Tech Giants’ Anti-Poaching Settlement Rejected In California Federal Case

“Not in my house!”  That is essentially what U.S. District Judge Lucy Koh recently said in rejecting a proposed settlement agreement in a federal case pending in California between several Silicon Valley tech giants and a class of tech employees who claimed that the companies conspired to suppress their wages.  As we here at Abnormal Use previously reported in April, the companies (including Apple, Intel, and Google) and the tech workers agreed to settle their dispute for approximately $325 million.  According to Judge Koh, that settlement amount “falls below the range of reasonableness.” Once the plaintiffs’  lawyers take their slice of the pie, the settlement would have provided the class members just over $3,500.  In reaching the conclusion that such an amount was unreasonable, Judge Koh noted that other class members settled the same claims last year against Pixar and Lucasfilm Ltd. more money per plaintiff, despite the fact these current plaintiffs had newly discovered evidence that made their claims even stronger.  The order also notes that to reach the same level as the previously settling class members, the current class members would need to receive $380 million. Check out the order’s conclusion:

This Court has lived with this case for nearly three years, and during that time, the Court has reviewed a significant number of documents in adjudicating not only the substantive motions, but also the voluminous sealing requests. Having done so, the Court cannot conclude that the instant settlement falls within the range of reasonableness. As this Court stated in its summary judgment order, there is ample evidence of an overarching conspiracy between the seven Defendants, including the similarities in the various agreements, the small number of intertwining high-level executives who entered into and enforced the agreements, Defendants’ knowledge about the other agreements, the sharing and benchmarking of confidential compensation information among Defendants and even between firms that did not have bilateral anti-solicitation agreements, along with Defendants’ expansion and attempted expansion of the anti-solicitation agreements. Moreover, as discussed above and in this Court’s class certification order, the evidence of Defendants’ rigid wage structures and internal equity concerns, along with statements from Defendants’ own executives, are likely to prove compelling in establishing the impact of the anti-solicitation agreements: a Class-wide depression of wages.

In light of this evidence, the Court is troubled by the fact that the instant settlement with Remaining Defendants is proportionally lower than the settlements with the Settled Defendants. This concern is magnified by the fact that the case evolved in Plaintiffs’ favor since those settlements. At the time those settlements were reached, Defendants still could have defeated class certification before this Court, Defendants still could have successfully sought appellate review and reversal of any class certification, Defendants still could have prevailed on summary judgment, or Defendants still could have succeeded in their attempt to exclude Plaintiffs’ principal expert. In contrast, the instant settlement was reached a mere month before trial was set to commence and after these opportunities for Defendants had evaporated. While the unpredictable nature of trial would have undoubtedly posed challenges for Plaintiffs, the exposure for Defendants was even more substantial, both in terms of the potential of more than $9 billion in damages and in terms of other collateral consequences, including the spotlight that would have been placed on the evidence discussed in this Order and other evidence and testimony that would have been brought to light. The procedural history and proximity to trial should have increased, not decreased, Plaintiffs’ leverage from the time the settlements with the Settled Defendants were reached a year ago.

The Court acknowledges that Class counsel have been zealous advocates for the Class and have funded this litigation themselves against extraordinarily well-resourced adversaries. Moreover, there very well may be weaknesses and challenges in Plaintiffs’ case that counsel cannot reveal to this Court. Nonetheless, the Court concludes that the Remaining Defendants should, at a minimum, pay their fair share as compared to the Settled Defendants, who resolved their case with Plaintiffs at a stage of the litigation where Defendants had much more leverage over Plaintiffs.

(Quotations and citations omitted).

This ruling is not at all surprising.  As we noted in our initial coverage, given the number of employees involved the settlement amounts to peanuts compared what the alleged conspiracy likely cost the workers.  We’re going to go out on a limb and guess that the class members and the defendants reach new deal for exactly $380 million. The order in question is In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation, No.: 11-CV-02509-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014).

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