Ah, what’s a little alcohol without a little insult?  Our friends at Overlawyered recently reported on one brand beer that is changing its name due to today’s politically-correct climate.  “Albino Rhino,” a craft beer brewed by Earls Restaurants in Canada, will change its name after 25 years.  The new name: just “Rhino.” A woman who suffers from albinism had filed an official complaint with the BC Human Rights Tribunal, prompting the brewer to opt for the name change. In response to this news, we here at Abnormal Use started looking at some other beer brands that have resulted in litigation.  To our delight, we found a lot!  Booze, apparently, often prompts suits.

Last year, the Michigan Liquor Control Commission banned Flying Dog’s Raging Bitch beer.  Flying Dog filed a First Amendment lawsuit as reported by Beerpulse.com, which bills itself as the “World’s #1 daily beer news website.”  (Sidebar:  now there’s a website we need to visit more often!  Why has no one told us about this before? Clearly, we have been reading too many legal websites).  Don’t forget about Bad Frog Beer, whose label prompted one state alcohol authority to ban it (as it featured a frog shooting the bird at the drinker).

There are, of course, the trademark infringement suits, which beg mentioning because of some of the words these breweries are trying to protect!  Here’s a story about two companies fighting over the use of the word “idiot!”  The most famous case, of course, involved that little spat between Budweiser and Budvar.  Read about it here, and take our word for it–the American beer is inferior to its Czech counterpart.  No comparison.

Of course, if we were to talk about beer and lawsuits, we can’t go without mentioning Collaboration Not Litigation Ale, brewed by Avery Brewery Company.  I can think of mediation or two that might have fared better with a little beer, and some that actually have.

If you’re just looking for offensive beer names, there’s a website for that.  Check out this page, which has a link to more names on this page, too.  WARNING:  Some of them are actually pretty awful, and probably warrant a Rated X label.  You’ve been warned!

From time to time, we here at Abnormal Use chance across quirky products (or quirky warnings) and offer our comments.  Well, we’ve seen some doozies, but this one may take the cake. The Retroist found a 1972 advertisement a Flame Gun!  Yes, you read that right.  The full post can be found here, but we simply can’t resist providing the actual image of the flame gun itself:

Now this thing looks useful!  After all, it’s “the gun of 1000-and-1 uses!”  Perfect for, um, well, I guess when your gas stove won’t light, this could do the trick! Apparently, it’s so easy to use that “Even your wife can use it.”  Wasn’t 1972 a little late for those kinds of statements? Actually, the helpful ad suggests a few other uses, including destroying insects, anthills, and old wasp nests from a “safe distance.”  But the real kicker, in our opinion, is that this unit is advertised as being of use BOTH indoors and outdoors.  Are we the only ones who think this is a BAD IDEA? The copyright on the bottom of the helpful ad shows that the project is registered to Bevis Industries, which apparently no longer exists.  We can’t imagine why!

As we have discussed in prior posts, warnings involving medical devices and/or prescription drugs are issued not to the end user patient, but to the doctor prescribing or using the device.  This does not, however, release the drug or device manufacturer from the duty to adequately warn of the dangers of using the device or product.  In fact, it simply complicates the issue of what an adequate warning looks like. Take the recent case of Horrillo v. Cook Inc., 10-15327, 2012 WL 6553611 (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2012) [PDF].  This case involved a stent manufactured by the defendant and approved by the FDA for use in bile ducts.  Dr. Michael Rush, however, used it during his angioplasty surgery on Margaret Horillo, not in a bile duct, but in her renal artery.

Within 24 hours of the procedure, Ms. Horillo suffered a serious stroke.

The warnings included by the manufacturer read as follows:

First, it stated that the device was “intended for use in palliation of malignant neoplasms in the biliary tree,” which is to say, treatment for cancer in the bile ducts. Second, under a heading entitled, “WARNINGS,” the instructions for use cautioned that “[t]he safety and effectiveness of this device for use in the vascular system have not been established.”

Deposition testimony in the case, however, revealed that stents such as this one were regularly used “off label” in the vascular system.  In fact, Dr. Rush had used this particular stent in the past in renal arteries.  The off-label use was so widespread, in fact, that the FDA called Cook and several other such manufacturers together about the issue before this surgery was performed.  As a result of that meeting, Cook sent a letter to the hospital where Dr. Rush did the surgery warning of the risk of stroke.

We’ve been blogging pretty regularly about the cases coming out of the case of Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).  The cases have presented interesting class action issues, as well as novel statutes of limitations issues.  On December 14, 2012, the second district court of appeal of Florida rendered its decision in Smith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 2D11-2562, 2012 WL 6216756 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2012), another case which provided Florida the opportunity to navigate “the interplay of the Florida Wrongful Death Act and the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.” Some background first.  Della Mae Butler was a plaintiff in a personal injury action against several tobacco companies; as the court notes in its decision, she was pursuing a so-called “Engle claim.”  After she died, the personal representative moved to amend the complaint to substitute himself as the plaintiff and to add a wrongful death claim.  The circuit court denied the motion and dismissed  the complaint. Here was the issue:

Under the Wrongful Death Act, “[w]hen a personal injury to the decedent results in death, no action for the personal injury shall survive, and any such action pending at the time of death shall abate.” § 768.20, Fla. Stat. (2008). The relevant Florida Rule of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]f a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.260(a)(1). Here, by denying the motion to substitute the personal representative for the deceased plaintiff, the circuit court essentially ruled that abate in the Wrongful Death Act equates with extinguish in the civil procedure rules.

Which, apparently, ignored the “remedial nature” of Florida’s Wrongful Death Act, as well as the “liberal spirit” of the civil procedure rules.  The court held that “stay” is a more appropriate synonym to “abate” as used in the Wrongful Death Act, thus allowing for a party to be substituted in the event of a death.  This interpretation, the court reasoned, is more in line with the rules of civil procedure, which specify that leave to amend “shall be given freely.” The interesting thing about this opinion is that, in the actual body of the opinion, the court actually acknowledges that it conflicts with a prior decision, and certified the conflict.  We will continue to watch this interesting line of cases.

Juries are fickle.  There is just no getting around it.  Ask any seasoned trial attorney, and he or she can probably tell you about the jury that “got it all wrong” – not simply, perhaps, because they ruled against the lawyer’s client, but because their award or decision defied all logic. That was the issue that confronted Florida’s third district court of appeals in the case Tricam Ind  ustries, Inc., et al v. Coba, 100 So.3d 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012), reh’g denied (Nov. 19, 2012) [PDF].  The case centered around a ladder manufactured by Tricam Industries and sold by Home Depot.  The decedent, a civil engineer, died 10 days after falling from the ladder from injuries sustained in that fall.  The plaintiff alleged strict liability and negligence against both defendants in several particulars, including manufacturing and design defects.  At trial, the evidence focused only on the design of the ladder, however.   Specifically, the plaintiff’s expert opined that the design of the ladder was such that it could give the impression of being in the locked position when, in fact, it was not.    The defendant’s expert, predictably, opined that the ladder could not “false lock.”

Prior to closing arguments, the plaintiffs withdrew the manufacturing defect claims.  In addition, the court limited the jury instructions to design defects in both the  strict liability and negligence theories.  The jury, however, returned a verdict finding that there were no design defects, but that the negligence of the defendants was a legal cause of the decedent’s death, and awarded more than $1.5 million to the plaintiff. After trial, the defendants argued that the verdict should be set aside because the finding of no design defects was fundamentally inconsistent with its finding of negligence.  The plaintiff also moved for a new trial based on some issues with one of the jurors not pertinent to a products liability discussion.  The trial court denied both motions.

The appellate court considering the defendants’ motion reversed the trial court’s decision.  First, however, it noted that a reversal on such grounds is no small task, given the fact that the defendants had failed to object to the verdict at the time it was rendered:

The plaintiff concedes that the verdict in this case was inconsistent, but argues that the defendants waived their objection to the inconsistency by failing to object before the jury was discharged. Normally, we would agree. The Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal, however, have carved out an exception to this general rule where the inconsistency “is of a fundamental nature.” Because we agree with the well-reasoned opinions of our sister courts to the north, and because there is no case in this district which has held to the contrary, we adopt the “fundamental nature” exception as applied in this context.

In November of 2012, we blogged about the Castleman case, the most recent Engle decision in Florida, where the court found itself in the strange position of hearing the plaintiff argue for an earlier manifestation date in his smoking/lung injury case.  Usually, the plaintiff is arguing for a later date to prove that he hasn’t blown the statute of limitations.  But, as we discussed in that post, the earlier manifestation date would have allowed the plaintiff to gain class member status, affording him the benefits of certain preclusive findings in his own case.

Well, Engle issues also arose in the October 2012 decision of Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Barbanell, 100 So. 3d 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) [PDF].  This case involved, predictably, the death of the plaintiff’s decedent as a result of smoking Philip Morris-manufactured cigarettes.

The other issue before the court in Barnabell, as in Castleman, was the statute of limitations.  Philip Morris argued that the court erred by not granting the company’s motion for summary judgment on the issue.  This appeals court affirmed the trial court’s decision and declined to grant Philip Morris judgment as a matter of law.

Specifically, the issue was whether the statute of limitations began to run when the decedent started to experience lung-related conditions including shortness of breath, “hard breathing,” and other breathing-related difficulties, or whether the clock didn’t start until the decedent was specifically informed by her doctor that she suffered from smoking-related emphysema and, later, lung cancer.

The court held that the latter diagnoses should be the measure by which the statute of limitations was calculated:

In this case, the trial court directed a verdict on PM’s affirmative defense that the statute of limitations barred Barbanell’s claim of wrongful death from lung cancer, and the jury made the finding that Shirley Barbanell did not know or have reason to know that she had COPD prior to May 5, 1990. Therefore, the unspecified injury that the jury determined that Mrs. Barbanell was aware of prior to May 5, 1990, was not COPD nor was it the lung cancer. We therefore affirm the trial court in all respects as to the direct appeal and cross-appeal. 

This picture was forwarded to me by a friend after he purchased a remote control helicopter.  Maybe Santa brought you one of these in your stocking as well.  In case you can’t see the warning printed on the blade, it reads as follows:

WARNING.  If blade damage, don’t be fly.  otherwise it will create the human body or blame damage.

Clearly, this warning label has some problems, but we thought that it would be a great time to review warnings standards, and discuss specifically what the drafter could have done better (at least under South Carolina law). First, when is a warning required in the first place?  Basically, if it is foreseeable that users might need to be warned about the precise risk involved with using a product, it will be required.  See, e.g. Madden v. Cox, 284 S.C. 574, 328 S.E.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1995).   Warnings are not required when the danger is open and obvious to the user.  Moore v. Barony House Rest., LLC, 382 S.C. 35, 41, 674 S.E.2d 500, 504 (Ct. App. 2009).  The issue of foreseeability has been the subject of litigation as well–how broadly should a manufacturer foresee that the product will be used, either appropriately (intended use) or inappropriately (non-intended use)?  One case provides a good guide:

In the summer of last year, we blogged about the Center for America’s Wacky Warning Labels Contest – a contest which, in the words of the Center’s own words, “reveal[s] the excesses of civil liberty.”  These are labels that assume mankind has no common sense.

Well, 2012 was no different for the Center for America. Once again, its loyal devotees submitted warning labels for the contest, and the “wackiest” have now been chosen.  Here is the winner of the 2012 contest:

Well, I suppose I must remove my globe from my car’s dashboard!  A complete list of the Wacky Warning Labels contest is here.

In other navigation news, several news outlets have reported that Australian police are warning users of Apple Maps, a feature of the newest iPhone, that following its directions can be life-threatening.  Really?  Yes.  Apparently, people using the feature to find Midura, Australia are directed not to the small town, but 40 miles away to a remote part of Murray-Sunset National Park in the Australian Outback.  This is no small sort of error.   Temperatures can reach more than 100 degrees, and there is no water source in the park.  Several travelers were rescued by the police.  On the bright side, it appears that the iPhone gets great cell service in the Outback.

Perhaps while Apple is scrambling to fix its widely criticized maps application, we can come up with an adequate warning to help in the case of an unanticipated detour:  “Warning:  Use of This Maps Application Can Be Life Threatening.” “Objects on Map are Further Than They Appear.”  “Make Sure to Carry Plenty of Food and Water When Using Navigation System.” “Beware of Crocodiles.”

Maybe we’ll see some of those in next year’s contest.

On June 10, 2005, a four-month-old child, identified only as “A.H.” was injured when the car in which he was riding was T-boned by another vehicle.  A.H. was riding in an Evenflo Discovery Model 316 car seat at the time.  During the accident, the seat detached from its base,and was found in the rear cargo compartment after the crash. Following the accident, A.H.’s father sued Evenflo in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.  Evenflo filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclude evidence of car seat models not involved in the accident.  The Court issued its opinion on October 31, 2012. See Hadjih v. Evenflo Company, Inc., No. 10-cv-024345-RBJ-KMT, 2012 WL 5363332 (D. Col. Oct. 31, 2012).

The major issue: the plaintiff’s desire to introduce evidence of testing by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration on the Evenflo 390/391, the model that succeeded the 316.  During testing, the 390/391 detached from its base during side-impact crashes.  No testing had been done on the 316, because it was designed and manufactured before testing by the NHTSA started. Evenflo sought to exclude evidence of the 390/391 generally, and specifically, with regard to the testing.  In both instances, the Court undertook a “substantially similar” analysis.  As the Court noted, “in products liability actions, substantially similar acts or occurrences are often permitted to demonstrate the existence of a defect, to prove notice, or to refute testimony given by defense witnesses.”  A higher degree of similarily is required if the plaintiff is using the other product to show causation than if the plaintiff is simply using the product to show notice.  In this case, the plaintiff was using the 390/391 model to prove the defect, so a higher degree of similarity was required.

The Court held that both general evidence of the 390/391 model, and evidence of the testing involving the 390/391 model, could be used by the plaintiff, and denied Evenflo’s motion in limine.  In both cases, the focus of the court remained squarely on the plaintiff’s theory of the case. The plaintiff’s theory of the defect in the 316 model was that the plastic latching mechanism did not work properly.  Evidence in the case tended to show that the two carseat models had nearly identical latching mechanisms; in fact, the carseats could each latch into the bases designed for either model.  Other differences between the models, the court ruled, would go to the weight of the evidence, but not its admissibility.

In terms of the specific testing by the NHTSA, Evenflo argued that the testing itself involved crashes that were substantially dissimilar to the accident at issue in the case and, therefore, the testing results should be excluded.  Again, the court focused on the plaintiff’s theory, which was that the car seat carrier dislodged from its base because of intertial forces.  The court held that the difference in delta-v forces, the weight of the child/dummy, and other differences went to the weight that the jury will give to the evidence, and let the evidence in.

We will watch to see if this case continues to trial and try to determine what impact these rulings have on the judgment, if any, rendered in the case.  This is a good refresher on the “substantially similar” test, at least in terms of how Colorado interprets it.

On August 17, 2012, the Florida District Court of Appeal issued its decision in Castleman v. R.J. Reynolds Tobaco Co., 97 So.3d 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) [PDF].  The case represents another decision arising out of the Engle class action against the tobacco company, jurisprudence which Abnormal Use has been following for some time now.  Prior posts on the subject can be found here. As a reminder, the Engle class is comprised of Florida citizens and residents, and their survivors, “who have suffered, presently suffer, or who have died from diseases and medical conditions caused by their addiction to cigarettes that contain nicotine.”  Those who fall into that class enjoy, inter alia, an extended limitations period for filing suit and res judicata on several findings of fact.

Two other dates are extremely important for those seeking membership in the class.  First, the class member(s) have to show that their tobacco-related disease or condition first manifested itself before the trial court’s order certifying the class, which was filed on November 21, 1996.  Second, suit must have been filed before January 11, 2008.

And now to the facts of this case.  Lewis Castleman started smoking cigarettes at the age of 19 in 1953.  He continued to smoke for 30 years but quit in 1983.  It was not until the early 1990’s that he began experiencing shortness of breath and chest pain, and it was not until 1998, when he underwent heart bypass surgery, that his doctors linked the symptoms to his smoking history.

Mr. Castleman and his wife sought membership in the Engle class, but the trial court denied them membership.  The appeals court affirmed summary judgment for R.J. Reynolds in this case, holding that because Mr. Castleman did not attribute his symptoms to his smoking history until 1998, he did not meet the class definition as of November 21, 1996 because the disease or condition had not “manifested” by the applicable date.

The appeals court relied on another case, Frazier v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. [PDF], in which the Third District Court of Appeal considered the definition of “manifestation” and held that symptoms such as shortness of breath and persistent coughing did not constitute a sufficient legal basis for intiating a lawsuit against a tobacco company – there must be something more that causes the individual to attribute the symptoms to tobacco use.  Because Mr. Castleman did not make that connection until 1998, the court reasoned in this case that the condition did not “manifest” itself before the date of the court’s order.

It strikes me that the courts in these cases are defining “manifestation” in a way that is 180 degrees from the way it is interpreted in many other cases.  It is strange to have a plaintiff arguing for an earlier manifestation date; usually, under traditional discovery rule interpretation, it is the defendants arguing that the plaintiff “should have known” that his disease was caused by the product at issue at an earlier date than the plaintiff cares to acknowledge.  In these cases, however, to have a chance at class membership, the plaintiffs are actually arguing for the earlier date, so that they can get the benfit of the Engle class provisions.  We will continue to monitor – and report on – this very interesting class as it develops.