The University of Pennsylvania (aka “Penn”) is home to the world renowned business school named the “Wharton School.”  In fact, the name “Wharton School” is more well-known than “Penn” itself, which is often confused with Penn State.   A lawsuit recently filed by Penn alleges that another company infringed on its trademark through use of the Wharton name.

Penn brought suit in federal court against the California based Wharton Business Foundation for its use of the word “Wharton.” According to its website, the Wharton Business Foundation offers business education and consulting services.  The education component is actually called the Wharton Business Foundation University.  Penn alleges that the Wharton Business Foundation has no legitimate reason to use the name “Wharton” in its brand.  The “Meet Our Team” section of the website doesn’t list anyone with the Wharton name.

The Wharton School bears its name because it was established in 1881 via a donation from Joseph Wharton.  Penn claims it has used the Wharton registered mark since 1881 for business education and since 1953 for business consultation.  The complaint, which is available on PACER, alleges that the Wharton Business Foundation’s name creates “a likelihood of confusion in the marketplace” and “a false impressing in the minds of consumers that WBF is affiliated with, endorsed or sponsored by [Penn], particularly the Wharton School.”

We’ll be keeping our eye on this suit.

On a side note, why don’t law schools have the type of “bling” that business schools have?  Having attended both law school and business school, I suspect it is because most lawyers block out all memories of their learning years.  Business school, on the other hand, is an enjoyable experience.  Also: Most business school graduates actually find jobs in their field, and thus, have money to donate.

Recently, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania brought suit against the NCAA, alleging that the NCAA violated antitrust laws in levying severe sanctions against Penn State’s football program.  Notably, the University is not a party to the suit.  We have seen a few of the media’s “legal experts,” such as Andrew Napolitano (here) and Lester Munson (here), argue that the Commonwealth has no legal standing.  They believe Penn State or its student athletes are the only ones with standing to sue.  So if these brilliant legal minds have spoken, there’s nothing to see here.  Or is there?  Well, upon reading the complaint and doing about ten minutes of legal research, it’s clear that there’s actually a solid basis for the Commonwealth to assert standing to sue.

By way of background, in 2011 Penn State’s president, vice-president, and athletic director were accused of failing to report a 2001 allegation sexual abuse of a minor by a retired assistant football coach.  All three have been criminally charged and are no longer actively employed with the school, but the trials are still pending.   There were no allegations that any student athletes were involved in this matter and the head football coach followed university procedures in passing the allegations to his superiors.  Nevertheless, in July, the NCAA bypassed its normal enforcement procedures and levied massive penalties against the football team, including drastic scholarship reductions, a four year bowl ban, and a $60 million fine.  Some have declared the sanctions to be worse than the “death penalty.” The NCAA did not cite a specific NCAA rule violation as basis for the punishment, but instead simply cited general ethics standards.

Penn State receives state funding but is not considered a “state school,” in spite of its name.  So how exactly does the Commonwealth have grounds to assert standing to challenge these sanctions levied against the Penn State?  It comes from a relatively obscure doctrine called Parens Patriae.  As noted in the first paragraph of the complaint, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania brought this suit Parens Patriae seeking an injunction under Section 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 26).  Under the doctrine of Parens Patriae, a state can bring a legal action to protect its citizens from harm. The Parens Patriae doctrine is indeed applicable in antitrust actions.  An American Law Reports article (23 A.L.R. Fed. 878) on Parens Patriae and Antitrust states:

…. a parens patriae action under § 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 26), which provides for injunctive relief against antitrust violations, can be maintained by a state on the basis of injury to the state’s general economy.

This is what the District Court held in Com. of Pa. v. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., CIV. A. 93-1972, 1993 WL 145264 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 1993) (citing State of Ga. v. Penn R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (U.S. 1945)).

The Commonwealth’s complaint lays out the case for how its economy was injured.  In short, the complaint alleges that the Penn State football program generates hundreds of millions of dollars for the economy in central Pennsylvania.  The complaint further alleges the sanctions levied by the NCAA, which are allegedly in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, will cripple the viability of the football program and will in turn impact the state’s economy through lost travel, hotels, ticket sales, dining, et cetera.

It would seem that the Commonwealth has a pretty strong basis for standing.  It shouldn’t be hard for it to secure expert affidavits to show economic harm in order to get it past a motion to dismiss for lack of standing.  Heck, the NCAA’s President, Dr. Mark Emmert, has essentially admitted that the Penn State football program is a major economic engine whose demise will have far reaching impact.  As noted in the complaint, in discussing why the NCAA imposed sanctions rather than completely shutting down the football program, Dr. Emmert stated:

The collateral damage imposed in this case would have been on people who were essentially innocent bystanders … This case had nothing to do with the marching band or the mom-and-pop hotel in State College or the guy who sells hot dogs, all of whom would have been profoundly affected by a multiyear football ban.

Of course, the sanctions imposed by the NCAA will still have the same collateral economic effects as those discussed by Dr. Emmert, but on a smaller scale.

Notably, the Commonwealth did not request monetary damages.  Courts are generally more relaxed in allowing standing for states in antitrust cases requesting injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act rather than treble damages under § 4.   Under § 4, courts are reluctant to allow standing for a general state economic injury because such indirect damages are difficult to measure.

If the Commonwealth can survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, this case could be very interesting.  Then again, I doubt either party wants to see this make the inside of a courtroom.   I wouldn’t be surprised to see some sort of settlement for reduced sanctions if the Commonwealth can get past motions to dismiss.   Some have already speculated that settlement is the real end game.

For me, golf carts stir up long ago memories. I remember begging my dad to let me be his caddy just so that I could drive the golf cart.  Golf carts, although initially built in the 1930s as a way to transport disabled golfers from shot to shot on the course while able-bodied individuals walked with a caddy, are no longer used only to carry two golfers and their golf clubs.  Today, golf carts are alternative road vehicles, saving people from using their gas-powered SUVs or even their legs to traverse their gated communities, tailgate spots, business complexes, or school campuses.  Like most things in our highly personalized economy, golf carts no longer only come in a one-size-fits-all style; rather, color and the number of rows for seating passengers are among some of the features which may be customized to fit the needs of the purchaser.  As options have increased, so too have injuries and, in turn, the amount of litigation.

According to one study, the number of golf cart injuries increased an astonishing 132% from 1990-2006. Such injuries usually stemmed from passenger ejection or overturned carts.  In one such case, the parties settled soon after  the court granted summary judgment to defendants on some of the Plaintiff’s claims. That case was Lynn v. Yamaha Golf-Car Company. On August 16, 2012, the parties settled for an undisclosed amount following the Western District of Pennsylvania’s order granting partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to Plaintiffs’ post-sale duty to warn and failure to warn claims.  In that case, the thirteen-year-old Plaintiff Lynn was riding as a seated passenger in a Model Year 1999 Yamaha Model G16 golf car.  Plaintiff Lynn’s friend had been operating the G16 for less than one quarter of a mile along a rural and infrequently traveled road at the time of the accident.  The accident occurred when Lynn’s friend made a u-turn, and as she was turning left, Lynn was ejected over the hip restraint of the cart (although the G16 did not tip, rollover, skid, or lose traction).  Lynn sustained serious injuries.

Plaintiffs contended that the G16 was defective in its design as it failed to prevent passenger ejection.  However, Yamaha argued that the G16 was properly was properly designed, properly manufactured, and safe for its intended use because it was never designed, manufactured, or intended to be used as a mode of general transportation.

In addition to finding summary judgment was proper as to Plaintiffs’ warning claims, the Court determined Plaintiffs produced enough evidence to show there was foreseeable risk of ejection when the golf cart was turned sharply at or near maximum speed, particularly when children are passengers, and that there were two reasonable alternative designs available at the time the G16 was constructed.  Finally, the Court was not convinced by Yamaha’s argument that Plaintiffs were using the golf cart for an unintended use.  The Court stated that the intended use of the vehicle could not be limited to cut-turf golf course surfaces.  The Court found, rather, that golf carts are intended to be used to convey persons from one point to another at a relatively low speed and that a jury could reasonably conclude “non-golf-course” uses were entirely foreseeable.

Based on these findings, it appears that at least in the Western District of Pennsylvania, holding onto the original use of a golf cart will not be a winning argument.  However, if the number of injuries keeps increasing as the uses for golf carts are broadened, each case will be factually intensive, and it will be interesting to see how courts treat these claims going forward.

As you can imagine, we here at Abnormal Use are big fans of the United States court system.  We recognize that it’s not perfect, but, on balance, it does a pretty good job protecting the rights of litigants–both plaintiffs and defendants.  We also believe, however, that some lawsuits are just ridiculous.  We are not advocating that some people be denied access to the court system.  What we might want, however, is for lawyers to sometimes take a step back and ask potential clients, “Do you really want to bring this before a judge?”  Below are two lawsuits we found recently that might have benefited from such an inquiry.

The case of the prematurely fading lipstick:

The Wall Street Journal Law Blog recently posted about a new suit seeking class action status against Maybelline, a cosmetics company that sells lip gloss and lipstick lines that it claims will last for 10 hours and 14 hours, respectively.  The plaintiffs allege, as you can imagine, that the lip color does not last nearly as long as advertised by Maybelline and have filed suit in Manhattan federal court. That’s right.  A New York federal court is going to have to decide if Maybelline has violated federal law, as well as consumer protection laws in New York, Michigan and New Jersey, simply because women might have to re-apply lip color more than once every 10 hours.

The case of the beer bottle in the bar-room brawl:

Hat tip:  Overlawyered:

A Texas appeals court has affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit seeking to hold Anheuser-Busch liable for an assault suffered by a bar patron. The suit alleged that the long-neck design of the bottle made it too attractive for assailants seeking a weapon; the court agreed with the brewer that the plaintiff had failed to make out a sufficient case to avoid summary judgment.

I would love to see a total bill for the court fees, lawyer time and expenses, and pro-rated judge, court reporter, and bailiff salaries that were incurred just getting this thing thrown out.  One of the comments on the Overlawyered blog suggested that the plaintiff’s lawyer be sanctioned under Rule 11.  Not sure we’d go that far, but this one definitely doesn’t pass our smell test.

Forum shopping fiasco:

While we’re on the subject of questionable moves in the legal world, I noticed a story in the Wall Street Journal on September 24, 2012 about the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.  Apparently, budget cuts prompted Judge Pamela Dembe to throw wide the doors of Philly’s courthouses for lawsuits–and, in turn, open the court’s wallet for filing fees.

As the story noted, lawsuits–primarily in the asbestos and pharma areas–exploded “from 550 in 2008 to nearly 2,700 last year.”   A new administrative judge, John Herron, is trying to clean up the mess that Judge Dembe’s invitation created for the court system up there.  As Judge Herron commented in the story, “Courts should not be in the business of making money.”  In our opinion, such blatant forum shopping should not be condoned–let alone suggested or supported.

Way, way back in the early 1970′s, there was once a television program called “The Young Lawyers,” which starred Lee J. Cobb, Judy Pace, and Zalman King (who passed away earlier this month at age 69). At some point during the show’s run, Dell Comics published the comic book above dedicated to the program. Its tagline for this issue reads: “When a bomber strikes, who is to blame?” We would suggest that the person to blame is likely the bomber. (Maybe they young lawyers never took Crim Law.).

Max Kennerly of the Litigation & Trial law blog offers this great post entitled “The Real Risks of Writing a Legal Blog.”

As you know, we here at Abnormal Use go to great lengths to chronicle the hot coffee litigation.  Some have accused of us of trying to relitigate a long dead issue (or is it beat a dead horse?).  However, it seems these issues may be more relevant than even we realized.  Just last week, at the local Starbucks drive-thru right here in our own Greenville, South Carolina, we overheard:  ”Give me a Venti Americano, two Splendas, and . . . make it extra hot!  I mean, really hot!” Contributory negligence, perhaps? Assumption of risk?  Or something more sinister? Perhaps this zealous customer was seeking a golden payday.  Stay tuned to Abnormal Use to find out.

Here we go again!  According to this report by Jon Campisi at Legal News Line, “[a] Philadelphia woman who claims she became burned by a hot cup of coffee at local Burger King is suing the fast food giant in state court.”  The incident occurred on Valentine’s Day 2010, two  years ago this week, and the Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he lid had not been properly placed on the cup, causing the hot coffee to spill on [the Plaintiff]” when the fast food employee handed it to her at the drive thru.  We’ll be following this one.

Hey, deponents, don’t call your 88 year old grandmother “The Creeper” at your deposition.  Okay? Thanks.

It was a slow news day at the world headquarters of Abnormal Use. Oh sure, the global economy was in the process of melting down. Washington had just created a super-Congress. And Tiger Woods was making a triumphant, yet underwhelming, return to professional golf. Yawn. But as the bureau chief for Abnormal Use: Vice Squad, I was looking for some fresh, products-based inspiration that toed the thin gray line between entertainment and decency. It’s a dirty job down here in the trenches, but there’s nowhere else I’d rather be. So as I’m sitting at the Vice Squad desk, I happened across a pharmaceutical litigation discussion board. I’d thought I’d stop in, just to see what I could see. Happily, what I saw was my inspiration for this post . . . .

Let’s take a quick poll. Imagine you have a condition that requires you to take medication that may cause certain side-effects. How far down the following list of side-effects would you go before you declined the medication, knowing – obviously – that you can’t pick and choose which side-effects you want?

(1) May cause depression.
(2) May cause compulsory shopping.
(3) May cause compulsory eating.
(4) May cause pathological gambling.
(5) May cause hypersexuality or sexually risky behavior.

Based on this list, some folks may choose to stay away from the meds. Others may look at the list of side-effects and think, all things considered, it’s not so bad. Personally, I can name eight people off the top of my head that have more than half of these side-effects and don’t even take medication. I’ll bet you can too. (Feel free to post their names in the comments.)

The side-effects listed above are alleged to occur in connection with drugs that use “dopamine agonists.” To be honest, I don’t understand what a dopamine agonist is; I don’t know what they do; I certainly don’t know how they work; and frankly, I don’t care to know. If you want to know, the best I can do is give you a link to the Wikipedia page and wish you good luck.

Based on my otherwise extensive research, meds that include dopamine agonists are commonly used to treat Parkinson’s Disease and – of all things – Restless Leg Syndrome. If the critics of dopamine agonists are right, a person could go to the doctor to get treatment for his jimmy legs and walk out with an unhealthy sex addiction, an urge to eat at Golden Corral, and the need to let it all ride on 17 black. This, of course, has prompted litigation.

One plaintiff claims that as a result of dopamine agonists, he developed a shopping compulsion and an eating disorder, went to Vegas without telling his wife, began adulterous relationships, and forged checks from his wife’s account. Other plaintiffs have made similar allegations a la that they began using dopamine agonists, that they began committing adultery, and that they would go gambling for days without telling their spouses where they were. See, e.g., Sweet v. Pfizer, 232 F.R.D. 360 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Again, this sounds exactly like people we already know.

A class action involving dopamine agonists and compulsive behavior was filed in Minnesota in 2006. The first case to be tried out of that litigation resulted in a jury verdict of $8.2 million. Charbonneau v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharma., Inc., C.A. No. 0:06–CV–1215 (D. Minn. 2006) (Note: Since there was no written order regarding the verdict, I’ve included just the case name and docket number, if you want to do more research.  Or you can just take my word for it.). The other cases in the class were settled soon thereafter. Other litigation has sprung up around the country, and in many jurisdictions, is still pending.

As someone who normally practices corporate defense litigation, I began wondering what kinds of affirmative defenses were raised in these cases. I had a feeling they could be entertaining. I was right. I’ve set my favorite affirmative defenses out below:

(5) Proximity to Gambling Outlets. This defense is obviously designed to attack causation: “The drugs didn’t make your no-good father / husband / son / boyfriend gamble; it was the fact he lived next to Caesar’s Palace.” It’s at least plausible.

(4) Personal Susceptibility. “Plaintiff has always been depressed / been overweight / had a gambling problem / been a womanizer.” This seems to tread awfully close to inadmissible propensity evidence, but for an answer to the complaint, that’s a non-issue.

(3) Utility. “The benefits of using dopamine agonists outweigh any negative side-effects that may occur.” This seems like a hard sell when the condition is something like jimmy legs and the consequence is something like bankruptcy, adult-onset diabetes, and a no-expenses paid trip to a sexual rehabilitation clinic where the best you can hope for is sharing a lunch table with David Duchovny.

(2) Bad Gambler. There are no bad gamblers; only bad luck. Motion to strike this defense granted.

(1) Act of God. Act of God? Are you serious?  Isn’t this the same God that condemns avarice, lust, AND gluttony? Is this for real? Yes, this is for real. If you don’t believe me, check out this document: 2006 WL 1829496 (Affirmative Defense No. 5). I would pay to see this defense in action. “And therefore, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, it was not dopamine agonists that caused the plaintiff to have illicit, extramarital sex and to bet on horses; it was God!” Statistically, you’d have 90 percent of Americans ready to punish you for even suggesting that God was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. The other 10% would be ready to commit you for suggesting that a figment of humanity’s imagination was responsible. It’s a losing proposition. But it does remind me of the seminal case, United States ex rel. Mayo v. Satan and His Staff, 54 F.R.D. 282 (W.D. Pa. 1971), which I’ve linked here for your reading pleasure.

I have two last observations. A quick bit of research on Westlaw yielded a number of decisions involving dopamine agonists, none of which came out of Nevada, which of course has legalized gambling and prostitution. How, if at all, this would affect the usefulness of “proximity to temptation” as an affirmative defense, who knows? But I thought it was an interesting bit of trivia.

Finally, in a number of the cases I looked at in preparing for this article, I couldn’t help but notice an interesting trend. Many plaintiffs alleged that as a consequence of using drugs with dopamine agonists, they developed hypersexual compulsions. In those same cases, there would usually be a spouse claiming loss of consortium. Go figure.

Earlier this month, on July 12, the Third Circuit upheld a jury’s verdict in favor of a manufacturer of bicycle helmets, and in doing so, affirmed the lower court’s application of a relatively new interpretation of product liability law.  Covell v. Bell Sports, Inc., No. 10–3860, —F.3d—, 2011 WL 2690396 (3d Cir. July 12,  2011). The case was filed by the parents of a 36-year-old schoolteacher who sustained serious brain injuries when he was hit by a car while bicycling to work in 2007.  The parents, in their capacity as guardians, filed suit against the manufacturer of their son’s helmet, alleging that it was defectively designed and lacked adequate warnings.  At trial, over the plaintiffs’ “strident objections,” the court permitted the helmet manufacturer to introduce expert testimony regarding the Consumer Product Safety Commission’s “Safety Standard for Bicycle Helmets.” In turn, the plaintiffs responded with their own expert regarding the CPSC safety standard.  Both experts testified at trial that the CPSC standard forms the “starting point” for any bicycle helmet design, and both agreed that the helmet at issue satisfied CPSC standards in all respects.  At the conclusion of trial, the court instructed the jury that in determining whether the helmet was defective, it could consider evidence of standards in the industry, including the CPSC standards.

The Third Circuit recognized the “core conflict” that exists within provisions of the “strict liability regime” of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: that courts are to ignore evidence that the seller “exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,” yet imposes liability only for products that are “unreasonably dangerous.”  It is, of course, often impossible for a jury to determine whether a product is “unreasonably dangerous” without referencing evidence that the seller did or did not exercise “care in the preparation” of its product. Ultimately, the court held that federal courts applying Pennsylvania law are to use the Restatement (Third) of Torts to guide both their decisions regarding the admittance of evidence and in their usage of jury instructions.  In this regard, it allows for a more negligence-friendly products liability regime than previously recognized in Pennsylvania, where juries may properly consider industry standards and government regulations.  This is certainly a defense-friendly analysis and decision.  Short of doing away with strict liability laws in their entirety, incorporating more negligence-type concepts into the analysis of manufacturer liability is a positive approach.

Emily Pincow of the Product Liability Monitor blog has additional thoughts on the case here.

Noted Plaintiff’s attorney turned filmmaker Susan Saladoff has created quite a buzz with her documentary, Hot Coffee. The anti-tort reform film, which derives its title from the infamous McDonald’s hot coffee case, premiered at the prestigious Sundance film festival and will air on HBO later this month.  As if Sundance and HBO were not enough, Hot Coffee has even been given its own feature role here on Abnormal Use.  With all of this success, how will Saladoff ever be able to find another frivolous misunderstood case  to use to cash-in document?  Thankfully, we know that Saladoff reads Abnormal Use, and we have discovered the subject-matter for the perfect Hot Coffee sequel. Here’s our free advice.

A Pennsylvania woman has sued Dunkin’ Donuts for personal injuries after drinking a cup of coffee purchased from one of the chain’s Philadelphia locations.  According to the complaint, the woman ordered coffee with artificial sweetener, but the Dunkin’ Donuts employee mistakenly used sugar.  The sugar mix-up allegedly caused the lady to enter into diabetic shock.  As a result, she has had to alter her diabetes medication and has “sustained a loss of enjoyment of life.”

With Hot Coffee, Saladoff formulated the perfect equation for the anti-tort reform documentary:  sympathetic plaintiff + big corporation + morning beverage = success.  This recent action fits perfectly within the criteria.

Sympathetic Plaintiff

The first rule of film-making is that audiences can be hypnotized by conflict faced by marginalized characters.  Instead of an elderly woman as in the McDonald’s case, this case features a medication-dependent diabetic.  Similar to their reaction to children and the elderly, audiences will naturally sympathize with people having pre-existing conditions.  Certainly each of Dunkin’ Donuts employees should have known the medical history of each patron prior to filling an order.  At the very least, they should have been instructed that each customer is a potential egg shell plaintiff and that the substitution of sugar for artificial sweetener could result in the “loss of enjoyment of life.”

Big Corporation

The second rule of film-making is that when given the choice between David and Goliath, audiences choose David.  In Hot Coffee, Saladoff was able to garner greater sympathy for Stella Liebeck by suggesting that McDonald’s flexed its billion-dollar muscles and engaged in a public disinformation campaign to alter the public perception of the lawsuit.  While McDonald’s has not meaningfully commented on the hot coffee case since the 1990′s, Dunkin’ Donuts has already made a public statement.  According to the report, Dunkin’ Donuts’ legal liaison in the Philadelphia-region said:

[W]e encounter thousands and thousands of customers on a daily basis.  We don’t provide a customer with anything they don’t request.  If they request a medium coffee, they will get a medium coffee.  If you fail to request a sugar substitute , we can’t read your mind.  We sell doughnuts, not crystal balls.

It is so much easier to mischaracterize the statements of a corporate representative when he or she has the nerve to suggest the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.  By using this case, Saladoff wouldn’t even have to undertake her own disinformation campaign in response.

Morning Beverage

The final rule of film-making must be the inclusion of a standard morning beverage, preferably one which is consumed without incident every day for years before causing a problem. Unfortunately, after Saladoff’s documentary, hot coffee cases have now run their course.  Those suits now happen all the time because restaurants still haven’t learned that their patrons prefer their coffee to be served cold.  But people have now grown tired of these stories.

Saladoff needs something new, something that will really get an audience fired up.  Since we here at Abnormal Use are unaware of any defective orange juice cases, sweet coffee will have to do the trick.  Like the dangers of hot coffee, it is obviously foreseeable that the substitution of one teaspoon of sugar in a cup of coffee can have dire consequences.  We suggest ignoring any evidence that the plaintiff negligently forgot to request artificial sweetener.  These types of omissions happen all the time in documentary editing.  After all, you can only put so much information in a film before it becomes the next War and Peace.

After a careful review of the recent Dunkin’ Donuts action, we find that with a little exaggeration careful editing, the foundation for a successful documentary has been laid.  Because we here at Abnormal Use have so enjoyed Saladoff’s contributions to our blawg, we would like to return the favor and name her next great documentary – Sweet Coffee:  Why Didn’t I Just Mix It Myself?

Recently, the estates of Pennsylvania couple, Sean and Natalie Wain, filed a product liability lawsuit against Pfizer in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The complaint alleged that the pharmaceutical company’s smoking cessation drug, Chantix, caused Wain to experience psychotic rage, shoot and kill his wife, and commit suicide in May 2009. Allegedly, Wain had been taking the drug for one or two weeks prior to the incident.

This action is only the most recent in a long line of Chantix-related claims. Over 100 lawsuits have been filed against Pfizer alleging that plaintiffs or their decedents committed suicide, suffered severe injury attempting to commit suicide, or exhibited unusual behavior after taking Chantix. Besides the consumption of Chantix, there is only one other apparent similarity among the plaintiffs – they were all deprived of cigarettes.

Being deprived of an addiction is difficult even without the alleged side effects of medication. We here at Abnormal Use know this all too well. No phone messages are checked or emails are read at the office until we get our first taste of coffee in the morning. On those rare occasions when that fresh nectar is not immediately available upon our arrival, we get a little angry. Our indignation only escalates as we await the percolation of our precious drink to relieve us of the perils of our temporary detoxification. While we have never reached the level of “psychotic rage,” we have also never been deprived of coffee for two weeks.

According to a study by the Institute of Safe Medication Practices, Chantix was shown to create violent behavior when users first began taking the drug, often before they had completely stopped smoking. The study also noted that the violent behavior ceased for 93 percent of the participants after they quit taking Chantix.

While this study may appear to be damning for Pfizer, a closer look indicates that it may not be as conclusive as the plaintiffs desire. First, the study was a mere compilation of Chantix adverse event reports submitted to the FDA. By limiting itself to the 78 reports submitted to the FDA and not examining the thousands of other Chantix users, the study lacks the ability to paint a global picture of the drug’s side effects. Second, this was not a controlled research study. The Institute did not gather a representative sample of individuals who wished to quit smoking. They did not study the individuals prior to the consumption of the drug. They did not administer any placebos. This study is far from what one would expect of viable scientific research.Without a controlled environment, the study lacked the ability to factor in third variables. By examining only cases reported to the FDA, at best, the study reveals correlation – not causation. With these limititations, suggesting that it is Chantix, not the process of quitting smoking, which is causing these side effects is premature.

We do not mean to suggest that these plaintiffs did not display violent behavior after taking Chantix. Nor do we suggest that quitting smoking always leads to psychotic rage. Rather, we suggest that we withhold judgment of Pfizer and Chantix before making sure that no other factors are at play. Of course, if making rash conclusions is your addiction, we know how withholding judgment may make you feel.