This past summer, the National Football League endured a 136-day lockout, the longest work stoppage in league history.  While current players spent the four month hiatus negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement, retired players had their own beef with the NFL.  Back in July, 75 former players sued the league and helmet manufacturer, Riddell, alleging that Riddell and the NFL concealed the harmful effects of concussions from coaches, players, and trainers.  Anderson v. National Football League et al., No. BC46842 (Cal. Sup. Ct.  July 19, 2011).  In addition, the players allege that football helmets were defectively designed and manufactured for attenuating the foreseeable force of impact.  Anderson was the first of three similar class actions filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court.  On August 3, 47 additional players brought similar allegations against the NFL, Riddell, and a number of other sports entities.  Pear v. National Football League et al., No. LC094453 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 3, 2011).  On August 26, another 18 players entered the picture. Barnes v. National Football League et al., No. BC468483 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 26, 2011).  At this time, the three actions have not been consolidated.

Even with the protection of helmets and pads, concussions and injuries are still commonplace within the game.  While injuries still occur, they shouldn’t be attributed to any defect in the equipment.  Football is a dangerous game.  Players routinely collide into one another using incredible force.  If not for helmets and pads, injuries would be even more prevalent.  To our knowledge, there are no feasible alternative designs which could eliminate concussions.  The manufacturers are not responsible for the risks of the game.  They are responsible for doing what they can to minimize those risks.  Players should know of the potential harm their profession poses to their bodies.

Last year, we reported on the claim brought by a former player’s widow against the NFL and an equipment manufacturer.  In that case, the plaintiff alleged that helmets and shoulder pads were defectively designed and that the NFL failed to warn of the dangers of heat stroke.  By contrast, the recent string of claims allege that the NFL not only failed to warn, but intentionally concealed the dangerous effects of the game of football. We can’t speak as to what the NFL did or did not know about concussions. Whatever evidence may or may not be produced on that point, how can the players allege that they were completely oblivious to the dangers?

With scientific and medical research, we are constantly expanding our knowledge about the brain and the prevention of head injuries.  Accordingly, it is understandable that a player in the 1920’s may have had less knowledge about such things than a player in the 1990’s.  With the expansion of knowledge, the NFL and the equipment manufacturers have evolved their standards to protect players.  The abandonment of the old leather-helmets illustrate this point.  By the mid-1940s, football helmets were required by the NFL.  Obviously, the league recognized a need to protect the head.  We can only assume that players understood this same need every time they strapped on a helmet.

We recognize that protecting one’s self from the danger of an impact does not necessarily carry with it knowledge of long-term effects of concussions.  However, today’s scientific evidence was not available yesterday.  Indeed, one need not be a practicing physician to recognize that every time something is damaged, it doesn’t come back in quite the same position it was before.

We here at Abnormal Use love football.  We respect the players and recognize the risk they take on a daily basis for both the thrill of the game and our entertainment.  These latest lawsuits against the NFL, however, are misguided.  Football is dangerous.  Helmets are not just a placard for team logos.  They are worn for a reason.

In 2007, Spin Master Ltd. recalled more than four million Aqua Dots toys in the United States after discovering the product’s Chinese manufacturer mistakenly substituted 1,4 butanediol for the adhesive 1,5 pentanediol.  When ingested, 1,4 butanediol metabolizes into gamma-hydrobutyric acid (GHB), otherwise known as the date rape drug.  Reportedly, two children in the U.S. and three children in Australia were hospitalized after ingesting the product.  We are guessing this is not what Wal-Mart had in mind when it deemed the product one of its “Top 12 Toys of Christmas.”

Not surprisingly, coating a child’s toy with a pre-metabolized date rape drug resulted in some legal action against the company and the product’s major retailer, Wal-Mart.  Recently, in Aqua Dots Products Liability Litigation, — F. 3d —-, 2011 WL 3629723 (7th Cir. August 17, 2011), the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion regarding class certification in the multi-district litigation.  The proposed class did not sue Spin Master due to any physical injury the plaintiffs suffered from the butanediol-coated toys.  Rather, the plaintiffs elected not to pursue a refund from the distributor and challenged the adequacy of the company’s recall program.  The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class holding that it would be more advantageous for the plaintiffs to return their products for a refund rather than pursuing litigation and racking up attorneys’ fees.   Not happy with this result, the plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal.

The Seventh Circuit criticized the district court’s interpretation of Rule 23(b)(3). According to the rule, class certification is proper when “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” While it recognized the district court’s objective, the Seventh Circuit did not equate a recall campaign with a form of adjudication.  Apparently, that three-judge panel has never attempted to return a product to Wal-Mart.

While the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court’s reasoning under Rule 23(b)(3), it ultimately agreed with the court’s decision – albeit under Rule 23(a)(4).  Under Rule 23(a)(4), a court may certify a class action only if “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”  On that point, the Seventh Circuit had this to say:

Plaintiffs want relief that duplicates a remedy that most buyers already have received, and that remains available to all members of the putative class.  A representative who proposes that high transaction costs (notice and attorneys’ fees) be incurred at the class members’ expense to obtain a refund that already is on offer is not adequately protecting the class members’ best interests.

There is no question about the inherent dangers of exposing young children to the date rape drug; however, it is nice to see a court stand up for a company who has acted reasonably under the circumstances.  Spin Master acknowledged that a mistake had been made and took a reasonable course of action to remedy that mistake.  Unless the proposed class can demonstrate some long-term physical harm due to 1,4 butanediol exposure, the only damage these plaintiffs have suffered is the time spent returning the product.

To be fair, we here at Abnormal Use have also had to return products a time or two and can attest to the hassle.  Getting in the car, driving to the store, and – dare we say – waiting in line all amounts to time better spent doing anything else.  It’s torture for sure, but somehow we endure.  Even with the perils of this arduous task, however, we will gladly do it ourselves instead of paying a plaintiff’s attorney a 30 percent take to do it for us.

Tip of the hat to our friend, Ted Frank at the Point of Law blog for alerting us to this opinion.

Red Grange, also known as the “Galloping Ghost,” was a star tailback for the University of Illinois and the Chicago Bears back in the 1920’s.  So we are told.  Apparently, his exploits were worthy of the cover of Football Thrills #1, published way back in 1952 and two decades after Grange’s professional football career came to an end in 1934.  We’re a bit puzzled as to why the referee on the cover is jubilantly leaping into the air as Red makes an apparent touchdown, although the fact that Red himself was the editor of this issue of Football Thrills may explain the conundrum.

Why do we peddle in football nostalgia today?  It’s opening day of the college football season, or as we call it here in South Carolina, “Christmas.”  Around here, college football is kind of a big deal.  We here at Abnormal Use and Gallivan, White, & Boyd, P.A. boast supporters of Clemson, the University of South Carolina, Notre Dame, and Texas, to name just a few schools.  For the past seven months, we have been making bold predictions about the upcoming season.  All those negative plays from last season have been erased from our minds like a hagiographic issue of Football Thrills.

How does football relate to litigation, you may ask?  This is a law blog, after all.  Well, you might be surprised to learn we’ve previously blogged about football, including allegations of a heat stroke causing football helmet as well as  lifetime donors upset at having to pay for football parking. We can only hope this isn’t our last football-related post.  If so, please look forward to the next installment of Football Thrills edited by the Abnormal Use blog team.

Recently, in Kirkland v. Emhart Glass S.A.,  — F. Supp. 2d —-, No. C10-5125BHS, 2011 WL 1435454 (W.D. Wash. April 14, 2011), the District Court for the Western District of Washington denied a manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment on an injured glass worker’s claim under the Washington Product Liability Act (“WPLA”).  The plaintiff, injured by molten glass while operating an Individual Section Machine, alleged that the machine lacked adequate warnings and failed to protect workers from injury resulting from “contact with red hot bottles on the conveyor while performing mold changes.”  The manufacturer’s defense?  The plaintiff’s injuries were not proximately caused by its failure to warn because the dangers of molten glass were open and obvious.  Sounds reasonable.  After all, in order for glass to be “molten,” it must be exceedingly hot.  We doubt the plaintiff was wearing his winter coat while operating the machine.

However, the Court wasn’t buying it.

Sometimes the difference between winning and losing an argument isn’t the facts, but rather how the argument is framed. In opposition to the manufacturer’s motion, the plaintiff argued that its failure to warn claim was based on the manufacturer’s failure to provide adequate instructions to the plant operator

[a]bout how to reduce or eliminate the known hazard of workers coming into contact with extremely hot bottles on the conveyor when working over the conveyor, despite expressly acknowledging the need for such instructions in [their] Technical Report regarding Individual Section machines. (emphasis added)

See what they did there?  They incorporated the open and obvious nature of the molten glass right into their argument.  I’ll take your “open and obvious” and raise you one “failure to provide instructions.”  The dangers remain open and obvious, but apparently, it’s the manufacturer’s fault for not providing a remedy.  To support his argument, the plaintiff produced evidence that the plant operator installed a protective shield following the plaintiff’s accident.  (Don’t worry, the Ninth Circuit previously held Federal Rule of Evidence 407 only applies to a defendant‘s remedial measures).

The manufacturer was right.  The dangers of molten glass are open and obvious.  However, sometimes being right just isn’t enough.

After teaching the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, my Torts professor immediately warned the class that the doctrine was not to be used as an answer on our final exam.  Why?  Well, according to the professor, answering a question with “the thing speaks for itself” is not a good way to get in the good graces with the faculty.  Nevertheless, plaintiffs may still invoke res ipsa to suggest negligent conduct without direct evidence of a specific wrongful act.  Of course, we here at Abnormal Use abhor res ipsa and its circumstantial implications.  Despite our concerns, though, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has reminded us of the doctrine’s long-lost cousin – the malfunction theory.  See Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deere & Co., SC 18341 (Ct. August 16, 2011).

At issue in that case was a Connecticut family’s home destroyed by fire.  On the day of the fire, a resident of the home attempted to mow the lawn with a 5-year old John Deere lawn tractor but was unable to finish because the engine was “running roughly.”  The woman returned the mower to the garage and noticed a “different kind of smell.”  Ninety minutes later, the home caught fire.  A fire marshal investigation could not determine the cause or origin of the fire but identified the tractor as a “significant factor.”  In addition, an insurance investigator concluded that the tractor was the specific point of origin.  Neither the marshall nor the investigator disassembled the tractor.  Several months later, an expert examined the mower and ruled out all possible causes of origin within the tractor except for the electrical system, which was 70 percent destroyed.  The expert examined the remaining 30 percent and found no indication of side effects.  The family’s insurer settled the property damage claim and, through its subrogation rights, brought a products liability action against Deere.  The plaintiff alleged the tractor’s electrical system was in defective condition when it left Deere’s control and that this defect caused the fire.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $749,642.69.  Deere appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict.

The Court agreed that the plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to establish liability.  Significantly, the Court upheld the malfunction theory of products liability asserted by the plaintiff.  The malfunction theory permits a plaintiff to establish a prima facie products claim on the basis of circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is unavailable.  The Court held that a jury may rely on circumstantial evidence to infer that a product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer’s control if evidence reveals:

(1) the incident that caused the plaintiff’s harm was of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of a product defect, and

(2) any defect most likely existed at the time the product left the manufacturer’s or seller’s control and was not the result of other reasonably possible causes not attributable to the manufacturer or seller.

While we must give credit to the Court for considering the inconclusiveness of the expert testimony and the age of the mower in reversing the trial court, we must question the affirmation of the malfunction theory.  As much as we loathe res ipsa, at least that doctrine requires the defendant to have control of the damage-causing instrumentality.  With a liberal application of the malfunction theory, manufacturers could find themselves lifetime insurers of products long outside the grasp of their control.

We do not think requiring plaintiffs to present direct evidence of a product defect is unfair in proving a product defect claim.  It just seems logical.  Think a court should be persuaded by our argument that Titleist makes a defective driver every time we slice a drive into the woods?  Of course not, unless we let the thing speak for itself.

Religion has yet to become a central element in our product liability practice.  However, with the prevalence of religion in this country, there must be somewhere we can find a spiritual product liability claim.  Maybe Georgia?  Texas, perhaps?  Try New Jersey.

Recently, in Gupta v. Asha Enterprises, No. A-3059-09T2 (N.J. Ct. App. July 18, 2011), the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of an Edison, New Jersey restaurant that allegedly served meat-filled samosas to sixteen Hindu vegetarians.  As part of an India Day celebration in 2009, the plaintiffs placed an order at the Indo-Pak restaurant for vegetarian samosas, informing the restaurant that the food was being purchased for a group of strict vegetarians.  The restaurant filled the order and assured the plaintiffs that the food did not contain meat.  After consuming some of the samosas, the plaintiffs returned the remaining samosas to the restaurant and were advised that the food was, in fact, filled with meat.  As a result, the plaintiffs claimed spiritual damage and asserted a number of causes of action against the restaurant, including product liability and breach of express warranty.  The Court found prima facie evidence of an express warranty by the restaurant employees and reversed the grant of summary judgment as to that claim.  However, the Court affirmed summary judgment on the product liability claim, holding that, while the plaintiffs were supplied the wrong product, the food was safe, edible, and fit for human consumption.  Alas, religion and products liability remain divided.

As practitioners of the Swaminarayan principles of Hinduism,the plaintiffs believe that by eating meat they “become involved in the sinful cycle of pain, injury and death on God’s creatures, and that it affects the karma and dharma, or purity of the soul.”  While the food may have been physically safe, for the plaintiffs, meat is hardly fit for human consumption.

If the plaintiffs prevail on their express warranty claim on remand, the jury may have their hands full when calculating damages.  The plaintiffs are seeking compensation for emotional distress and economic damages in connection with a purification ritual they must now undergo to cleanse themselves.  According to Swaminarayan principles, the souls of those who eat meat can never go to God after death.  What dollar amount can be placed on eternal damnation?  After violating this principle, knowingly or unknowingly, the plaintiffs must travel to the River Ganges in Haridwar, Uttranchal, India to undergo a purification ritual which can last up to 30 days.  As the Court noted, in order to be awarded consequential damages, the damages must have been foreseeable at the time of the sale.  While that might not be the case with a fast food joint, perhaps a restaurant focusing on Indian cuisine could be charged with such knowledge.

In an increasingly pluralistic society, restaurants and manufacturers cannot reasonably be expected to produce their products in accordance with the plethora of religious principles.  However, there are some express statements here that will soon be litigated. We will have to wait and see what happens.

Fans of The Hangover undoubtedly remember the scene in which the actors are tasered by a group of children at the instruction of two police officers.  We here at Abnormal Use must admit that we found it at amusing.  Who wouldn’t find it funny watching 5000 volts of pulsed current flowing through Bradley Cooper and Zach Galifianakis?  However, after the recent $10 million jury verdict against it, TASER International might not consider this scene a laughing matter.

Very recently, in Turner v. Taser International, Inc., Case No. 3:10-CV-00125 (W.D.N.C.), a federal jury in the Western District of North Carolina ordered TASER to pay the estate of a 17-year old North Carolina resident $10 million.  According to reports, in 2008, the boy went into cardiac arrest and died inside a grocery store after being shocked in the chest for 37 seconds by a Charlotte-Mecklenberg police officer.   The boy was tased at the store by police following a verbal dispute with his boss.  The City of Charlotte settled with the boy’s estate for $625,000 in 2009 without admitting any wrongdoing.  TASER has moved for judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict.

Counsel for the plaintiffs issued a press release regarding the verdict, which said the jury found TASER negligently failed to warn users that discharging the taser into the chest of a person near his heart poses a substantial risk of cardiac arrest.  The press release further indicates that the medical examiner “found no drugs” in the decedent’s system, though Heraldonline.com reports that TASER has said a drug screen was not performed either at the autopsy or at any time before the lab destroyed the teenager’s blood evidence.  In any event, presiding District Judge Conrad reportedly did not allow the defense to offer evidence that three bags of marijuana were found in the decedent plaintiff’s sock during the incident and did not instruct the jury on contributory negligence in spite of defense counsel’s argument that the plaintiff’s behavior was negligent and “necessitated the use of force by police.”  Other outlets report that the teenager had committed offenses including theft, assault of other employees, resisting arrest, and assault on law enforcement.

TASER, the leading manufacturer of conducted energy devices (CEDs), is no stranger to litigation.  It has won judgment or been dismissed from more than 125 product liability cases.  The Turner verdict is only the company’s second adverse jury verdict (the first being a $7 million verdict in 2008 which was later reduced to $200,000).  With the limited information about the case in the media, we can only speculate what distinguished this case from the previous 128.  In TASER’s opinion, “compassion may have overwhelmed the scientific evidence presented in this case.”  TASER may be right, but certainly compassion was not the only factor at play.

It stands to reason that being shocked with large amounts of electricity may not be synonymous with a trip to the spa.  According to TASER’s website, however, the 5000 volts of electricity exerted by its product have a lower risk of danger than a 110 volt wall outlet.  TASER bases this conclusion on a taser’s pulsated current versus the continuous current found in a wall outlet.  Even at a pulsated rate, 37 seconds still seems like a long time to be subjected to 5000 volts of electricity – especially in the chest area.

A study recently released by the United States Department of Justice indicated that “there is currently no medical evidence that CEDs pose a significant health risk for induced cardiac dysrhythmia when deployed reasonably.” (emphasis added)  Interestingly enough, the study fails to define “reasonably.”  Regardless of how it is interpreted, the risk of injury is present. The question is what is TASER’s duty to warn?

We do not know what warnings TASER provided police officers prior to this incident.  (According to the DOJ study, TASER now recommends changing the target zone to below the chest).  Should officers have known the dangers regardless of any inadequate warning from the manufacturer?  Certainly, the officers from The Hangover didn’t get the memo.

Want more on this story?  Try this interesting piece from the South Carolina Criminal Defense Blog.

Bloomberg.com recently reported on a study which found that bacteria in raw poultry may be a source of superbugs in people.  Our first thought upon reading this story was, “What the heck is a superbug?” Well, we did a bit of cybersleuthing and learned that a superbug is a bacteria that has multiple antibiotic resistance genes. Or something like that. We’re not quite sure we get it. But, anyway, the theory goes: Superbugs have been spawned due to the overuse of antibiotics in animals. Yikes.

According to the study, found in the Center for Disease Control’s Emerging Infectious Diseases journal, a bacteria resistant to third-generation cephalosporins (i.e. medications to treat bacterial meningitis, pneumonia, and E. coli) was found on 80 percent of raw poultry purchased from grocery stores in the southern Netherlands.  By comparison, the bacteria was only found in 12 percent of the pork, beef and ground meat sampled.  Further, the study concluded that people infected with the bacteria where 2.5 times more likely to die within a month of infection.

If the image above is any indication, then the human race better take cover. (To be honest, we don’t know if that artistic rendering is of an actual superbug, but it’s scary, and it looks like what we think a superbug should look like). The study was silent on whether the superbugs possessed carnivorous teeth.

Before we abandon our local supermarkets and vow to buy only organic poultry, we must disclose that the Netherlands is one of Europe’s largest users of antibiotics in farm animals.  The animals are exposed to more antibiotics; therefore, they have a higher likelihood of breeding drug-resistant bacteria.  However, the use of antibiotics among residents of the Netherlands is also among the lowest in Europe. Whatever the case, we fear superbugs. Immensely.

In recent weeks, no beverage on earth has been more widely discussed, analyzed, and investigated than hot coffee.  Indeed, it has been the subject of a recent HBO documentary and a point of contention on the many legal blogs that elected to review the film.  Just as the the media frenzy had finally begun to subside, hot coffee litigation is once again back in the news. It never seems to end, does it?

The Toronto Sun recently reported that McDonald’s has settled a claim with a Quebec woman after hot coffee spilled onto her leg back in May.  Reportedly, the woman ordered several cups of coffee from a McDonald’s drive-through.  As the attendant handed her the beverages,  the cardboard carrying tray allegedly buckled, spilling three cups of coffee into her car and onto her person.  Following the spill, she was transported by ambulance to an area hospital for second-degree burns.  She demanded $12,313.24, and the fast food company’s insurer honored the request.

Let’s not get ahead of ourselves and claim this settlement is evidence that McDonald’s serves an unreasonably dangerous product.  There are clearly other factors at play here to explain McDonald’s willingness to expeditiously settle this woman’s claim.  First, there is no real dispute among credible sources that hot coffee can cause burns when spilled onto someone.  Second, after all of the recent bad press, McDonald’s may have an incentive to tidily dispose of such matters. Let’s remember: McDonald’s has taken its share of criticism for refusing to settle medical claims due to hot coffee burns.  Be it right or wrong, McDonald’s needs to temper the potential for any additional bad press.

Finally, this is not your typical Stella Liebeck-style hot coffee case.  The Quebec woman – the potential plaintiff – was not herself the spiller of the coffee.  Not only was the coffee reportedly spilled by a McDonald’s employee, but also, the spilling may have been the result of an apparently dysfunctional carrying tray.  Obviously, the facts are subject to discovery, and there may be a number of unknown factors, but at present, there is no evidence from the Toronto Sun article suggesting the woman played any role in the spill apart from being the victim.  Even if McDonald’s maintained the position, often asserted here at Abnormal Use, that coffee is a beverage meant to be served hot, it still must account for the possible negligence of its own  employee and the reportedly defective tray it chose to carry said beverage.

Nevertheless, this case may be exploited to advance the questionable proposition that hot coffee is, by its nature, unreasonably dangerous and defective.  Let us remember, however, that coffee is meant to be served hot and when it is spilled, it will burn.  That is simply the nature of the product.

If there is one thing we here at Abnormal Use take seriously, it’s college football. Among our writers and contributors and fellow lawyers here at Gallivan, White, & Boyd, P.A., we boast fans of the University of South Carolina, Clemson, Notre Dame, and the University of Texas.  When the autumn arrives, you can rest assured that we are talking stats and plays when we are not otherwise toiling or blogging. But, dear readers, imagine our dilemma! We here are perpetrators of a legal blog dedicated to the discussion of products liability! Rarely, if ever, are we permitted to discuss football on these fair pages!  But the fates have smiled upon us! The South Carolina Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion dealing with the contentious issue of football stadium parking which, though not exactly related to products liability, is important enough to bring to your attention.

Last week, The State reported on a family of South Carolina Gamecock fans who sued the University of South Carolina after the university began charging them a hefty $595 for their three parking spots near the fabled Williams-Brice Stadium.  The family alleged that they were entitled to free parking by virtue of a $140,000 donation they made in 1987 for a Lifetime Silver Spur membership in the Gamecock Club.  The family had parked for free for nearly twenty years until the school began charging for the privilege in 2007.  The university attributed the change to its efforts to raise money in order to compete with the facilities of other Southeastern Conference members.

Enter the courts. Following the Rosens’ suit against the university, the trial court granted the university’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the relevant written contract was not ambiguous and failed to identify any of its listed privileges as “free.”  The trial court also found that as lifetime members, the family, by virtue of its $140,000 donation, only received the “benefit” of maintaining their donor level with the Gamecock Club.  During the final week of June, in an unpublished opinion, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the contract was ambiguous on the parking issue, primarily due to the family’s 20-year history of free parking. See Rosen v. University of South Carolina, No. 2011-UP-331 (June 27, 2011) (unpublished). In so doing, the Court of Appeals, in an opinion authored by Justice Huff, noted:

At oral argument, the University urged this court to consider that the Rosens paid for football tickets, including the increases in football ticket prices, as the “customs, practices, [and] usages” of the Gamecock Club.  In considering the payment of ticket prices, we must also consider that during the same time period, the Rosens were not required to pay for the parking spaces.  Exhibit A [of the contract, which listed the benefits and priorities the Rosens received] made no distinction in the language used describing the tickets and parking spaces.  It neither stated additional charges would apply or that the benefits would be free.  When considering “the customs, practices, [and] usages” of the Gamecock Club that despite similar language, the members paid for tickets but did not pay for parking, we find the contracts to be ambiguous as to the parking issue.

The unpublished opinion drew a concurrence and dissent from Justice Pieper, who agreed with the court on the parking issue but not on an unrelated – and far less interesting – beneficiary issue.

We here at Abnormal Use must commend our Court of Appeals.  If anyone is willing to pay $140,000 for the privilege of attending college football games, they probably deserve some benefit. (There’s got to be some equitable Latin phrase from jurisprudence echoing that sentiment, right?). Whatever the case, the college football season officially begins in just a month and a half, and we’ll have to resist the urge to blog about that most important of subjects when September arrives.