history).
  • Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion. In so doing, he examined the legislative history and the statute’s basic purpose to reach the same result.
  • Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, authored a lengthy dissent. According to her dissent, the statute does not preempt all design defect claims. Rather, Justice Sotomayor argued that where a plaintiff has proven that he was injured by a design defect, vaccine manufacturers are only protected if they demonstrate that the side effect was unavoidable and is otherwise free from manufacturing and design defects.

After all of that analysis, the Court couldn’t possibly have enough grammatical energy to decide another preemption case for some time, right? Apparently, the average preemption second-wind of a Supreme Court Justice is approximately 24 hours, because the following day, the Court rendered its second opinion of the week. In Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc. No. 08-1314 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2011), the Court held that Section 208 of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act (FMVSS) does not preempt state tort suits claiming manufacturers should have installed lap-and-shoulder belts in lieu of lap belts in rear inner seats. Much to the chagrin of elementary school teachers across America, however, this decision didn’t demand such a precise stranglehold on the English language. The following is an overview of the opinion:

  • Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for the seven justice majority (Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment and Justice Kagan took no part in the decision). As aforementioned, in Bruesewitz, Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion advocating a broader approach to the preemption analysis. Williamson gave him the chance to demonstrate that approach.
  • Breyer used the majority of the opinion to distinguish this case from Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (holding that Section 208 of the FMVSS preempted a state tort suit against a auto manufacturer for failure to install airbags).
  • In light of Geier, neither Section 208’s express preemption clause, nor its savings clause, limit the operation of conflict preemption principles. Instead, the Court must determine whether the state tort action conflicts with the federal regulation.
  • According to Geier, giving auto manufacturers a choice between various passive restraint devices was a significant objective of the federal regulations. In allowing for this choice, the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) was concerned about a consumer backlash if airbags were required.
  • In Williamson, the regulation gave auto manufacturers a choice between lap-and-shoulder belts and lap belts. That choice, however, was not a significant regulatory objective. The DOT enacted the regulation because it was convinced lap-and-shoulder belts would increase safety. The regulation’s history indicates that manufacturers were given a choice because lap-and-shoulder belts could cause “entry and exit problems for occupants.” Moreover, the DOT indicated it did not think a lap-and-shoulder belt requirement would be cost-effective.
  • Even though the state tort suit may limit manufacturer choice, the Court held it is not an obstacle to accomplishing the purpose and objective of the federal regulation.
  • Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize the Court’s rejection of an overreading of Geier. She reiterated that the “mere fact that an agency regulation allows manufacturers a choice between options is insufficient to justify implied preemption.”
  • Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, indicated that plain text of the FMVSS would lead to the same conclusion. Thomas argued that the FMVSS’s savings clause expressly preserved state tort actions.

While the advocates of preemption ended last week with only a .500 record, we here at Abnormal Use will not hang our heads. Unashamed of a moral victory, we can recognize the importance of distinguishing, rather than overruling, Geier.