Over the last few years, Hillerich and Bradsby, the manufacturer of Louisville Slugger baseball bats, has endured much litigation.  In 2009, a Montana jury awarded a family $850,000 after their son was killed by a ball struck by the aluminum bats.  Last month, the company settled the claims of a New Jersey teenager severely injured in a similar accident for $14.5 million.  The multi-million dollar settlement came on the heels of another $951,000 verdict from an Oklahoma federal jury.

Things weren’t looking too good for the bat manufacturer, to say the least.

In a twist of fate, however, an Oklahoma court tossed the $951,000 jury verdict just days after the massive New Jersey settlement.

The jury had awarded a 15-year old boy and his parents nearly $1 million after he was struck in the face by a line drive, causing severe facial injuries.  In reaching its decision, the jury determined that the aluminum bat was defective and unreasonably dangerous because it could hit a ball faster than its wooden counterparts – a condition for which Louisville Slugger failed to warn.  Moreover, it determined that the boy did not assume the risk of injury when electing to play baseball.

On Hillerich’s post-trial motions, the court held that there was “no basis for a reasonable jury to find that the bat had ‘dangerous characteristics.'” Certainly an aluminum bat can create increased bat speed, but does this necessarily mean it is more dangerous than its wooden counterpart?  As Forbes writer Dan Fisher, noted:

[T]he experts who testify about the supposedly dangerous characteristics of aluminum bats are talking about a relative scale. Fewer players would be injured if Little Leaguers used foam-rubber bats, but it doesn’t reasonably follow that manufacturers of wooden bats would then be liable for imparting “increased exit speed” to the ball.

Apparently, the plaintiff also never established that the bat – and not some other extraneous factor (i.e. a good hitter) – was to blame for the injuries.  As the judge noted, a “verdict may not be based on this kind of conjecture.”

The theory behind these Louisville Slugger suits is an interesting one.  Undoubtedly, an expert of some sort can testify as to the increased bat speed created by aluminum bats.  We imagine, however, that even a well-struck ball by a wooden bat could cause facial injuries.  The only way to prevent such injuries is to use baseball equipment manufactured exclusively by NERF.  Unfortunately, sport and injury often go hand-in-hand regardless of the equipment used.

The more intriguing question may be the tremendous discrepancy between the jury awards and the multi-million dollar New Jersey settlement.  While every case and jury is different, damages may not be the issue – the “smallest” verdict involved a child that was killed.  As Ted Frank at the  Point of Law blog notes:

The fact that Oklahoma caps noneconomic damages surely made a difference here: without the threat of jackpot justice, the defendant could defend itself without fear of disproportionate liability.

A factor, to be sure.

The Consumer Product Safety Commission is at it again.  Now, the CPSC has recalled the Bear Grylls Parang Machetes manufactured by Gerber because, get this, the product allegedly is a laceration hazard.  Yes, you read that correctly.  A machete has been recalled for being a laceration hazard.  Sounds ridiculous, sure.  But before we criticize the agency for its over-zealousness, we must admit that the CPSC may – at least this time – have some ground for its decision.

According to the CPSC, the machete has a weakness near the point where the handle meets the blade.  When in use, the machete’s handle or blade can break, posing a laceration hazard.  There have been 24 reports (out of 119,000 units sold) of breakages and one report of a laceration injury.  There have been no reports of injuries necessitating stitches.

Even we here at Abnormal Use can appreciate the risk of a runaway machete blade.  But is there really enough evidence to issue a recall?  With only 24 reports of breakage out of thousands sold, it is difficult to determine whether the product truly is defective. There is no evidence as to how the machetes were being used when they broke, so it is premature to comment on the product’s defectiveness in either design or manufacture.  Nevertheless, we suppose when it comes to sharp objects, an abundance of caution is necessary.  After all, we would hate to see an episode of Man vs. Wild interrupted because Grylls was injured while using the machete to make a lean-to out of an alligator carcass.

On a positive note for Gerber, with only one minor reported injury, this recall may have come early enough to avoid any potential litigation.  In the event litigation comes to fruition, however, we imagine the defense will have no problem coming up with a theme.  And, of course, the puns will run rampant.

[Hat Tip:  Boston Personal Injury News]

[Editor’s note: This Dallas Cowboys lawsuit was of such great interest to us that we decided that both Steve Buckingham and Nick Farr, fine writers of this site, should comment upon it. Accordingly, today, we offer Nick’s views, while tomorrow, we’ll share Steve’s thoughts. We hope you enjoy reading about it as much as we did.]

In 2009, Jerry Jones and the Dallas Cowboys unveiled the billion dollar Cowboys Stadium in Arlington, Texas.  With its plethora of unique and extravagant features, the stadium is the closest thing the National Football League has to a work of art.

Now, it is the subject of a lawsuit.

When we here at Abnormal Use heard that “Jerry’s World” was involved in a civil suit, we just knew it had to be some devastating accident involving the 2,100 inch video screen suspended over 60 yards of the field.  (Seriously, how do they keep that think hanging?)  To our surprise, however, it is not the monstrous video board at the center of the personal injury litigation, but, rather, a bench.  A simple black marble bench.

According to reports, a Texas woman has sued the Dallas Cowboys and Jerry Jones in the Tarrant County District Court after she allegedly sustained third-degree burns on her buttocks after sitting on the marble bench.  The woman, attending a Cowboys scrimmage in August 2010, sat on the bench in 100-plus degree temperatures for an undisclosed amount of time while wearing full-length pants.  She alleges that the combination of the black marble and the hot sun made the bench extremely hot and unreasonably dangerous – a condition about which the Cowboys allegedly failed to warn her.

The words “extremely hot and unreasonably dangerous” immediately conjure up thoughts regarding the infamous hot coffee litigation.  Like freshly brewed coffee, a black object basting in 100 degree temperatures will be hot.  Common sense and logic would suggest that the woman bares at least some responsibility for her injuries.

Unlike hot coffee, however, there may be issues of fact regarding whether the common person should appreciate the risk of sitting on a bench made of marble as opposed to a less heat-absorbent material.  Nevertheless, it seems a bit ridiculous to require a warning that a bench resting in the Texas sun may be hot.  Should they also warn that a bench sitting in the rain may be wet?

Of course, the naysayers will suggest that Jones obviously had the money to purchase a sign or design an external bench out of a non-heat-absorbent material.  But should he have to?  This is a marble bench – clearly not a case of a company skimping on costs by cutting safety measures.

For whatever reason, insurance companies may not have the best reputations. So, it comes as no one surprise that a recent Tumblr post entitled, “My Sister Paid Progressive Insurance to Defend Her Killer in Court,” has gone viral and garnered much attention across the Internet. The piece, penned by comedian Matt Fisher, documents his family’s struggle to recover underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under a Progressive auto policy. Fisher’s sister, Katie, was  killed  in a motor vehicle accident after another driver reportedly ran a red light.    The liability carrier for the other motorist tendered its policy limits shortly after the accident.  Thereafter, the family turned to Progressive for additional UIM benefits.  For reasons not specifically documented in his post, Progressive denied coverage.  In order to pursue those benefits, the family filed suit against the other driver.  Progressive, as the UIM carrier, appeared in the matter and defended the case.  Although the jury ultimately returned a verdict for the Fishers in the matter following a trial last week, Matt Fisher was none too pleased with Progressive’s conduct, leading him to write a series of posts on the issue.

First off, it should be noted that there is not much information in the public record about the specifics of this case, other than Fisher’s original post and a brief reply from Progressive.  Accordingly, it’s challenging to opine about the specifics of this case without access to trial transcripts, court orders, policy documents, or other information that might usually be available in a reported case. But, as we see it, much of the confusion here lies in the very nature of UIM coverage.

Indeed, following Fisher’s post, a firestorm was unleashed against Progressive.  Celebs such as Wil Wheaton and Patton Oswalt took to Twitter, campaigning against the company.  The story has also been well-documented on other sites, including Thought Catalog and Gawker.  Despite this fanfare, however, Progressive appears to be getting a bad rap, primarily because of a great misunderstanding of the sometimes counterintuitive nature of UIM coverage and benefits.

For starters, we do not know exactly why Progressive denied coverage in the first place.  As noted above, we do not have access to many of the relevant documents in this case, including any letters explaining the denial of coverage. But, we imagine it may have had something to do with perceived liability.  In his own post, Fisher, who attended the trial, admits that there may have been some issue with his sister’s comparative fault:

Now, I don’t discount the possibility that Katie was at fault in the accident, but it never really looked that way. The only witness who gave a statement on the day said that Katie had the light, etc. The totality of the evidence left some room for argument, but that will be the case any time there’s a catastrophic car accident that doesn’t happen underneath an array of video cameras.

Further, as Ted Frank of the Point of Law blog notes:

Maryland is one of the few remaining contributory negligence states: if Katie was 1% at fault in the accident, there is no liability to the other driver or Progressive.

In other words, under Maryland law, if Katie played any role – no matter how slight – in contributing to the accident, Maryland state law would not permit her to recover.  Thus, we must consider “the totality of the evidence” and Maryland’s adherence to the contributory negligence doctrine when analyzing Progressive’s initial coverage decision and subsequent actions in defending the case (as was its right to do so).

Second, a simple explanation of the UIM concept may help to clarify the misguided notion that “Progressive defended Katie’s killer.”  In reply to a Progressive statement that  it did not serve as an attorney for the defendant, Fisher outlined the conduct of “Progressive’s legal team” at trial in support of his argument.  In this instance, both Fisher and Progressive are correct – to a degree.  Progressive did employ lawyers – not in-house – to represent its interests in the matter.  While Progressive essentially stepped into the shoes of the defendant at trial, however, it did not serve as his attorney.  The lawyers represented Progressive.  Even though the defendant may have sat in the chair right next to Progressive’s lawyer, there was not an attorney-client relationship.

To the lay person, it may be a strange dynamic when one’s own insurance company technically “defends” the underinsured motorist.  However, here, Progressive had an ostensibly legitimate coverage position, and this was the forum available to the insured in which to litigate it. While we do not know all of the facts in this matter, nor are we aware of  Progressive’s internal decision-making process, UIM cases are very common and sometimes do culminate in a trial where this very dynamic comes into play.

We recognize Fisher’s frustration.  Sitting through a civil trial and fighting with an insurer is the last thing anyone wants to do after the loss of a loved one.  Just as every accident does not necessitate the insurer paying under its policy, every accident with an uninsured/underinsured policy does not necessarily entitle the insured to UM/UIM benefits.  Insurers, including Progressive, should investigate every accident and accordingly make coverage determinations based on liability and damages.

I know you lawyers can, with ease, twist words and meanings as you please.

– John Gay

We here at Abnormal Use imagine the 18th Century wordsmith uttered these words in a derogatory tone, but we can still appreciate his sentiment.  After all, we do pride ourselves in our “interpretations” of laws, contracts, and transcripts.  But, we don’t like to call it “twisting.”  Rather, we are enaging in a “semantic exercise.”

Recently, in Schilf v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 11-2082, 2012 WL 3139233 (8th. Cir. Aug. 3, 2012), the Eighth Circuit put on a fine display of its own expertise in the linguistical arts.

In that case, the Schilfs filed suit against Eli Lilly and Quintiles Transnational, alleging that Lilly’s failure to warn of a link between an anti-depressant and suicide caused the death of their teenage son.  The 16-year old boy visited his family doctor in November 2004 to discuss his depression.  The doctor gave the boy samples of the antidepressant, Cymbalta.  The medication had been removed from the packaging and, thus, lacked any warnings.  When dispensing the samples, the doctor informed the boy that there may be an increased “association” with anti-depressants and suicidal ideations, but “no completed suicides” occurred during the clinic trials.  The boy began taking the drug and committed suicide a few weeks later.  Thereafter, Lilly revised the literate for Cymbalta to include an FDA-approved black box warning.

The district court granted Lilly’s motion for summary judgment, holding (1) that a warning would not have informed the doctor of anything he did not already know and (2) that the doctor would have prescribed the drug even if he knew of the actual risks.  The Eight Circuit disagreed with both points.

Now, here comes the Olympic-esque semantic exercise.  As to the first point, the Eighth Circuit found that a warning could have pointed the doctor to more knowledge of the drug.  According the Court, the doctor was not aware of a “causal link” between Cymbalta and suicide, but, rather, an “association.”  In support, the Eighth Circuit pointed to the doctor’s deposition testimony, in which he stated that was aware of an FDA study finding such an association, but believed the FDA wasn’t “saying the risk was there.”  Under South Dakota law, warnings of side-effect associations are typically not warnings of causal connections.

Contrary to the doctor’s belief, the FDA press release did, in fact, find a causal connection.  The district court found that the doctor “read” this release and, thus, knew of the risks.  The Eighth Circuit pointed out, however, that the doctor only testified that he was “aware” of its existence. Clearly, a distinction.

On the second point, the district court based its finding on some testimony that the doctor still believed his prescription decision was appropriate.  Not so fast!  Being such fine stewards of the English language, the Eighth Circuit examined the testimony a little more closely.  When asked if there was anything he would differently, the doctor actually answered, “Not at the time.  I did – I did exactly what I would have done.”  “Not at the time” being the operative phase.  If he didn’t know of the suicide related information, he clearly wouldn’t have had reason to alter his decision.

If we were judges, we would have to give the Eighth Circuit high technical marks for its linguistic efforts.  However, instead of lecturing the district court on its interpretation of a deposition transcript, we would still would appreciate some more guidance on that whole failure to warn issue.

Evidence of a plaintiff’s use of drug and alcohol is often admissible in a personal injury action.  While prejudicial, the usage of such substances is highly relevant when it contributed to causing the injury of which the plaintiff complains.  Simple enough.  But what happens when there is evidence of drug use in product liability litigation (by a plaintiff, not a manufacturer)? You can seek the support of drug rehab centers to treat patients with drug addiction. But the same cannot be assured when there is evidence of drug use in products. Certainly, a product remains defectively designed or manufactured regardless of the user’s propensity to indulge in body altering substances, right?  Maybe not, says the Western District of Louisiana.

In Graham v. Hamilton, No. 3:11-609, 2012 WL 1898667 (W.D. La. May 23, 2012), the plaintiff’s alleged that the door latch design in a Chevrolet Camaro was unreasonably dangerous because it allowed an unlocked door to open during a motor vehicle accident.  As plaintiffs, the widower of the driver and the guardian of a child passenger, argued that had the door latch not been defectively designed, the driver would not have been ejected, would have survived the accident, and rescued her child before he died when the vehicle caught fire.

But there is one problem – the driver was under the influence of marijuana at the time of the accident.

The plaintiffs moved in limine to exclude the evidence of drug use as unfairly prejudicial.  They argued that the mere mention of marijuana would

[C]reate an over-arching presence in jury deliberations which would cause a miscarriage of justice related to the issues of whether the Camaro was defective . . . .

The Court agreed that the evidence was highly prejudicial; however, the potential prejudice to the plaintiffs did not outweigh the probative value of that evidence.  According to the Court, the driver’s use of marijuana made it more likely that she caused her injuries and less likely that she could quickly remove her child from the vehicle.  As such, this evidence should be left in the jury’s hands.

We here at Abnormal Use don’t intend to engage in a socio-political debate regarding the use of marijuana.  But under the facts of this case, we must applaud the Court’s decision.  While we have no idea whether the design of the door locks was defective, a plaintiff’s own comparative fault must be considered.  The question is not whether product can be defectively designed when the user is high.  Rather, the question is whether a plaintiff should be able to recover when, despite the alleged defect, he had a hand in causing his injuries?

We here at Abnormal Use are a lot of things.  We are not, however, fashion gurus.  Sure, we can appreciate the look of a tailored suit, but you won’t catch us perusing Vogue for the latest fashion trends.  We are lawyers, after all, not Project Runway contestants.  Until fashion crosses paths with the law, we’ll eschew that trade and give it no screen time on this award winning blog.

Alas.  William Peacock of The Chicago Personal Injury Blog has done the unthinkable – discuss the legal ramifications of “skinny jeans.”  Apparently, skinny jeans pose dangers of leg numbness, nerve damage, and . . . twisted testicles.  Ouch!  According to British medical experts:

Twisted testicles occur when tight trousers prevent the spermatic cord from moving freely, meaning it twists and leads to testicular torsion which cuts off the blood supply requiring immediate surgery to prevent a gangrenous testicle.

Again, ouch! Products causing gangrenous testicles? There must be some potential for product liability litigation!?!

While there may be some potential for litigation, we doubt skinny jeans will ever turn into the next mega-class action suit.  As Peacock correctly points out, wearing skinny jeans presents serious issues of comparative fault:

In other words, the idiot in skinny jeans is held somewhat responsible for his own testicular torsion. And if a jury thinks that the wearer is more than 50 percent at fault, the manufacturer is completely off the hook.

Even without the knowledge of scientific research, it is doubtful the reasonable man would expect to confine his nethermost region in such a way without fear of some repercussions.

No one ever said looking beautiful is easy.  For guys, if for some reason that means wearing skinny jeans, then the price just may be gangrenous testicles.

The Consumer Product Safety Commission serves a necessary purpose.  According to its website, the CPSC is charged with the burdensome task of “protecting the public from unreasonable risks of injury or death from thousands of types of consumer products under the agency’s jurisdiction.” (emphasis added) An important job, sure.

In its recent suit against Buckyballs, however, it misses the mark and oversteps its boundaries.

Buckyballs, distributed by New York-based Maxfield & Oberton, are spherically shaped magnets which together can be manipulated to form an infinite number of objects.  Last week, the CPSC initiated an action against Maxfield & Oberton seeking a declaration that Buckyballs constitute a “substantial product hazard” and an injunction prohibiting their distribution.  According to the complaint, the product poses a risk of ingestion and, once swallowed, presents further complications due to its magnetic qualities.  Allegedly, numerous instances of ingestion by children under 14 have occurred.

The CPSC alleges that the Buckyballs’ warning labels are defective as they do not adequately communicate the hazards associated with the small, magnetic spheres.  From March 2009 through March 2010, the product contained a warning on its packaging which stated:

Warning: Not intended for children.  Swallowing of magnets may cause serious injury and require immediate medical care.  Ages 13+.

Well, the warning sure sounds appropriate.  The CPSC wasn’t satisfied, however, noting that such products should not be marketed to children under the age of 14.  In response , Maxfield & Oberton recalled Buckyballs in March 2010 and changed its warnings to reflect the same.

Nonetheless, the CPSC alleges that the warning is ineffective because parents do not appreciate the hazards associated with magnet ingestion and will continue to allow children to have access to the products, “mouth the items, swallow them, or, in the case of young adolescents and teens, mimic body piercings.”  Really?  Even if parents and children/young adolescents are ignorant to the dangers of magnet ingestion, do they really not appreciate the risks of swallowing small metallic objects?  If so, then conceivably any object capable of being swallowed is not suitable for commerce.

To make matters worse, the CPSC alleges that Buckyballs are defectively designed because they do not operate exclusively as intended.  Again, really?  Buckyballs are intended to be used by adults and “shaped, molded, and torn apart.”  Any unintended operations (i.e. swallowing) are not the result of a defective product, but, rather, poor parental supervision or bad choices.

The question is not whether the ingestion of a small, metallic ball creates a substantial risk of harm.  Of course it does.  Rather, the question is whether Maxfield & Oberton has placed an unreasonably dangerous product on the market.  If Buckyballs were prizes in Happy Meals, then this may be a case for CPSC intervention.  These products, however, have been featured in the likes of Maxim, Rolling Stone, and Esquire magazine – not exactly children’s material.

Even so, once purchased, consumers should bear some personal responsibility.  Product manufacturers are not the absolute insurers of public health.  According to a report by USA Today, a 12-year old girl was hospitalized for 6 days upon swallowing Buckyballs after placing them in her mouth to mimic a tongue piercing.  If you are old enough to appreciate the apparent attractiveness of a tongue piercing, so to should you be able to recognize the risk of swallowing metallic objects.

Buckyballs should be treated like any product capable of ingestion.  Parents can and should keep them out of the reach of young children, not use them as refrigerator magnets.  No warning from Maxfield & Oberton or the CPSC should be necessary.  And, certainly, there is no reason to pull them from the market and risk putting a company out of business (Buckyballs and its progeny are Maxfield & Oberton’s only product).

Through its distribution of Buckyballs, Maxfield & Oberton is not putting consumers in danger.  Consumers are putting themselves and their children in danger by poor supervision and a lack of common sense.  It is one thing for the CPSC to not want the product marketed to children.  It is another to call for its extinction.

We have all heard tales of foreign substances found in food products. Hams glazed with syringes, sandwiches with human skin as a condiment, and bread stuffed with dead rats, to name a few. In these situations, you may expect the unfortunate diner would want his day in court. But what happens when the defective food isn’t so glaring and gross? Better yet, what if the injury-causing substance found in the product is natural to the food itself? Recently, in Estate of Pinkham v. Cargill, Inc., 2012 ME 85 (Me. July 3, 2012), the Supreme Court of Maine offered its opinion on the issue – producers of food products are liable for injuries caused by any substance the consumer would not reasonably expect to find in the product.

At issue in Pinkham is a turkey sandwich made in the kitchen of Dysart’s Truck Stop and Restaurant in Maine.  Dysart’s utilized a boneless turkey product manufactured by Cargill, Inc. for its sandwiches.  The kitchen staff occasionally found pieces of bone in the Cargill turkey.  One night, the plaintiff, a line cook at the truck stop, consumed a turkey sandwich during a work break.  Immediately thereafter, he experienced a severe pain in his abdominal area.  Thinking he was having a heart attack , he was rushed to the hospital.  After some diagnostic testing, the plaintiff was found to have an “esophageal tear or perforation.”  Doctors found small, white cartilaginous fragments that appeared to be bone fragments at the site of the injury.  Thereafter, the plaintiff filed suit against Cargill, alleging that the turkey was a “defective or unreasonably dangerous” food.  The court granted Cargill’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that average consumers would reasonably expect to find fragments of bone, a naturally occurring substance, in turkey – even of the boneless variety.

In reaching its decision, the trial court had difficulty determining the proper test to evaluate a strict product liability claim for an allegedly defective food product – an issue undecided in Maine law since the enactment of its strict liability statute in 1973.  Traditionally, Maine utilized the “foreign natural” doctrine, which provides that there is no liability if the substance is natural to the ingredients.  The modern trend applies the “reasonable expectation” test, which provides that a manufacturer is liable for injuries caused by a substance which the consumer would not reasonably expect to find in the product even if that substance is a natural ingredient thereof.  The Court of Appeals held that the “reasonable expectation” test is consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts – from which Maine’s strict liability statute was crafted – and, thus, should be the law of Maine.  Finding that questions on reasonable expectations are to be left to the jury, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Cargill and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

Regardless of the test applied, there has to be some comparative fault in this case.  Even though the product was labeled “boneless,” the truck stop kitchen staff of which the plaintiff was a member had observed bone fragments in the product.  It probably should have been a red flag that this isn’t turkey worthy of a Thanksgiving dinner. On top of that, the turkey was served at a truck stop of all places. Any reasonable court should find as a matter of law that one assumes the risk of truck stop dining – or, at least that is what one would reasonably expect.

Independence Day may have passed, but for millions, the fireworks are still ongoing – in their bathrooms.  And, no, this is not a cheap excuse for potty humor.  The Consumer Product Safety Commission has issued a recall of the Sloan Flushmate III Pressure-Assist Flushing System after receiving over 300 reports of exploding toilets.  According to the CPSC, the flushing system installed in approximately 2.3 million toilets nationwide can burst under increased pressure, shattering the tank.  At least 14 people have reported impact and laceration injuries from pieces of exploding porcelain. Ouch.

The recall comes in light of several news reports over the past year of unexplained toilet explosions.  Last September, two federal employees were injured by shards of porcelain when two toilets exploded in the General Services Administration building in Washington D.C.  In March, students from the University of Chicago reported that toilets were exploding in their dormitory.  It is unknown whether these incidents are related to the Flushmate, but we imagine it may become the scapegoat for government bureaucracy and inhumane freshman living conditions.

While the CPSC did not comment on the relative severity of any such incidents, explosions are not something one typically expects from the inner sanctum of the bathroom abode.  Exploding toilets are supposed to be the product of urban legend and children of the ’90s toting M-80s (See, e.g. Problem Child).  At this time, no details are available as to the cause of the pressure build-up in the Flushmate, but we can not refrain from utilizing a few jokes to help tell the story.

If the reports of injuries are accurate, we here at Abnormal Use expect the Flushmate may be the future target of some product liability litigation.  While not enough facts are known to accurately comment of the validity of any manufacturing defect claims, it is difficult to foresee many inherent defects in the product’s design given the relatively few complaints compared to the millions of products sold over a decade.   And, as for failure to warn? We can only imagine the allegations of the well-drafted complaint:

Manufacturer failed to adequately warn that toilet may become explosive with use.

Obviously, if there are true injuries involved, this should be no laughing matter.  However, there is something about the combination of toilets and explosions that brings out the child in us all.  Now, with news of the recall and the likelihood of potential litigation, the exploding toilet is no longer the stuff of urban legends.